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Ein vielgereister Sophist frägt Sokrates:  
‘Stehst Du immer noch da und sagst  
immer dasselbe? Du machst Dir die Sache  
aber leicht‘. Sokrates antwortet:  
‘Nein, ihr Sophisten macht es euch leicht,  
denn ihr sagt immer das Neueste und  
Allerneueste und immer etwas anderes.  
Das schwere aber ist, das Selbe zu sagen  
und das allerschwerste: vom Selben  
das Selbe zu sagen‘. 
— Martin Heidegger
Wie schwer fällt mir zu sehen,  
was vor meinen Augen liegt !
— Ludwig Wittgenstein 
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Abstract
Parenting support revisited: retrieving an ethics of hermeneutics. A 
philosophical investigation inspired by the viewpoints of Heidegger, 
Wittgenstein and Taylor.
Dissertation to obtain the degree of Doctor in Educational Sciences, 
February 2017, Laboratory for Education and Society.
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Stefan Ramaekers
Co-supervisor: Prof. Dr. Judith Suissa
This dissertation aims at gaining insight in our late modern moral 
backgrounds by considering the case of ‘parenting support’. The 
method it uses is a hermeneutical one, drawing on Polt’s idea that 
interpretation is a continuous attempt to gain a deeper insight in 
something, by revising and elaborating existing interpretations. Start-
ing from everyday lived experiences these investigations try to narrow 
the hermeneutical circle by going back-and-forth between the abstract 
thinking of philosophy on the one hand and everyday experiences on 
the other. Four methodical ‘conjectures’ concerning our late modern 
Western world serve as signposts: (1) that parents are a priori sup-
posed to be in need of support, though it remains unclear what kind 
of support they need and what this implies for the way support is 
offered; (2) that parents are infantilized and instrumentalized; (3) that 
parenting support in a standard way makes use of scientific results 
and even more so of scientific terminology and frameworks; (4) that 
notwithstanding this, it is still possible to develop alternative ways of 
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supporting parents that take parents seriously as the full-blown moral 
and political beings they are. More in general the assumption is that 
the first three issues are symptomatic of what Taylor has called a dis­
engaged stance in our culture: the idea that sense giving backgrounds 
are necessary to be able to make sense of the world is forgotten and 
replaced by the idea that understanding boils down to an objective 
and thus ideally contextless causal explanation of phenomena. It may 
seem that this dissertation begs the question, i.e. assumes what needs 
to be proven, by drawing on philosophers who in line with Kant’s 
transcendental deduction show that phenomena as ‘knowing’ and 
‘being able to’ imply certain contexts as necessary conditions: Hei-
degger, Wittgenstein and Taylor. The purpose is however to gain a 
deeper insight, not to prove that they are right in believing so. These 
philosophers give us terminologies and ways of thinking that help to 
take a critical distance from what is so nearby, that we can hardly 
grasp it. Conceptual distinctions help us to see that parents can be 
construed as ‘victims’ of evolutions in their societies that are taken as 
external and causal, or, as actors who are connected with their society, 
and feel responsible for what happens in it. Science-based parenting 
support seems to be less informing parents then initiating them in cer-
tain frameworks and to reduce them to means to an end without 
allowing them the status of adulthood in a moral and political sense. 
Above all, parenting support seems to be more supportive of parent-
ing processes than of parents with all their questions. This entails that 
parents are construed as ‘figures of disengagement’ who are in princi-
ple capable of dealing with their children and the domain of child 
rearing from a disengaged scientific manner. Parenting support stands 
clearly in need of revision, as well as the role and the self-understand-
ing of the figure that gives the support: it can become a figure of 
engagement in the strong sense that applies an ethics of hermeneutics. 
More in general the conclusion will be that an ethics of hermeneutics 
is to be preferred over an ethics of causality if the aim is to support 
parents qua parents. 
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Samenvatting
‘Parenting support’ herbekeken: het terugwinnen van een ethiek van 
de hermeneutiek. Een filosofisch onderzoek geïnspireerd door de gezichts­
punten van Heidegger, Wittgenstein en Taylor. 
De opzet van dit proefschrift is om inzicht te verwerven in onze heden-
daagse laatmoderne morele achtergronden door na te denken over de 
casus ‘parenting support’ (een niet echt in het Nederlands te vertalen 
begrip). De methode is hermeneutisch en maakt gebruik van Polts idee 
dat interpretatie een voortdurend pogen is om tot een dieper begrijpen 
van iets te komen, door bestaande interpretaties te herzien en verder 
uit te werken. Beginnend bij alledaagse ‘geleefde’ ervaringen trachten 
deze onderzoekingen de hermeneutische cirkel kleiner te maken door 
een heen-en-weer gaan tussen het abstracte denken van de filosofie 
enerzijds en de alledaagse ervaring anderzijds. Vier methodische ‘ver-
moedens’ over onze laatmoderne Westerse wereld doen daarbij dienst 
als wegwijzer: (1) dat ouders a priori geacht worden steun nodig te 
hebben, waarbij nog niet helder is welke steun precies en wat dat 
impliceert voor de geboden steun; (2) dat ouders worden geïnfantili-
seerd en geïnstrumentaliseerd; (3) dat parenting support standaard 
gebruik maakt van resultaten en vooral de terminologie of denkkaders 
van (harde) wetenschappen; en (4) dat het desondanks mogelijk is om 
alternatieven te bedenken voor parenting support en dus om ouders te 
steunen, die ouders niet infantiliseren en instrumentaliseren door hen 
wel au sérieux te nemen als de volwaardig morele en politieke actoren 
die ze zijn. Meer algemeen is de aanname dat de eerste drie kwesties 
symptomatisch zijn voor wat Taylor een ‘onthecht standpunt’ genoemd 
heeft: de idee dat zingevende contexten nodig zijn om zin te geven aan 
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de dingen raakt ondergesneeuwd en wordt vervangen door de idee dat 
begrijpen neerkomt op een objectief en dus idealiter contextloos, cau-
saal verklaren van fenomenen. Nu lijkt het er misschien op dat dit 
proefschrift al aanneemt wat bewezen dient te worden (question beg­
ging) door precies filosofen aan het woord te laten die in navolging 
van Kants transcendentale deductie aantonen dat fenomenen als ken-
nen en kunnen niet zonder contexten mogelijk zijn, met name Heideg-
ger, Wittgenstein en Taylor. Het doel is echter om tot verheldering en 
dieper begrip te komen, niet om te bewijzen dat zij het bij het rechte 
eind hebben. Deze filosofen reiken een terminologie en een wijze van 
denken aan die helpen om afstand te nemen van wat zo nabij is, dat 
die nabijheid ons het zicht erop ontneemt. Conceptuele onderscheidin-
gen helpen om te zien dat ouders kunnen opgevat worden als ‘slacht-
offers’ van evoluties in de samenleving die als extern en causaal wor-
den opgevat, maar ook als ‘actoren’ die wezenlijk verbondenheid met, 
en verantwoordelijkheid voor hun samenleving ervaren. Op weten-
schappelijke leest geschoeide ‘parenting support’ lijkt niet zozeer 
ouders te informeren dan wel hen in te leiden binnen bepaalde denk-
kaders en hen in dezelfde beweging te herleiden tot middelen of instru-
menten zonder hen het statuut van volwassenen te gunnen in een 
morele en politieke zin van het woord. Bovenal, lijkt ‘parenting sup-
port’ er eerder op uit te zijn om ‘parenting’ te ondersteunen dan ouders 
(parents) met al hun vragen. Dit houdt in dat ouders opgevat worden als 
‘figuren van onthechting’ die in de mogelijkheid verkeren om hun kin-
deren en het ganse domein van opvoeden te benaderen vanuit een ont-
hechte of wetenschappelijke manier. Het lijkt dus de moeite waard om 
het hele ‘parenting support’ gebeuren te herzien. Dit komt neer op een 
herbekijken van de rol en het zelfverstaan van degene die ouders steunt: 
zij wordt een figuur van betrokkenheid in een sterke zin van het woord 
die zich laat leiden door een ethiek van het hermeneutische. Meer alge-
meen zal de conclusie zijn dat een ethiek van het hermeneutische te 
verkiezen valt boven een ethiek van causaliteit als men ouders werkelijk 
wil steunen als ouders. 
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Dankwoord
Heidegger schrijft in Zijn en Tijd dat het erzijn zich ervoor behoedt 
om ‘te oud te zijn voor zijn overwinningen’ [264]. Dat is mij alvast niet 
gelukt. Desalniettemin ben ik zeer dankbaar dat ik de kans heb gekre-
gen om dit doctoraatsonderzoek niet alleen aan te vatten, maar ook 
tot een goed einde te brengen. 
Toen ik in het najaar van 2007 mijn filosofiestudie had afgerond 
beslisten we bij een etentje in Brussel dat ik bij Patricia De Martelaere 
zou promoveren als filosoof. Het lot beschikte daar anders over. 
Gelukkig had zij mij jaren voordien al in contact gebracht met een 
toenmalige doctoraatsstudent, die promoveerde bij Paul Smeyers als 
wijsgerig pedagoog. 
Ik zocht Stefan Ramaekers opnieuw op in juni 2009 om een artikel dat 
ik had geschreven over Wittgenstein met hem te bespreken. Hij was 
toen pasbenoemd in Leuven. Enthousiast en genadeloos bekritiseerde 
hij mijn tekst. Ik vroeg hem, onder de indruk van zijn scherpe analyti-
sche geest en zijn warme persoonlijkheid, en passant of ik bij hem kon 
promoveren. Tot mijn verbazing zei hij ‘ja’. Het was het begin van een 
ondertussen jarenlange fijne samenwerking. 
Stefan was altijd bereid om vroege versies van teksten te lezen, en hij 
slaagde erin om mij mijn schaamte te doen overwinnen om wat in 
mijn ogen vaak nonsens leek toch met hem en nadien met anderen te 
delen. Onze inhoudelijke discussies haalden mij telkens weer construc-
tief onderuit en leverden veel betere teksten op dan ik ooit in mijn 
eentje had kunnen schrijven. 
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belanden en dan kon ik bij Stefan steeds weer terecht voor wat ik met 
een ouderwets begrip ‘morele ondersteuning’ wil noemen. Ik plaagde de 
pedagoog in hem meermaals met het compliment dat aan hem een 
‘goede’ psycholoog verloren was gegaan. Hoewel we beiden soms onder 
hoge tijdsdruk stonden bleef onze verstandhouding altijd amicaal. Ste-
fans bijdrage aan dit proefschrift is in meerdere opzichten onmetelijk. 
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Doktorvater stond nu een Doktormutter. Judith heeft alle onderdelen 
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versies van de verschillende hoofdstukken en meer nog voor hun steeds 
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een bijzondere doctoraatsbeurs toe te kennen en mij zo de kans te geven 
om een jaar uitsluitend met mijn onderzoek bezig te zijn. Het is een van 
de mooiste jaren van mijn leven geworden, en ik heb in dat jaar onge-
veer evenveel gerealiseerd als gedurende alle voorgaande. 
Na de publicatie van mijn eerste hoofdstuk, drong het langzaam tot 
mij door dat mijn oude leraar Annie Mattheeuws steeds met me mee 
aan het schrijven was. Annies denken maakt een dermate vanzelfspre-
kend onderdeel uit van mijn zingevende en morele achtergronden, dat 
ik dat altijd weer erg laat in de gaten krijg. 
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schoolpoort en naast het voetbalveld. Ik vermeld in het bijzonder Phi-
lippe Noens, Ellen Reijmers, Dany Baert, Frank Luttens, Philippe De 
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Introduction 
L et me start with some preliminary terminological remarks. When looking at the terms used in the world of parenting and parent-
ing support today, and if, for the moment, we stick with English usage, 
we must say that the term that has become predominant in our late-
modern (Anglophone) Western cultures is ‘parenting’, rather than 
child-rearing or upbringing. Many commentators have remarked on 
this and have shone a light on this fairly recent phenomenon. The lin-
guist Couchman (1983) traces the use of ‘parenting’ as a common 
denominator of what parents do back to the mid-seventies, although 
its use has been reported much earlier. As opposed to ‘parenthood’, it 
seems to involve an active stance on the part of parents, hence, as he 
writes in his very detailed ‘informal survey’: ‘On 20 Oct. and 28 0ct. 
1979 there were ‘learned discussions of the “techniques of parenting” 
and the “parenting” process.’ In his comments on Couchman, Smith 
(2010) concludes up that parenting is largely seen as a technical mat-
ter, that is often referred to as ‘almost the toughest job human beings 
have’. Furthermore, it is a process involving techniques, in which 
experts have a proper role. In the meantime, it has become so current 
in its uses, with this skein of interdependent meanings that Smith 
points out (technical, skills that can be learned, experts who draw on 
science, something that is hard to do and so on) and that silently 
accompanies it, that at the outset of my philosophical research, I 
decided to take the term at face value as a rich term that contains (and 
probably changes) older terms such as rearing children or upbringing. 
I also chose not to differentiate, at least at the beginning of my research, 
between parent support and parenting support as is done for instance 
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by Ramaekers (2010) because I wanted to understand why the combi-
nation of ‘parenting’ and ‘support’ is so dominant.
Scholars in the field also distinguish between supporting parents in the 
case of serious problems and parenting support that tries to reach 
every parent, often in order to prevent problems or because parenting 
is seen as a means to an end by policy-makers and politicians. I just 
wanted to start from the obvious ‘given’ that as a parent in our late 
modern Western societies, one cannot escape parenting support. It will 
be provided to her or him, whether (s)he likes it or not, whether there 
are more serious problems, for instance on the level of parental or 
child behaviour, or not. 
In the meantime, the proposition ‘parenting exists’ belongs indeed to 
the obvious and hence silent bedrock of our contemporary convic-
tions – it is beyond doubt, as the later Wittgenstein of On Certainty 
would have said – at least in the Anglophone world: in Dutch, for 
instance, ‘parenting’ has no equivalent. Notwithstanding this, when 
we look at some of the most popular parenting manuals or websites 
in Flanders, they seem to be informed by the same skein of meanings: 
in our globalised world the fact that there is no equivalent term does 
not seem to mean that there are no equivalent practices. So one might 
wonder why in English, grammar not only prepared a place for it, 
but also had a word available, while for instance in Dutch although 
the place was vacant, there was no candidate word. In Dutch the 
word for ‘a parent’ is ‘een ouder’, and the verb ‘to parent’ would be 
translated as ‘ouderen’, but this word already means ‘elderly people’. 
In The Netherlands it is on the other hand more common than in 
Flanders to say ‘to mother’ or ‘to father’ (bemoederen, bevaderen, 
used as a transitive verb). We can thus say that the proposition ‘par-
enting exists’ expresses – no more, no less than – a contingent and 
temporal truth. Thus everything written in this dissertation has only 
a limited significance. On the other hand, this is ‘our’ time, and it is 
up to us to try to make sense of it, and, even to try to embrace it, 
since we as educators, cannot afford to be too critical of our world, 
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that, as Arendt (2006 [1954]) famously contends in The Crisis of 
Education, we should protect and pass on to our children. In order 
to be better able to embrace it, I believe it is important to make sense 
of it. One reason to engage in such an enterprise is the belief that this 
hermeneutical effort, in articulating our world, can and will change 
it (Taylor, 2016, 117).
This philosophical investigation tries to make sense of our time, by 
addressing our contemporary parenting support culture. It consists of 
a compilation of published essays – a word that derives from the 
French verb ‘essayer’, to try. As it is informed by a hermeneutical 
stance, it might be accused of lacking a more systematic structure. In 
understanding, that is the lesson to be drawn from modern hermeneu-
tics, one always starts somewhere, with no more and no less than a 
preliminary understanding. There are two personal experiences that 
put me as a researcher and philosopher in medias res and urged me to 
reflect philosophically on issues of parenting and parenting support, 
starting from my preliminary understanding of them. The first was 
becoming a father myself and experiencing the strange and paradoxi-
cal feeling that once one becomes a parent, she or he is in a certain 
sense taken less seriously, is often no longer treated as an adult human 
being, who is capable of moral and political thinking and acting. I 
remember an information session at my son’s school, where the assem-
bled group of parents were addressed by the schoolteacher as if they 
were little children themselves. This was still an unarticulated feeling 
though, that I perhaps could better describe as a slightly disturbing gut 
feeling, and I found some words for it when, by chance, I came across 
the Dutch translation of the first edition of Furedi’s Paranoid Parenting 
(2001a and b). When I read the Introduction to this first edition, it was 
as if someone was speaking my mind. Furedi gave words to my unar-
ticulated feelings. Soon I was to discover however that his words were 
indeed his, as I wasn’t completely satisfied with the way he treated the 
subject. I began to wonder if this domain of questions perhaps deserved 
a more philosophical treatment. The second somehow paradoxical 
experience stems from my work with parents as a parent counsellor in 
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a Child and adolescent mental health service in Ghent, where I 
work(ed) as a psychotherapist with children and/or their parents. 
There I discovered that although parents often urgently demanded 
practical educational advice, they weren’t always happy when I gave 
it. I felt that they also wanted to be given space to reflect on their self-
understanding, and that they were often fed up with the way they 
looked at themselves and their children, who, being patients in an 
ambulatory child psychiatric service, often displayed difficult behav-
iour or had severe mental health issues that were truly challenging to 
them as parents. I noticed that, next to the obligatory practical advice, 
they often found relief in fresh insights, about themselves, about their 
children, or about whatever truly mattered to them, on the condition 
that the new insight was truly their own, or that they at least could 
appropriate it. Where they often, initially, asked for help with finding 
new actions or strategies, they often settled for reflection, with a new 
insight, with revising their self-understanding, or with being changed 
themselves. These two experiences within the field of parenting and 
parenting support kept on puzzling me. 
But were they worthy of philosophical treatment? Thiselton (2009, 
10) reminds us of ‘what Gadamer perceives as a fundamental con-
trast between confronting philosophical “problems” in abstraction 
from what gave rise to them in human life, and exploring “questions 
that arise” within a chain of question-and-answer that reflect con-
crete situations in human life’. From this, Thiselton remarks, an 
important contrast arises between hermeneutical philosophy and 
more traditional philosophical thought, and he also mentions Witt-
genstein as a proponent of such a contextualized and engaged philo-
sophical approach.
Gadamer expounds this fundamental contrast between abstract 
‘problems’ and processes of questioning embedded in life as a key 
philosophical divide. (…) This is no minor or hairsplitting distinc-
tion. It underlies almost the whole of Gadamer’s approach and his 
formulation of philosophical hermeneutics. (…) It also reflects the 
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distinctive approach of the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgen-
stein (1889-1952), who argues that conceptual questions cannot 
be asked ‘outside’ a particular language game, by which he means 
‘the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is 
woven’. (ibid. 11) 
Still, Gadamer and Wittgenstein, as well as Heidegger, preferred to 
philosophize about very abstract notions. For instance, Heidegger 
didn’t want to digress on ontic matters in his Being and Time, and it 
was not until his meeting and further cooperation with the Swiss 
psychiatrist Médard Boss, that was published as The Zollikon Semi­
nars, that he showed a genuine philosophical interest in concrete or 
ontic matters. I want to tread in Heidegger’s footsteps, in a sense, by 
indeed trying to philosophize about ontic matters. To reiterate, if we 
truly want to try to make sense of our lived experiences in our cur-
rent time, we cannot but start in medias res. We cannot but start 
with as Schleiermacher puts it, a preliminary knowledge of human 
beings and a preliminary knowledge of the subject-matter (1977, 
59). What makes this research philosophical in a hermeneutical 
sense, I believe, is the fact that it tries very consistently to go back 
and forth from the abstract to the concrete; that is, it tries to cover 
both. It tries to situate philosophical problems in the lives of real 
people, and it tries to connect the lives of real people with more 
abstract and philosophical issues. As Thiselton (2009, 156) and Polt 
(1999, 41) suggest, it is perhaps better to use the image of a herme-
neutical spiral, than that of a hermeneutical circle, to describe this 
type of investigation. 
For Heidegger, Polt (1999, 41) contends,
Interpretation (…) is the act of developing one’s understanding of 
something and illuminating the thing. For example, when I learn 
that a gesture means that something is too expensive, I have inter-
preted the gesture. Of course, my interpretation does not have to 
stop here – for instance, I can investigate what counts as ‘expen-
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sive’. In fact, an interpretation is always subject to revision and 
elaboration. (…) Heidegger himself follows a ‘spiral’ structure, in 
which he continually reinterprets the phenomena. There is no 
point at which we can safely conclude this process of interpreta-
tion and reach a perfect, definitive account of things. 
Every time we go through it, we reach a new, perhaps better insight or 
understanding. To paraphrase Wittgenstein (1969, §141), ‘light dawns 
gradually over the whole’. 
One thing a hermeneutical perspective reveals is that not only becom-
ing, but also being a parent, unceasingly reinterprets one’s whole way 
of being, whether one likes it or not. It interprets oneself. This does not 
mean that parents are better or worse human beings than people who 
are not parents. Nor do I believe this interpretive relation is restricted 
to biological parents, for that matter. But the whole hermeneutical 
idea of our not only actively interpreting texts, but also being inter-
preted by texts, of all kinds, in other words, also by other beings, or in 
the case of parents, by having children, deserves a philosophical treat-
ment. On the other hand, this ontological given is always concretized 
in lived experiences, for instance the experience of being the father of 
my son, of this child, these children. Without the latter category, the 
former does not make any sense at all. (The particular is contextual-
ised by the general and vice versa.)
So my questions arise from concrete experiences in idiosyncratic situ-
ations in human life, and thus from a hermeneutical perspective my 
investigation is philosophical, although (or just because) it is firmly 
rooted in questions that arise in the everyday domain of parenthood 
and the education or upbringing of children. In fact, I try to make 
sense of concrete experiences as situated in and typical of our late 
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modern Western cultures1. By calling them Western cultures I emphat-
ically do not intend to deny the multifaceted cultural, historical, lin-
guistic, social, religious, age-related, sex-related and other factual 
diversity of these societies. I want rather to expose the fact that these 
late modern Western societies often forget to take this diversity into 
account in their collective self-understandings, for instance in their 
technical conception of parenting and parenting support, as became 
apparent in the course of my investigation. 
Given its nature, this philosophical and hermeneutical investigation 
did not start from hypotheses in the strict sense of the word. It started 
from an unease with the current state of affairs in the practices of par-
enting support and from a dissatisfaction regarding the theoretical 
articulation of these practices. Related to this unease, and informed by 
existing critical literature on the matter at hand, I elaborated on my 
first paradoxical experiences and articulated a number of ‘conjectures’ 
or preliminary interpretations, or ‘pre-understandings’, that require a 
hermeneutical effort to be articulated and clarified further. To sum up: 
Parents in the beginning of the 21sth century in our Western soci-
eties are supposed (expected?) to be in need of (some kind of) sup-
port. One of the clearest indicators for this is the enormous amount 
of parenting advice literature and parenting websites.
1 I want to make a remark about the use of ‘we ‘or ‘us’ when referring to ‘our’ late modern 
western societies. I do realize this ‘we’ does not coincide with all the inhabitants of these 
societies. Many of them do not recognize this western perspective as their own. One of the 
groups, for instance, whose members do not always reckon themselves among our western 
societies are Muslims – who form by the way also an internally differentiated group, who for 
instance follow different law schools. I believe it is precisely a problem that the predominant 
parenting (support) account speaks blindly and naively in the name of a universal ‘we’. 
Perhaps because it is informed by a scientist viewpoint that doesn’t consider itself to be a 
viewpoint, a denial that in its paradoxicality is precisely constitutive of this (perspective-
less) perspective. As such it can become blind for the import of religion, sex and gender, 
culture, values and norms, and the idiosyncrasy of personal contexts, in short, of the neces-
sity of context for meaning. I like to refer to Wittgenstein who might be criticized for not 
being more specific when he uses ‘we’ in his philosophical remarks. He was however (one of) 
the first to distinguish between different world-pictures (in his On Certainty), and thus to 
problematize the naïve use of ‘we’. 
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Parents often are not taken seriously as the full-blown adults they 
are in many of the current parenting support practices: they are 
instrumentalized2 and infantilized.
Parenting support is often science-based, which means that (1) 
parents are less well informed than scientists, and thus in an asym-
metrical relationship, which can account for (b) because parents 
are made dependent on a language game they cannot ever, nor are 
expected to, master themselves; and (2) that parents can experi-
ence a tension between more ‘natural’3 or usual ways of conceptu-
alizing child rearing and the prescribed ways of understanding 
themselves and their parenting within a scientific framework (a 
tension that is not acknowledged nor addressed within this scien-
tific framework itself).
It is possible though to develop or at least conceptualize practices 
of parenting support and counselling that take parents seriously as 
the full-blown moral and political subjects they are; and probably 
such practices already exist, but they remain hidden behind the 
dominant picture of parenting support. 
As in Polt’s example, above, the purpose of these investigations is to 
give an interpretation of these phenomena, to make sense of them, or 
to try at least to clarify them a little bit. 
Because it is always very hard to make sense of what is happening here 
and now, without the clarifying distance in time and space, it is useful 
to draw on philosophical frameworks. Some philosophers are very 
2 In a short introduction movie on the site of the Flemish governmental organisation Kind en 
Gezin (Child and Family) the message for parents is that this is an organization where 
everything is viewed from the standpoint of the child and the main idea is that children’s 
development is stimulated (http://www.kindengezin.be/over-kind-en-gezin/ retrieved 
23/05/2016).
3 I put ‘natural’ between quotation marks because ideas of intuitive or innate ways of raising 
children conceal the necessity of sense-making backgrounds, and this is something I 
emphatically want to problematize. 
29 
appealing, especially those who cannot only be placed in a broader 
hermeneutical tradition, but also, as Taylor points out in the next quo-
tation, who accept the idea of a sense-making background as a neces-
sary condition for making sense in the first place, in other words, who 
follow in the footsteps of Kant’s transcendental deduction. The list of 
such philosophers includes Heidegger and Wittgenstein, and of course 
Taylor himself, and they are thus inherently critical of our predomi-
nant disengaged culture.
Heidegger speaks of ‘finitude’ in his account of human being (Das­
ein). Wittgenstein places the meanings of our words in the context 
of our form of life (Lebensform). Both are therefore concerned 
with the context of intelligibility of knowledge, thought and mean-
ing. Both propose some notion of background; and, more, both 
articulate some part of this background whose neglect has allowed 
the disengaged view to seem plausible. Articulation plays a crucial 
part in their argumentative strategy; it is central to the innovative 
force of their philosophy. There are therefore good reasons for 
mentioning them in the same breath, as there are for going back 
again and again to their arguments. What makes the latter so nec-
essary is the hold of the disengaged view on our thought and cul-
ture, which has a lot to do, of course, with the hegemony of institu-
tions and practices that require and entrench a disengaged stance: 
science, technology, rationalized forms of production, bureaucratic 
administration, a civilization committed to growth, and the like. 
The kind of thinking of which both are variants has a certain 
counter-cultural significance, an inherent thrust against the hege-
monic forms of our time. (Taylor 1995b, 75-76)
If our late modern Western culture is indeed taken over by a disen-
gaged stance, and if this is also the case as far as parenting is con-
cerned, then this means that it is no longer clear that a background is 
required to make sense of things. But how can we conceive of parent-
ing outside of sense-giving contexts? Doesn’t education always pre-
suppose a broader cultural context? Doesn’t it presuppose parents 
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who act out of particular interests and their own moral and other 
backgrounds? And isn’t the child also ‘thrown’ into the world, with its 
peculiarities. And what about the expert? Isn’t (s)he a concrete (wo)
man of flesh and blood, with her or his own stories and history? Can 
we really find traces of the disengaged stance, of this tendency to 
decontextualize, in the all too human domain of childrearing and edu-
cation? This is the overall conjecture: even the domain of the very 
subjective, lived experiences of being a mother or a father, is at least 
affected, and maybe even colonized, by the disengaged scientific stance. 
General outline
Chapter One revisits Furedi’s Paranoid Parenting (2001a, 2001b, 
2008). In that book the sociologist Furedi describes a parenting cul-
ture that puts parents under all kinds of pressures, and he offers the 
parents he addresses, after giving them the necessary insights into the 
mechanisms at work, no choice other than to opt out, and to with-
draw. Furedi can be regarded as the exception to the rule that parents 
are seen as in need of support, or at least in need of parenting experts. 
In Furedi’s account the societal level with its parenting culture is con-
ceived of as hostile. The problem I have with this position is that it 
seems to be paranoid too. To develop this argument from a hermeneu-
tical perspective I first draw on Heidegger to distinguish between two 
ways of being social that are elaborated in Being and Time. People, 
and thus parents, can be social in an interpersonal manner, as well as 
in an impersonal manner. The latter is an existentiale better known as 
‘das Man’ or the ‘Anyone’. By conceiving it as an existentiale, it is 
conceived as belonging to Dasein, and is no longer seen as an external 
‘causal’ factor. Although, and this is a further distinction, ‘what they 
say’ or ‘das Man’ is mostly seen, also by Heidegger, as something nor-
matively negative, in connection with the idea of (in)authenticity, 
Heidegger also develops it, be it in a rather preliminary fashion, as 
constitutive of our self-understanding as social beings. Still, although 
Heidegger opens the route to engagement and a reclaiming of ownership 
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of one’s own community or society, it is Taylor who takes the further 
step by conceiving of the community as constitutive of the individual, 
‘in the sense that the self-interpretations which define him are drawn 
from the interchange which the community carries on’ (1985, 8). Tay-
lor believes we are dependent upon a community or society, but 
remarks that this dependence is too often seen as causal, and not as 
‘touching our very identity’ (ibid.). It is this hermeneutical idea of our 
self-interpretations being dependent upon our community, that allows 
us to see parents as actors who can take responsibility for their com-
munity or society. 
After writing this chapter, two issues still remained to be considered: 
first it seemed a bit naïve to believe that parents really would take the 
initiative to gather and to scrutinize the possible ways of being a par-
ent in the ways offered by our social normativity, as I contend in the 
final part of the first chapter, although it wasn’t clear at the time why 
this suggestion seemed so unworldly. Second, Heidegger proved to be 
less helpful in understanding our late modern predicament, in his stat-
ing that Dasein by no means can be regarded as an object. In that 
sense Heidegger seems far more radical than Taylor, for whom ‘(wo)
man’ is part of a mechanist universe, while on the other hand (s)he 
doesn’t converge or coincide with it. Taylor revisits Heidegger, one 
could say, in the sense that he allows for an explicit morality, whereas 
Heidegger notoriously refused that (cf. Polt 1999, 169-171), and Tay-
lor seems to be more tolerant of the ambiguity and paradox in our late 
modern cultures. Instead of, as Heidegger does, radically criticizing 
the scientization and rationalization of our self-understanding, Taylor 
tries to understand for instance how on the one hand, we can onto-
logically be beings who cannot exist unless as social beings, but that 
we on the other hand are contingently capable of denying this, and of 
valuing our individuality so highly. Instead of denouncing this as inau-
thenticity, or as ‘not owned’ ways of self-understanding, Taylor will 
try to understand how these ways of self-understanding have become 
valued by us. 
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Another example of such a paradox is to be found in certain parenting 
manuals and websites: in the (co-authored) Chapter Two we started 
our investigation with the perplexity caused by the idea that parents 
were supposed to accept without questioning that they (as human 
beings) would treat themselves and their child(ren) as exclusively 
belonging to a causal-mechanist universe. Since both authors of this 
co-authored chapter are fathers, we could ask explicitly from a first 
person perspective: Can I, as a father, conceive of my son first and 
foremost as a developing neurological organism? Can I see myself as 
a father who gives his son an oxytocin shot by hugging him, or can I 
understand myself as a father whose relationship with his son is first 
and foremost endocrinological? These questions arose from our read-
ing science- or rather brain-based parenting manuals, which seemed to 
take these possibilities for granted. This means that parents are con-
strued as Taylorian strong figures of disengagement, who act in a way 
that is disconnected from moral and other sense giving contexts. 
The point made in this chapter is that it would be wrong to radically 
oppose the idea that parents use scientific insights or evidence while 
bringing up their children, since parents often have become such fig-
ures of disengagement. They should however not be conceived of as 
figures of disengagement in a strong sense, meaning that they have 
really left behind any moral or other background, but rather as figures 
of weak disengagement, meaning that they still have, and act from, 
moral and other backgrounds. For instance, because for them to draw 
on a scientific approach of parenting is strongly valued. We thus hold 
a plea for a middle way between a Heideggerian rejection of an objec-
tifying scientific approach of parenting on the one hand and a com-
plete endorsing of the idea of ‘scientific parenting’ (Sunderland, 
Letourneau) on the other because paradoxes are typical of our late 
modern condition, for instance the idea that we can (only) make sense 
of things by stepping out of all sense giving and thus subjective back-
grounds. We use Taylor to try to account for these paradoxes, that are 
typical of our late-modern condition. They can be hard to bear. Once 
we cannot stand the tension any longer we tend to simplify our world 
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by choosing only one possibility. Another example of such a paradox 
in our late-modern society is that we demand that persons must be 
unique individuals in order to be accepted socially. Instead of bearing 
this ambiguity, we have a tendency to become individualists, and for-
get it is a social requirement. In the case of scientific parenting, our 
Taylor reading suggests it might be better indeed to endure this ten-
sion, instead of giving in to it and taking sides in this discussion, and 
for instance rejecting our valuing of scientific resources. But maybe 
more revealing is the fact that to reinterpret parents as figures of dis-
engagement in a weak sense of the word, signifies they are conceived 
again as full­blown moral beings, that deserve to be treated as such, 
whereas there seems to be a tendency not to treat parents as such. 
Chapter Two shows that it is no longer possible in our late modern 
western societies to conceive of parenting without a cultural back-
ground that endorses science and its values. A scientific outlook 
belongs to our sense-making backgrounds. 
Chapter Three engages with this question by looking into what I refer 
to as the ‘liminality’ of certain propositions, that I found in a popular 
and bestselling parenting manual, The Whole­brain Child. 12 Revolu­
tionary Strategies to Nurture Your Child’s Developing Mind (Siegel 
and Bryson 2012). I draw here on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, 
especially On Certainty and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathe­
matics. By accepting the fact that certain propositions, that claim to be 
mirroring timeless features of our world, are in fact liminal, being not 
empirical, nor methodological or framework propositions, but betwixt 
and between empirical and methodological, they are exposed as tem-
poral, as situated, as contingent. Of course, one could object that 
propositions that are actually mirroring nature could also be liminal, 
in the sense that many still contest their truth. But for the later Witt-
genstein, the picture theory of language – that he adhered to in his 
Tractatus – cannot but be wrong, so the whole idea of mirroring nature 
is unacceptable. Our framework propositions, once they have become 
part of what Wittgenstein calls ‘the scaffolding of our thoughts’ (1969, 
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§211), provide us with ways of seeing things, that become very hard 
to resist, and that can become even very hard to notice and to articu-
late, as On Certainty reveals. Instead of providing parents with the 
latest scientific insights or findings, parents, I argue, are rather initi-
ated into new ways of conceiving of themselves and their children and 
of the nature of parenting. 
But this being initiated is connected with the idea of liminality: only 
when certain propositions are accepted by parents and others as being 
beyond doubt, has a process of initiation in the sense Cavell gives to it 
been accomplished: the ontology has changed, new ‘objects’ are to be 
found, such as for instance ‘attachment’ or ‘interactions’. Only then 
they belong to ‘the scaffolding of our thoughts’. Or maybe what Tay-
lor recently has called ‘the whole range of footings that come about in 
human culture’ (2016, 35). Since all this happens as it were behind 
parents’ backs, this again is reminiscent of a broader cultural phenom-
enon of infantilization that Susan Neiman (2014) warns us of. Maybe 
it is this picture ‘that holds us captive’, and that makes the whole idea 
of parents gathering and talking of what they value in their culture or 
in parenting manuals etc. seem so naïve. Dreyfus and Taylor refer to 
Wittgenstein’s (1958, I, §115) frequently quoted simile 
A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay 
in our language and language seems to repeat it to us inexorably. 
They explain how powerful such pictures can be.
What he is referring to is the powerful picture of mind-in-world 
which inhabits and underlies what we could call the modern epis-
temological tradition, which begins with Descartes. The point he 
wants to convey with the use of the word ‘picture’ (Bild) is that 
there is something here different and bigger than a theory. It is a 
largely unreflected-upon background understanding which pro-
vides the context for, and thus influences all our theorizing in, this 
area. (Dreyfus and Taylor, 2015, 1) 
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In Chapter Four I start from two observations: (1) that the parenting 
account as it stands is a frictionless fiction that makes a very strong 
appeal to many of us, denizens of late modern Western societies; and 
(2) that there is an overall agreement that parents qua parents are, 
almost by definition, in need of support, and hence there is a genuine 
parental deficit. I argue that the technical conception of parenting 
(support) picks out or defines a very specific kind of deficit, a shortage 
of practical and theoretical knowledge, and that the void can be filled 
by supplying parents with the missing information. This needs to be 
distinguished from another kind of deficit, that is for instance spelled 
out by Ramaekers and Suissa (2012), drawing upon Cavell, and that 
is related to the hermeneutical deficit. I will make the same movement 
the other way around and will try to articulate what kind of support 
parents need when we depart from this kind of deficit. What kind of 
support does this specific deficit pick out or define? This will lead to a 
preliminary conceptualization of the parent counsellor as a figure of 
strong engagement, allowing for parental momentum, or a condition 
where the friction of being a parent is accepted as such. 
In the Conclusion I bring the different threads together and I develop a 
distinction between an ethics of causality and an ethics of hermeneutics 
in the broad field of initiatives that purport to support parents. The 
issue becomes then why an ethics of hermeneutics would be preferable? 
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Parenting support and the role of society  
in parental self-understanding:  
Furedi’s Paranoid Parenting revisited 4
T he last two decades have witnessed a growing attention to par-enting issues originating from a broad range of professional 
fields: journalism (e.g. Schaubroek 2010; Hodgkinson 2010 and 
Bristow 2009), social work (e.g. Van der Pas 2003), politics and policy 
making, sociology (Furedi 2001b and 2008), developmental psychol-
ogy, literature (e.g. Shriver 2003) and poetry (e.g. Dove 1995), child 
psychiatry (e.g. Adriaenssens 2007 and 2010), the advertising indus-
try, moral philosophy (e.g. Burggraeve 2006) and last but not least 
philosophy of education (among others: Suissa 2006; Lambeir and 
Ramaekers 2007; Ramaekers 2010; Ramaekers and Suissa 2010 and 
2012; Smeyers 2010 and Smith 2010). Concern for these parenting 
issues takes very different forms: research centres (for instance the 
Centre for Parenting Culture Studies at the university of Kent, or 
Parenthood and Professional Work with Parents at Leiden University 
of Applied Sciences (see Weille 2011)), books, newspaper articles, TV 
programmes, magazines, websites, iPods, columns, laws, policy docu-
ments, research programs, parent training programs (e.g. Triple P), 
papers in magazines, websites for parents (e.g. attachmentparenting.
com) and so on and so on. In short, parenting issues seem to be 
omnipresent.
4 This chapter is a slightly revised version of the article with the same title that has been 
published in the Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 47, 3, 2013, 391-406.
39 CHAPTER 1
In this chapter, I want to focus on the recent tendency to support par-
ents by critically looking at the impact this huge interest in parenting 
matters has on parents themselves. For instance Hodgkinson (2010) 
believes that parents are exhausted and Schaubroeck (2010) argues 
that parents are always prone to feel guilty. With the publication of his 
Paranoid Parenting (2001b and 2008), sociologist Frank Furedi 
became trend-setting. Furedi not only diagnoses and analyses parents’ 
alleged predicament as a lack of confidence induced by society, but in 
similar ways to Schaubroeck and Hodgkinson, he addresses parents 
directly, and wants to help them out. Furedi hopes that what he views 
as a disempowering of parents can be put to an end, if only parents 
gain some insight – that he willingly provides – into the cultural mech-
anisms that are responsible for their lack of confidence. Despite the 
quality of his analyses, I believe his view is problematic. The main 
problem, in my view, is that underlying his sketch a metaphysics is at 
work that denies parents an important aspect of normal human 
agency. I want to argue that casting the parenting predicament in the 
terms Furedi uses paradoxically adds to the disempowerment of par-
ents. I draw on a hermeneutical perspective to show this and in doing 
so, I will try to amend Furedi’s one-sided picture of what he believes 
to be supportive to parents, to open up a new perspective on the idea 
of parent support.
Parenting today: problems, diagnosis and remedy 
according to Furedi 
Furedi offers a sharp analysis of the predicament parents find them-
selves in nowadays. Parents, he argues, cannot escape the predomi-
nant culture of ‘paranoid parenting’. Furedi describes paranoid par-
enting as a parental condition of which the distinctive feature is a lack 
of confidence (1) of parents in themselves, (2) of parents in other 
adults and vice versa, and (3) of policy makers and experts towards 
parents. This paranoia leads to phenomena such as ‘over-parenting’ 
and ‘parent-blaming’.
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Paranoid parenting is not about parents, but about a culture of para-
noid parenting. 
This is a culture that continually incites the public to worry about 
every dimension of children’s lives. It is a culture that dramatizes 
every issue facing mothers and fathers and turns everyday prob-
lems into scare stories. It is also a culture that denigrates parental 
competence and insists that mothers and fathers cannot cope with-
out the help of experts. These cultural messages are zealously pro-
moted by a formidable network of professional experts, child rear-
ing gurus, child protection advocates, fear entrepreneurs and 
politicians.’ (Furedi, 2008, 16) 
Although Furedi deals with such diverse issues as the impact of the 
cultural dogmas of child determinism and parental determinism, the 
phenomenon of the professionalization of parents, the growing politi-
cization of parenting, the absence of a relevant moral outlook for par-
ents, etc., all allegedly contributing to the above described lack of con-
fidence, everything in his book eventually boils down to cultural 
pressures. 
Despite Furedi’s choice of a psychiatric metaphor – paranoia being a 
condition that places the sufferer in the middle of a closed universe, 
where every event, however meaningless it may seem to an outsider, is 
imbued with an inescapable and distressing self-referential significance 
– he remains hopeful: 
Of course we do not have to fatalistically give in to these forces. 
Although parents cannot opt out of the culture they inhabit they 
can challenge it. And if we understand the forces at work then at 
least we can learn to believe in ourselves and in other adults in the 
community.’ (ibid., 16) 
In his conclusion he writes: 
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(…) if parents can grasp why parenting has been turned into such 
a troublesome enterprise, then they can do something about regain-
ing their self-confidence. Today’s parenting culture systematically 
de-skills mothers and fathers. It places enormous pressure on par-
ents to turn away from what only they can do. The good news is 
that if parents understand the pressures that bear down upon 
them, they can insulate themselves from it. They may still be anx-
ious about their children’s well-being, but at least it will be possi-
ble to put those fears into a more balanced perspective. (ibid., 197) 
Furedi supplies parents with further advice. They would do better to 
listen to their own instinct than to professional advice or even advice 
of friends (ibid., 196-7) and they should create little communities of 
stakeholders in their children’s welfare (ibid., 196).5
I believe that this account, however attractive and convincing it may 
seem, contains some serious shortcomings. First it strikes me that soci-
ety or the cultural domain as a whole is seen here as purely suppres-
sive. To stretch the paranoia metaphor a bit further, parents are dis-
connected from their society. Society is out of reach. It has become a 
source of hostile forces that is crushing parents. Below I introduce 
some elements of a Heideggerian hermeneutics to throw another light 
on what is happening here. Furedi’s analyses are reminiscent of the 
negative role das Man (the ‘they’), at least at first glance, plays in Hei-
degger’s Being and Time. However, for Heidegger the role given to das 
Man in his fundamental analysis of Dasein is not solely negative. Sec-
ond Furedi puts a lot of emphasis on insight. Parents should adopt an 
5 Similar analyses and remedies can be found in Schaubroeck (2010). This Belgian journalist 
has interviewed parents about feelings of guilt. She stresses the fact that parents feel 
responsible and guilty due to the enormous expectations society has towards them (41). 
She for instance asks child rearing experts to be less optimistic about the possibilities of 
education. She applauds all kinds of activities that can help parents to meet each other and 
she thus elaborates Furedi’s idea of creating a community that can provide practical and 
emotional support (238-239 and 241). The British journalist Hodgkinson also attaches 
importance to the idea of parents giving each other practical support (2010, 29 and 
98-99). 
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external sociological point of view. Parents need to gain insight into 
the cultural mechanisms but can they ever be outsiders towards their 
own culture? And is this only a matter of cognitive insight? To deal 
with this issue I will use Charles Taylor’s concept of atomism that will 
help to problematize the idea that parents can be conceived of as being 
able to step outside their own culture. Third, Furedi is very optimistic 
about the instinctive knowhow parents possess. Again Taylor’s criti-
cism of atomism will be very useful in trying to show why this posi-
tion is untenable. 
Fourth, one possible way out of the alleged parental predicament con-
sists, for Furedi, in the creation of a community of fellow-parents. 
Hence problems that in Furedi’s account originate in the community 
on the level of society are dealt with at the level of a community of 
partners or companions (maybe even fellow-victims). To resolve the 
disconnectedness from society, parents have to connect with each 
other. But will this not enlarge the feelings of paranoia towards soci-
ety? Are these levels not at a too great distance in Furedi’s account?
A hermeneutical approach of the cultural domain (1): 
Heidegger on parental self-understanding 
In division I of Being and Time Heidegger develops a fundamental 
analysis of Dasein (being a human being). From this hermeneutical 
perspective, the broad social or cultural domain is not something we 
can objectify, in fact it is not a thing at all, it is an existentiale of Das­
ein; a way of making sense of one’s being, or a mode of self-under-
standing. To get more of a grip on Furedi’s understanding of the social, 
and why I believe it is problematic, I want to introduce two distinc-
tions that are inherent in Heidegger’s existentialist phenomenology6 in 
6 I am fully aware of the fact that Heidegger later on rejected the idea that his Being and 
Time was about existential phenomenology (see e.g. his Letter on Humanism, Heidegger 
2008, 231-232). But still I believe that precisely Heidegger’s existential phenomenology 
can throw a new light on some problems we deal with in this chapter. 
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Being and Time, namely: (1) the distinction between (inter)personal 
and impersonal ways of being social and (2) on the impersonal level 
we can distinguish between a constitutive and a normative way of 
being social. 
On being social 
The first distinction Heidegger makes quite explicitly by treating the 
question of the ‘who’ of Dasein in two different paragraphs of division 
I, chapter 4 of Being and Time. Heidegger elaborates on a quality 
(existentiale) of Dasein he mentioned earlier7, viz. that Dasein is in 
each case mine (Jemeinigkeit). Heidegger wants to know ‘who’ Dasein 
is and (§25) rhetorically asks if possibly Dasein is proximally and for 
the most time [zunächst und zumeist] not itself. ‘Who’ we are in our 
everydayness is worked out in the two following paragraphs. In my 
reading of the text, drawing on Blattner (2006), Heidegger gives an 
account of the way Dasein is a social being. The first distinction is 
about how we are social beings. That man is a social being is widely 
accepted. But the distinction Heidegger draws is that we are social 
beings at the same time in a personal way as well as in an impersonal 
manner, respectively analyzed in §26 and 27. Starting from the Hei-
deggerian idea that people share a common intelligibility (Blattner, 
2006, 73), we could look at parental self-understanding from two dif-
ferent, though not entirely separate, points of view.
On the one hand, according to Heidegger, we are social beings in a 
way that we care for others, because our self-understanding is inter-
woven with that of others. Heidegger uses the word solicitude (Fürs­
orge) to indicate this form of care, not for equipment, but care for 
other beings of the type of Dasein. Following Heidegger (2001, 159) 
‘Da-sein must always be seen as being-in-the-world, as concern for 
things, and as caring for other [Da-seins], as the being-with the human 
7 In §9. 
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beings it encounters, and never as a self-contained subject.’ ‘Solicitude’ 
is just a technical term for the way others matter to us simply in so far 
as we lead our own lives (Blattner, 2006, 67). This of course, does not 
mean that Dasein always or even mostly cares for others in a morally 
outstanding manner. So we are social beings in an (inter)personal way. 
Parents understand themselves mostly as living at least partly for the 
sake of their children. Parents meet other parents. Parents also meet 
other people, e.g. teachers, through the fact that they have children. It 
is this kind of self-understanding that can amount to the creation of 
an interpersonal community, an idea touched upon by Furedi, 
Schaubroeck and Hodgkinson8, where people have common purposes, 
common interests and where people know each other by sight.
On the other hand however, Heidegger points out another way of 
being social, and so another way of self-understanding, that is imper-
sonal. Blattner (ibid., 69) claims that Heidegger’s concern (in division 
I, chapter 4) is to establish that what and how things are an issue for 
us, or matter to us, is governed by the social patterns in which we live, 
the patterns of social normativity. This impersonal way of being social 
implies that we mostly do things in the way others do, without know-
ing who these others are, because they are not known to us (by sight). 
The ‘they’ is faceless, so to speak (Heidegger 1962, 164).
As Blattner (2006, 68) remarks, the ‘they’ or the ‘Anyone’ (das Man) 
is not a community in the sense that communitarians would use the 
term. I believe it is, rather, a community in the sense some Wittgenstei-
nian scholars give to the word9. We might say that this kind of com-
munity is not a community we have created, but a community that has 
formed us or that at least strongly informs our acting and thinking10. 
So we understand ourselves because there is this shared intelligibility. 
8 See note 5.
9 E.g. Meredith Williams (1999).
10 The following quote is a rare reference in Being and Time to the process of initiation in one’s 
culture: ‘This everyday way in which things have been interpreted is one in which Dasein has 
grown in the first instance, with never a possibility of extrication’ (Heidegger 1962, 213).
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Or, as Blattner (ibid., 73-74) puts it: ‘ [Heidegger] described the social 
dimension of the world and the way in which we Dasein are in the first 
instance Anyone-selves, that is, selves who understand ourselves pri-
marily by way of the public articulation of the world.’ In other words: 
das Man is an existentiale of Dasein.
Normativity versus constitutivity  
(of our self-understanding as social beings)
The second distinction I would like to introduce is one drawn less 
clearly by Heidegger himself. The ‘they’/’Anyone’ can be construed as 
a normative ‘community’ that puts pressure on people to behave as 
others (‘they’) do, but also as a constitutive ‘community’ that provides 
the ways one does things or one understands oneself, in the normal 
course of things. On the one hand the ‘they’ constitutes what we do, 
so without this background we wouldn’t be able to do anything that 
would make sense and we would not be able to make sense of others. 
On the other hand it puts us under pressure to behave like ‘normal’ 
persons do. In Blattner’s (2006, 71) words: ‘(…) the same forces that 
keep human life recognizable to us all around here and allow us to 
understand one another without further ado generate a form of con-
formism and social suppression.’ 
One might easily overlook the passages where Heidegger treats the ‘they’ 
in a positive manner. Following Blattner (2006, 69), the next passage can 
be taken as being about the constitutivity of the ‘they’ (das Man):
We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they [man] take pleasure; 
we read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see and 
judge; likewise we shrink back from the ‘great mass’ as they shrink 
back; we find ‘shocking’ what they find shocking. The ‘they’, which is 
nothing definite, and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribes 
the kind of Being of everydayness. The ‘they’ has its own ways in 
which to be. (Heidegger 1962, 164)
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Blattner (2006, 69-70) explains how these patterns of social normativ-
ity prescribe how to do things or to be for example a teacher (or a 
father).
There are ways to hammer, ways to drive, ways to drink coffee, 
and ways to be a teacher. Proximally and for the most part we do 
things the way one does them. Because that man is drinking a cof-
fee as one drinks coffee, his presence is unobtrusive, obvious. I 
‘know what he is doing’, because he is doing it as one does it. If he 
is drinking coffee abnormally (say he is lying on the floor of the 
coffee house while he drinks), then he obtrudes, stands out, and 
requires interpretation. 
We can elaborate on this by adding that not only do I know ‘what oth-
ers are doing’ simply because they are doing it the way one does it, but 
I also know what I am doing because I am doing it the way one does 
it. So I agree to the patterns of social normativity that are dominant in 
our culture. In other words, to be able to make sense of myself, I need 
the ‘they’. 
It is much easier to detect the other type of the ‘they,’ i.e. the normative 
one, in Being and Time, since, as Blattner (2006, 70) points out, Hei-
degger does not merely note the existence of social normativity, he 
investigates phenomenologically how it functions. So we human 
beings, according to Heidegger, understand ourselves as being con-
cerned about not being at too great a distance from others. We prefer 
not to attract too much attention. This averageness has, curiously 
enough, a disburdening function for Dasein. 
Yet, because the ‘they’ presents every judgment and decision as its 
own, it deprives the particular Dasein of its answerability. The 
‘they’ can, as it were, manage to have ‘them’ constantly invoking 
it. (…) it ‘was’ always the “they” who did it, and yet it can be said 
that it has been ‘no one’. (…) Thus the particular Dasein in its 
everydayness is disburdened by the ‘they’. Not only that; by thus 
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disburdening it of its Being, the ‘they’ accommodates Dasein 
[kommt . . . dem Dasein entgegen] if Dasein has any tendency to 
take things easily and make them easy. And because the ‘they’ con-
stantly accommodates the particular Dasein by disburdening it of 
its Being, the ‘they’ retains and enhances its stubborn dominion. 
(Heidegger 1962, 165)
We can conclude that for Heidegger, constitutivity and normativity are 
two sides of the same coin. The one can’t exist without the other, but 
we can of course look at the ‘they’ from one perspective at a time.
Heidegger’s ambiguity towards the ’they’ (das Man) 
It is interesting however to see that Heidegger takes a rather ambigu-
ous stand towards ‘the they’. On the one hand ‘das Man’ is understood 
as a necessary and positive existentiale or a distinguishing mark of 
Dasein or the being of a human being (see e.g. Heidegger, 1962, 167), 
on the other hand Heidegger often writes about ‘the they’ in a conde-
scending manner although he denies this tendency. 
(Our) own Interpretation is purely ontological in its aims, and is 
far removed from any moralizing critique of everyday Dasein, and 
from the aspirations of a ‘philosophy of culture’. (ibid., 210-211 
[167])
Why is Heidegger not neutral about the ’they’ as he probably should 
be if he stuck to his ontological programme? Was he not trying to 
investigate what the meaning of being is? I am drawing attention to 
this because of an interesting similarity with Furedi here. As pointed 
out, Furedi is also rather critical towards the ’they’ or, our culture. And 
in being so critical he tends to neglect the necessity of the constitutivity 
of our culture. Heidegger on the other hand is not purely negative 
towards das Man, and so ultimately does not neglect the constitutivity 
of our culture (the ’they’). 
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It is important to notice that for Heidegger, there is a tendency towards 
superficiality that is inherent in the being of Dasein, as evident in his 
1929 inaugural address What is metaphysics? (Was ist Metaphysik?) 
Discussing anxiety, Heidegger argues that the tendency of human beings 
to turn away from being (the nothing) and to lose themselves in public 
superficiality protects them from facing their anxiety. But it is precisely 
this tendency that is typical for the nothing (the being) itself. The noth-
ing (being) itself is what makes the transcendence possible. Without the 
nothing there would be no beings to meet in the world. This openness 
always implies that one becomes absorbed by the world. 
And yet this constant if ambiguous turning away from the nothing 
accords, within certain limits, with the most proper significance of 
the nothing. In its nihilation the nothing directs us precisely toward 
beings. (Heidegger 2008, 104)
So here Heidegger seems to accept Dasein’s tendency towards superfi-
ciality. Blattner (2006) sums up different reasons why Heidegger nev-
ertheless remained ambiguous towards this tendency of Dasein. Prob-
ably Heidegger’s existentialist philosophy and / or personal morality 
was in tension with his ontological project11. Whatever the case, one 
11 Blattner (2006, 129) makes the following remark: ‘(-) Heidegger held a dim view of every-
day life in the early twentieth century. Perhaps Heidegger really meant to describe every-
day life as egregiously leveled down and disowned, not unlike the way Kierkegaard and 
Nietzsche often characterize contemporary life. Most people, according to Nietzsche, 
belong to the “herd,” the weak-willed and unimaginative mass of humanity that does as it is 
told and tries not to rock the boat. The herd has no taste and no ability to tell what is great 
from what is ordinary. Nietzsche’s rhetoric dovetailed with the revulsion of the German 
“mandarins” to Weimar culture. Although Heidegger himself was a small-town, lower mid-
dle-class boy, and therefore not a member of the Mandarin class, he seems to have had 
sympathy for the Mandarin critique of the decadence of modern urban life. Kierkegaard’s 
concern was less with greatness, taste and decadence, than with one’s ability to rise above 
the ethical and rational demands of common sense and communal life and commit oneself 
to a singular, life-defining project, as Abraham did. The reason to mention this existentialist 
reaction to modern life is that in some passages in Being and Time Heidegger appears to 
endorse elements of Nietzsche’s, Kierkegaard’s, and the Mandarins’ rhetoric. In the grip of 
such rhetoric, Heidegger may have wanted to assimilate average everyday Dasein to 
something less admirable, something lower. Seeing philosophically that this is implausible, 
Heidegger always moderates his critiques with assurances that his characterizations are 
not meant to be disparaging and that he is describing a “positive” existential phenomenon. 
The assurances ring hollow, however, in proximity to all the rhetoric.’
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might consider this ambiguity a good reason to believe that the’ they’ 
for Heidegger can and should not be reduced to a purely negative 
phenomenon. 
Authentic and inauthentic ways of self-understanding 
Sharp as his analyses may be, from this Heideggerian perspective we 
can point out two human possibilities that are not mentioned in Fure-
di’s account. First, the ‘they’ can have a disburdening effect on parents 
and second, anxiety can be conceived as an opportunity to live a more 
owned or authentic life12. Let us first look at the possible disburdening 
function of the ‘they’. When we look at parents as human beings who 
are always trying to make sense of who they are, then we can under-
stand that they sometimes become anxious when experiencing the 
feeling that they are not coping with what seems manageable for other 
parents. When ‘they say/one says’ that parents are ultimately respon-
sible for the ‘outcome’ of education or the child rearing process (what 
Furedi calls the myth of parental determinism), it becomes under-
standable that parents feel guilty. What adds to the worries is of course 
the fact that the ‘they’ is not homogenous (anymore). Parents often do 
not know how to behave as ‘good’ or ‘good enough’ or ‘effective’ par-
ents and the ‘they’ is much more varied than it probably was in for 
instance Heidegger’s time. The pressure is coming from different angles 
as it were. It is precisely this that comes out in Furedi’s analysis. It does 
12 Following Blattner Heidegger never made up his mind whether Dasein that is immersed in 
‘the they’ is just not authentic or, as Blattner translates the German word ‘uneigentlich’ as 
unowned, or whether it is a more degraded or disowned way of Dasein. Blattner formulates 
as a working hypothesis ‘the suggestion that there are three modes of life. (…) The hypothesis, 
then, is this: We live to a large extent in a mode that is unowned. For many of us the wrenching 
existential challenges that Heidegger describes under the headings of “death” and “anxiety” 
have not arisen. We glide along through life without having to face the question whether to 
own our lives. When the existential challenges of death and anxiety do arise, however, we 
are confronted with a choice, whether to own or disown our lives. Heidegger’s word for the 
disowning response is usually “flight”. Disowned Dasein flees in the face of death and 
anxiety and tries to return to everyday life. Having been awakened to the existential chal-
lenges, however, one cannot return “naïvely” to everyday life. One must, rather, cover up or 
bury the existential challenges, and that involves disowning the sorts of entity we are.’ 
(Blattner 2006, 130)
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not seem to be disburdening at all. How could we make sense of the 
possible disburdening effect of the ‘they’? It is easy to misinterpret 
Heidegger here. In the earlier mentioned quotation about the disbur-
dening function of the ‘they’, he talks about Dasein that tries to take 
things easily and make them easy (Heidegger, 1962, 165). For Hei-
degger, in what some might call an elitist tendency, the ‘they’ helps 
parents to escape the possibilities that lie in anxiety and guilt. The 
anxiety and guilt Furedi mentions would be examples for Heidegger 
of fretting and worries about trivial ontic, instead of ontological, mat-
ters, and in that way the ‘they’ in his view uncomfortably blocks the 
road to anxiety and resoluteness. So in this Heideggerian sense the 
‘they’ and the worries it brings with it, does play a disburdening role. 
The second possibility Furedi misses, is favoured by Heidegger. 
Through anxiety, we can learn to understand ourselves in a way that 
is closer to the way we are ontologically. As Blattner says: through 
anxiety we don’t learn what we are, but we come to see ourselves as 
how we are. And we are ‘ability-to-be’ (2006, 160). There is ultimately 
no-one who can tell us what we should do with our lives. Anxiety in 
Heidegger’s Being and Time is a positive way of self-understanding. 
Anxiety, for Heidegger, paves the way to authenticity for Dasein. Guilt 
is a way of self-understanding that implies that we realize that what-
ever we do, there are always more decisions or choices we did not 
make. And also that since we’re thrown (facticity), our range of pos-
sibilities is always limited. This guilt is a task, in which we have to 
persevere on the level of resoluteness. For Heidegger anxiety and guilt 
are of course not feelings, but rather ontological states that make these 
feelings possible. So from a hermeneutical Heideggerian perspective 
anxiety has got a more distinct positive dimension, i.e. that it is not 
only something negative, but can lead people to live a more owned or 
authentic life. In Furedi’s account, anxiety is not at all seen as a way 
of self-understanding that could help people to see how they are, i.e. 
‘ability-to-be’. Neither is being anxious about concrete ‘ontic matters’ 
seen as disburdening and in that sense as a supportive possibility of 
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the ‘they’, since it reliefs parents (temporarily) of the sometimes heavy 
existential burden of leading their lives (as parents) authentically. 
A hermeneutical approach of the cultural domain (2): 
Taylor on atomism and human agency
Let us take a look at the work of another philosopher whose views in 
some respect come close to Heidegger’s. In Charles Taylor’s post-Hei-
deggerian hermeneutics (1985), (1) man13 is conceived as a self-inter-
preting animal, and (2) society is deemed indispensable for a man to 
be a self-interpreting animal, i.e. for being human. Taylor believes that 
a fully competent human agent, i.e. a person or a self in the ordinary 
meaning, is partly constituted by the understanding he has of himself. 
What makes this self-understanding human is that it essentially incor-
porates our seeing ourselves against a background of ‘strong evalua-
tion’, or as Taylor explains, ‘a background of distinctions between 
things which are recognized as of categoric or unconditional or higher 
importance or worth, and things which lack this or are of lesser value’ 
(ibid., 3). Full, normal human agency necessarily implies that ‘certain 
questions of categoric value have arisen, and received at least partial 
answers’ (ibid, 3). Taylor distinguishes between two possibilities: these 
answers can be given authoritatively by the culture or they can be 
elaborated in the deliberation by the person concerned. In any case 
they are his in the sense that they are incorporated into his self-under-
standing (ibid, 3).
But man is dependent upon the community and communities he 
belongs to. The issue our Heidegger reading evoked, namely whether 
society does have a positive function, is put aside by Taylor. Still, 
Taylor has something important to say about the kind of dependency 
the individual has on the community. In criticizing the ‘disengaged 
13 Taylor uses the gendered expression ‘man’ instead of ‘(wo)man’. I believe it is clear he means 
human beings regardless of sex or gender with the term ‘man’. 
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identity’ that is typically valued by moderns, Taylor believes the most 
negative feature of this stance is atomism. This is an understanding of 
the individual as metaphysically independent of society. Taylor holds 
that atomism ‘hides from view the way an individual is constituted by 
the language and the culture which can only be maintained and 
renewed in the communities he is part of’ (ibid, 8). Taylor (ibid, 8) 
explains why this is the case: 
The community is not simply an aggregation of individuals; nor is 
there simply a causal interaction between the two. The community 
is also constitutive of the individual, in the sense that the self-inter-
pretations which define him are drawn from the interchange which 
the community carries on. A human being alone is an impossibil-
ity, not just de facto, but as it were de jure. Outside of the continu-
ing conversation of a community, which provides the language by 
which we draw our background distinctions, human agency of the 
kind I describe above would be not just impossible, but inconceiv-
able. As organisms we are separable from society – although it 
may be hard in fact to survive as a lone being; but as humans this 
separation is unthinkable. On our own, as Aristotle says, we would 
be either beasts or Gods.’ 
The consequence is that in order to have a full normal human agency, 
participating in the ongoing conversation of a community and thus 
dependence on a community is a necessary condition. According to 
Taylor we moderns do not in fact deny our dependence on society, but 
the problem is that this dependence is seen in causal terms, and not as 
touching our very identity (ibid, 8). Unlike Heidegger, Taylor does not 
hesitate to accept the constitutive aspects of society. On the other 
hand, both Heidegger and Taylor – as hermeneutical philosophers – 
shudder at the idea of humans being governed by causal forces. 
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Furedi’s analyses revisited
Now we can take a closer look at some of the metaphysics that are 
(not) at work in Furedi’s account. From a (post-) Heideggerian herme-
neutical point of view Furedi objectifies das Man or in other words 
sees the broader community14 as an object, as an external causal factor 
and not as an existentiale of Dasein (i.e. a distinguishing mark of the 
being of a human being). This means that our society, or the broader 
community, is conceived not only as something negative but, more 
seriously, that it remains external to parental self-understanding in the 
way this is conceived by Heidegger and Taylor. That is why Furedi 
believes parents can gain some intellectual (sociological) insight into 
these external forces, from an outsider’s point of view. Heidegger 
could never regard Furedi’s cultural influences as beings that are pres-
ent-at-hand (objects) and have causal effects on parents, reducing the 
latter also to beings that are present-at-hand. So Heidegger’s problem 
with this idea of parents being disengaged and disconnected from 
society would be that it comes with the high price of them becoming 
objectified themselves. It is important to notice that Heidegger does 
not even mention the idea of a community or society in Being and 
Time, averse as he is to the idea that a way of being of Dasein (existen-
tiale) would be conceived of as an object and Dasein would become a 
being that is present-at-hand15. For Taylor, Furedi’s approach would 
be an outstanding example of how atomism is embraced nowadays 
and how our dependency on a community in order to be a human 
agent is conceived of as an interaction with causal effects that do not 
touch our very identity.
14 When I use the term ‘society’ or ‘broader community’, I do not suppose there is one mono-
lithic cultural community; I mean the different impersonal cultural, linguistic etc. communi-
ties in which parents as social beings are already embedded. I interpret Heidegger’s ‘the 
they’ in a Taylorian way, in the sense that there are many ongoing conversations parents 
take part in. And of course, next to that, parents are also part of interpersonal communi-
ties, which means that they know the other members as it were by sight. These are explicitly 
not meant when I use the term ‘broader community’.
15 Heidegger starts his Zollikon Seminars with a warning for his audience of psychiatrists that 
‘Human Dasein as a domain with the capacity for receiving-perceiving is never merely an 
object present-at-hand. On the contrary, it is not something which can be objectified at all 
under any circumstances.’ (Heidegger 2001, 4, emphasis mine)
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Disconnected as parents are from it, in Furedi’s account society can 
never be a resource for parenting knowhow. So Furedi’s idea that par-
enting is something one does instinctively should come as no surprise. 
Furedi claims that parents know all by themselves what to do16. Put in 
terms of our discussion of Heidegger and Taylor, there is no need for 
social constitutivity. So if Furedi ignores the above-discussed constitu-
tive functioning of our culture he has to look for the positive aspects 
of parenting in the instinctive realm rather than in the public realm. 
Heidegger’s distinctions help us to see that there is a one-sidedness in 
Furedi’s approach, in the sense that he emphasises the normativity of 
the community (the normative functioning), without taking into 
account the need for a constitutive society or community (the consti-
tutive functioning). For Furedi, it seems that everything would be all 
right if society would only leave these parents alone.
Furedi analyzes the problems attributed to parenthood on a funda-
mental level as cultural influences coming from the broader society 
(community), but he looks for a solution, at least in part, at the level 
of smaller and interpersonal communities. Why is this? The disen-
gaged atomist view leads to the belief that parents and society are on 
the opposite sides of a fence or a wall. This means that parents have to 
deal with society as a whole, in which case ‘fellow-victims’ would do 
well to organize themselves and look for ways to support each other 
without the hope they could ever really change the way things are at 
the level of society. This is not to say that bringing parents together is 
16 One could of course in a more sympathetic reading connect the idea of instinct not to 
nature in the sense of first nature, but to nature in the sense of second nature (e.g. Helen 
Reece in her review of The Claims Of Parenting (Ramaekers and Suissa 2012), source: 
http://www.spiked-online.com/index.php/site/reviewofbooks_article/12153). 
 This would imply some sort of constitutivity. But the instinctive knowhow would still remain 
disconnected from a societal level in Furedi’s view, at least in his book Paranoid Parenting, 
where this is very obvious, if one reads the following long quote (emphasis mine): ‘In any 
case, most professional advice is at best good common sense or at worst someone’s preju-
dice. (…) Experience indicates that today’s authorative advice will probably be dismissed in 
five years as unenlightened opinion, so don’t feel worried about not heeding it. The advice 
of friends and family members is likely to be far more relevant, since they are acquainted 
with your circumstances and actually know a bit about your child. However in the end it is 
your call, so you might as well follow your instinct. Be prepared to call the child expert’s 
bluff’ (Furedi 2008 196-7).
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a bad thing to do, but it is not clear how this could help them out on 
the level of society putting pressure on them. One gets the impression 
that it rather enlarges the image of a powerful and hostile society. 
From a hermeneutical viewpoint, both impersonal and (inter)personal 
ways of being social originate in Dasein’s self-understanding as a 
social being. 
Since Furedi does not draw a distinction between the constitutive side 
of being (a) social (being) and the normative side of being (a) social 
(being) he cannot form the hypothesis that parenthood might be out 
of balance on a more fundamental level. Perhaps, indeed, there is an 
imbalance between the normative function of the broader anonymous 
community on the one hand and the constitutive function it has on the 
other. The anxiety Furedi describes and the feelings of guilt 
(Schaubroeck 2010) or exhaustion (Hodgkinson 2010) others write 
about, can be interpreted as ways of self­understanding that are symp-
tomatic of having too many possibilities of understanding themselves 
as parents and not enough criteria to distinguish between different 
social articulations of how to be a good parent. Another way of put-
ting this is to say that there is too much room for values others have 
concerning parenting (even if they deny that their approaches are 
value-laden, as many scientific accounts actually do), but that parents 
on the other hand seem to have not enough space at all to try to find 
out what they value themselves as parents. 
A new perspective on parenting support
Furedi’s Paranoid Parenting, for all its merits, shows how an uncritical 
embracing of a modernist atomist view of human agency leads us 
astray, when we are trying to conceive of the idea of parenting sup-
port. Furedi’s overstrained atomism leads to a very negative concep-
tion of parenting support indeed. The default position seems to be one 
that distrusts our culture, that a priori distrusts every expert, that 
encourages parents to join each other and give each other support, but 
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this always against the background of a hostile society. When, instead 
of seeing the individual (parent) as opposed to an anonymous society, 
we conceive of parents or other individuals as human beings that 
always try to make sense of their lives in terms of the social articula-
tions that are available, we can start to treat them as full human 
agents; not just subject to forces coming from a massive society, and 
not only able to reflect upon their lives and actions, but in fact con-
stantly doing so. Following the hypothesis that parents are not given 
the room to reflect on the values that are inherent in the cultural mes-
sages Furedi believes they constantly receive, and accepting the Hei-
deggerian idea that das Man, or our culture, is not some ‘thing’ that 
lies outside our self-understanding as a causal factor, into which we 
can gain insight, in such a manner that we can liberate ourselves from 
it, but accepting that cultural pressures can be seen as possible ways of 
understanding oneself as a parent17, the problem can then be consid-
ered not just in terms of a hostile society or culture versus a lonely 
parent, but , I believe, as first and foremost in terms of whether I, as a 
parent, can live with the idea that this is happening in my society; or, 
in other words, whether I can live with the idea that this is the kind of 
parent I would want to be. Furedi clearly does not want to look at 
himself as a parent who deeply distrusts other parents and adults. It is 
because he is connected with (and not disengaged from) his society 
that he protests. Yet it is exactly this connectedness that is cast aside in 
Furedi’s Paranoid Parenting. From a hermeneutical point of view, it is 
my self-understanding and my ability to be at the level of the anony-
mous society that gets challenged. From a causal-mechanistic point of 
view, in a certain sense what is happening has nothing to do with who 
I am, and who I want to be. 
This is highly reminiscent of Cavell’s idea of philosophy as the educa-
tion of grownups, in which there is no fundamental gap between the 
17 E.g. in the example Furedi gives on his website of a parent getting mad at the lifeguard who 
forbids her to take a photograph of her child in the swimming pool (http://www.frankfuredi.
com/index.php/site/article/272 retrieved on July 5, 2012). 
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personal and the impersonal and these levels of sense-making can be 
brought together: 
In philosophizing I have to bring my own language and life into 
imagination. What I require is a convening of my culture’s criteria, 
in order to confront them with my words and life as I pursue them 
and as I may imagine them; and at the same time to confront my 
words and life as I pursue them with the life my culture’s words 
may imagine for me: to confront the culture with itself, along the 
lines in which it meets in me. This seems to me a task that warrants 
the name philosophy. It is also the description of something we 
might call education. (…) In this light philosophy becomes the 
education of grownups. (…) The anxiety in teaching, in serious 
communication, is that I myself require education. And for grown-
ups this is not natural growth, but change. Conversion is a turning 
of our natural reactions; so it is symbolized as rebirth. (Cavell 
1999 [1979], 125) 
This is not to say that parent support, whatever form it takes, should 
be a kind of philosophizing, but this is to say that it at least should 
allow parents the possibility to articulate (imagine, put into words) 
what they themselves value in their culture. There is at least one form 
of parenting support conceivable along these lines that would allow 
such a connection between the personal and impersonal levels of com-
munity. Parents could gather with other parents to help each other to 
make sense of their lives by looking from close quarters at how they 
actually understand themselves in the ways our social normativity 
provides for. Perhaps they could find out together which of the cultur-
ally prescribed ways of ‘parenting’ are valued by themselves. This 
could be another good reason to create a community of parents, 
alongside the reasons mentioned by Furedi, Schaubroeck and Hodg-
kinson18. And although at first glance this new proposal does not seem 
that different from what these authors propose, I believe that it could 
18 See note 5.
58 CHAPTER 1
make a huge difference because it would not only give parenting issues 
back to parents, but it would also let them take responsibility for their 
own (broader) community qua community and connect them in this 
way with their (broader) community.
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Introduction: the parenting paradox
I n this chapter we want to approach the new science-informed par-enting account from a hermeneutical perspective, because we believe 
it can help us to get a grip on at least some aspects of our late-modern 
condition. In this first section we articulate what is at stake. Since the 
1970s ‘parenting’ has become a major issue in Western societies. It has 
been remarked that this growing public interest in child rearing is 
underpinned by parental determinism, or ‘the assumption that there is 
a direct causal link between the quality of parenting and social out-
comes’ (Lee, Bristow, Faircloth, and Macvarish 2014, 3).20 Low-qual-
ity parenting is presumed to be the source of all kinds of problems. For 
instance, the founders of the Positive Parenting Program (Triple P) 
believe that mental health problems as well as social and economic 
problems can be traced back to the parent-child relationship (Sanders, 
Markie-Dadds and Turner 2003). Consequently, so the reasoning goes, 
19 This chapter is a slightly revised version of the article, co-authored by Stefan Ramaekers, 
that has been published in Educational Theory, Vol. 64, 6, 2014, 607-625. No changes were 
made apart from some small corrections and a changing of references into APA style. 
20 The authors of this work define ‘parental determinism’ as follows: ‘a form of deterministic 
thinking that construes the everyday activities of parents as directly and causally asso-
ciated with ‘failing’ or harming children, and so the wider society’; they further state that it 
is precisely the project of their research centre to ‘understand better the roots and trajectory 
of parental determinism’ (ibid., 3). See also Furedi 2008.
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the reverse (namely good or high-quality parenting), understood in a 
particular way, is a panacea. For example, Nicole Letourneau, who 
holds a chair in research on parent-infant mental health, states that a 
strong, positive parent-infant relationship can help prevent alcohol-
ism, obesity, heart disease, depression, and cancer (Letourneau 2013, 
237). Similarly, children’s psychologist Margot Sunderland names 
anxiety (attacks), depression, rage, bullying, aggression, addiction to 
alcohol, smoking, and drugs as possible problems good parenting can 
prevent (Sunderland 2006, 10-11). She claims that ‘If we act upon 
what science can tell us about parenting, we can develop more benign 
societies (ibid., 6)’. Policymakers welcome this causal relationship 
between bad parenting and poor outcomes because intervening in the 
familial sphere is considered a more straightforward process than 
attempting to deal with wider social and economic issues (Lee et al. 
2014, ix). In this sense policymakers reinforce the importance attrib-
uted to the causal relationship between what parents do and ‘out-
comes’ in their children.
So good parenting is not based on instincts, but has to be backed up 
scientifically (Lee et al. 2014, ix and Ramaekers and Suissa 2012). 
Scientists and experts are required to show parents how to parent 
their children. The bottom line is simple: parenting, if and only if it is 
backed up scientifically, can and will prevent all kinds of problems, be 
it on the individual level, on an interpersonal level, or on the level of 
society. From this point of view, parents have good reasons to take a 
scientific approach in dealing with their children and their parenting.
Where earlier forms of parenting support – including Triple P, for 
example – were informed by psychology, the new scientific parenting 
discourse is informed by ‘harder’ sciences, such as neurobiology, endo-
crinology, and epigenetics. Jan Macvarish remarks that ‘brain claims’ 
are emphasizing the extreme vulnerability of the infant brain and thus 
raising the stakes of parenting and making the idea of ‘parental deter-
minism’ even more concrete (McVarish 2014, 165). Take, for example, 
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Letourneau’s description of causal mechanisms parents themselves are 
not aware of:
Parental interaction stimulates the development of key circuitry in 
the infant brain, among them the dopamine response system and 
the HPA axis responsible, as you know, for regulating our response 
to stress. Think of Meany’s rats: less licking and grooming resulted 
in poorly regulated, oversensitive stress response systems. The 
dopamine pleasure-reward system is no different. A lack of paren-
tal warmth leaves a child’s dopamine receptors stunted and weak, 
and an outside stimulus becomes the only way he or she can jump-
start them (Letourneau 2013, 189-190).
‘Parental influence’ has a causal meaning in this account and functions 
in an explanatory way. This means that what happens between par-
ents and their children can be described in a correct and precise way 
by an outsider, without checking with the insiders. ‘Understanding’ is 
completely disposed of and replaced by ‘explaining’. This is clearly 
one of the reasons parents cannot turn to more intuitive or common-
sense ideas about raising their children: they have no access to the 
significant causal mechanisms. Necessary parenting knowledge just is 
not accessible to them.
Furthermore, authors like Sunderland and Letourneau present this 
harder scientific stance as the default position for parenting21. This 
idea(l) of good parenting is more than just a new framework for 
coming to a better understanding of the more or less problematic 
behavior of children. Parents are supposed to accept these hand-
books as providing a framework and guideline for every parental 
action. This account is pervasive: there are no limits to its applica-
tion; there are no exceptions. It is not seen as a perspective or 
approach that parents can adhere to in case of trouble; rather, a good 
21 See for instance also: Crone 2011, Healy 2011, Hughes and Baylin 2012, Medina 2013, Siegel 
2011, 2015. 
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parent is supposed to take this stance always.22 What is of interest to 
us is that this entails a taken-for-grantedness of certain forms of 
parental self-understanding.
Scholars such as Stefan Ramaekers and Judith Suissa have already 
pointed out many problems that arise as a consequence of the scienti-
zation of the parent-child relation. The scientific account makes par-
ents dependent upon experts; it requires a form of professionalization 
and psychologization; and, most importantly, it requires parents to see 
their child as ‘a child’ and thus they are asked to ‘bracket out the spe-
cific commitments and understandings they have about how they want 
to be as a person in their relationship with their individual child’ 
(Ramaekers and Suissa 2012, 75). What they call the first-person per-
spective is replaced by a more objective, detached third-person per-
spective. The new brain-based parenting gives us a glimpse into the 
parenting paradox as parents are asked to look at their children as if 
they were organisms obeying the causal laws of nature.
It is instructive to look at some examples of the way this neurobio-
logical account of the parent-child interaction indeed paradoxically 
positions parents. The language, especially in Sunderland’s work, is 
very positive and warm while, at the same time, what parents are 
asked to do requires that they adopt a detached, scientific way of look-
ing at how they interact with their child. Take, for example, Sunder-
land’s explanation of ‘touching base’:
Touching base is when little kids run around happily, then sud-
denly sit on Mom or Dad’s lap or lean on them or touch them in 
someway. This can last a matter of seconds or minutes. Then off 
22 Letourneau includes this significant biographical note: ‘My interest in parenting followed 
me to graduate school, where I began to study the science underlying child development’ 
(2013, 8).
 (8). Jaak Panksepp writes in his foreword to Sunderland’s The Science of Parenting, ‘Here 
we have a scientifically secure base for child-rearing practices in the twenty-first century’ 
(Sunderland 2006, 7). Both Letourneau and Sunderland take for granted that science and 
science alone can tell us what parenting is really about. No further justification is required.
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they go to run around happily again. This is called ‘emotional refu-
eling’ and it serves to create a lovely chemical balance in their 
brains. If your child is doing this to you, it’s a real compliment – 
she is experiencing you as a source of natural brain opioids (Sun-
derland 2006, 86).
Later in the book she counsels,
The more warm, unconditional, constant, and physically affection-
ate your relationship is with your child, the stronger the release of 
opioids, oxytocin, and prolactin in his brain. As a result, your child 
is likely to feel increasingly at ease and comfortable with himself. 
And when he brings to mind your warm presence he will feel very 
safe in the world. In short, your relationship enables your child to 
develop psychological strength. Scientists have found that such 
strength is dependent on opioids being strongly activated in the 
brain (ibid., 108).
Bringing up children has long been considered to be an instinctive or 
intuitive endeavor, where the love of a mother for her child was of 
decisive importance. As early as the end of the nineteenth century, 
however, a scientifically informed upbringing was being promoted 
(Lee 2014, 54-55). By referring to the harder sciences, on the one 
hand, and using a very warm and emotional vernacular, on the other, 
the examples just presented take on a strange flavor. Part of this 
strangeness has to do with the idea that it may simply be inhuman or 
immoral to treat one’s child as an object or an organism. This is remi-
niscent of Martin Heidegger’s critique of physiological explanations 
of a relationship between two human beings, as he believes that the 
physiological is a necessary but by no means sufficient condition for a 
human relationship:
From the fact that human bodily being is interpreted as something 
chemical and as something which can be affected by chemical 
interventions it is concluded that the chemistry of the physiologi-
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cal is the ground and cause for the psychical in humans. This is a 
fallacious conclusion because something which is a [necessary]23 
condition, that is, something without which the existential rela-
tionship cannot be actualized, is not the cause, not the efficient 
cause, and therefore, also, not the ground. The existential relation-
ship does not consist of molecules, and they do not produce it. 
(Heidegger 2001, 155)
Heidegger believes that we simply should not confuse the physiologi-
cal with the existential. However, authors such as Sunderland and 
Letourneau take for granted that parents as human beings are per-
fectly capable of looking at their relationship with their children as if 
it was ‘produced by molecules’. They do not seem to have any doubt 
about this at all.
Exploring our moral horizons
But what happens if we do not just regard this possibility as para-
doxical, but if we examine it seriously as a human possibility and take 
a closer look at it? Here we have one reason to turn to Charles Tay-
lor’s hermeneutical philosophy: the given examples are reminiscent of 
how Taylor in his Sources of the Self describes the highly valued form 
of modern Western rationality as it was first articulated by René Des-
cartes and John Locke:
Being rational now comes to mean taking some distance from ordi-
nary, embodied human existence and striving to acquire mastery 
over the self and the world. The disengagement that this involves is 
mental or intellectual; the mind tries to prescind from its involve-
ment in ordinary existence and aspires to a more detached, disinter-
ested perspective on the world. (Taylor 1989, 149)
23 In this Heidegger quotation ‘necessary’ was added by the translator.
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From this Taylorian perspective we could conceive of parents who fol-
low Sunderland’s advice not as parents who behave in an immoral 
manner, as a Heideggerian reading would suggest, but as parents who 
are striving toward a more rational and thus better way of parenting 
– that is, they are striving toward the ideal of scientific parenting. 
Taylor does not take the disengaged identity as being simply wrong 
and misguided. He believes we are all too deeply imbued with it and 
thus are not able to really repudiate it. The main issue would rather be 
to ‘free it of its illusory pretensions to define the totality of our lives as 
agents, without attempting the futile and ultimately self-destructive 
task of rejecting it altogether’ (Taylor 1985, 7).
For Sunderland, this scientific viewpoint is obligatory. Because we as 
authors are both fathers, taking this obligation seriously would require 
that we truly contemplate the following self-understandings: Can I, as 
a father, conceive of my son first and foremost as a developing neuro­
logical organism? Can I see myself as a father who gives his son an 
oxytocin shot by hugging him, or can I understand myself as a father 
whose relationship with his son is first and foremost endocrinological? 
These are questions on a personal experiential level. Can we as par-
ents really fit this disengaged approach into an understanding of our-
selves as loving parents? In other words, can we see ourselves as good 
parents while and by objectifying our children? Could we really act 
upon this self-understanding? Our point is that these questions, which 
confront us directly with the parenting paradox, remain unasked. Sun-
derland, however, seems to be convinced that these experiences are 
first-person experiences and takes for granted that they are humanly 
possible. 
We now see a second reason to turn to the work of Charles Taylor: his 
interest in the connection of human beings’ self-understandings and 
the broad historical and moral backgrounds that provide the neces-
sary condition to be able to understand oneself in one way or another 
in the first place. We can now ask a transcendental question: What 
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must be the case in the evolution of our self­understanding and moral 
horizons in order that we could and would characterize the parent­
child relation in physicalist, detached, and instrumental ways? Who 
are we now that we give ourselves this paradoxical, seemingly self­
defeating advice? 
In the remainder of this essay, we show how we can read Taylor’s 
work in a way that allows for the possibility of such paradoxes as 
‘scientific parenting’. In fact, we go further still in claiming that this 
late-modern period is a time of many confusions exemplified precisely 
by such oxymoronic formulations as ‘scientific parenting’. One possi-
ble reaction to this situation is to ignore the ambiguity by saying the 
new scientific parenting discourse is completely wrong, along Heideg-
gerian lines; or, on the contrary, to endorse it completely and to advo-
cate it as, for instance, Letourneau and Sunderland do. We instead try 
to find a middle way. This approach will help us to show that our 
late-modern condition entails certain idiosyncratic dangers.
Taylor on human agency
Our aim in this section and the next is to develop a reading of Taylor’s 
account of human agency that will help us to gain insight into the ambi-
guities and paradoxes of our late-modern condition. First, we will look 
at the noncontingent features of our being human; and, second, we will 
develop a strong version of the hermeneutical circle to allow for our 
responsibility as human beings and to make room for historicity and 
thus for the possibility of paradoxical self-understandings.
Taylor is a philosopher who has devoted a considerable part of his 
oeuvre to the question of what it means to be human, examining this 
issue in different guises: in these studies, he has used the terms ‘self’, 
‘identity’, ’person’, and ‘subject’ interchangeably because they all relate 
to the same question (Abbey 2001, 57). Of particular interest for us is 
how Taylor deals with certain ambiguities in our self-understanding, 
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ambiguities that stem from the fact that his ontological account of 
being a self and his contingent or historical account do not necessarily 
coincide.
In his 1977 paper What Is Human Agency? Taylor recasts the question 
‘What does it mean to be a human being?’ as follows: ‘We would like 
to explore in this paper what is involved in the notion of a self, of a 
responsible human agent. What is it that we attribute to ourselves as 
human agents which we would not attribute to animals?’ Taylor 
(1985, 3) stresses two points. First, as human agents we are self­inter­
preting subjects.24 As Ruth Abbey points out, for Taylor one of the 
things that makes a person what he or she is, is the understanding the 
person has of him or herself:
While human beings are natural entities, we are beings with self-
understanding as well, and in order to understand and explain us, 
consideration has to be given to these understandings. Taylor 
claims that humans are partly constituted by our self-understand-
ings: how a person views or interprets herself is not all there is to 
know about her, but it is a vital component of identity, one that 
cannot be overlooked. (Abbey 2001, 58)
Second, our self-understanding incorporates our seeing ourselves as 
living in a space defined by (our) distinctions of worth, or strong eval-
uations.25 Strong evaluation is concerned with the qualitative worth 
of different desires.26 Taylor claims on different occasions that human 
24 In Human Agency and Language, Taylor (1985, 191) makes a stronger statement: ‘That is 
what is contained in the slogan that human beings are self-interpreting animals: there is no 
such thing as what they are, independently of how they understand themselves. To use 
Bert Dreyfus’ evocative term, they are interpretation all the way down.’ See also Taylor 
1989, 34.
25 Taylor 1985, 3.
26 Ibid., 16.
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agency necessarily implies a background of strong evaluation.27 In 
Sources of the Self, he further develops the intimate connection 
between our morality and our identity or self-understanding by using 
the image of orientation in physical space.28 As human beings, we 
consider our identity as an orientation toward the good. According to 
Taylor, our being self-interpretive subjects against a background of 
strong evaluations forms a first distinct ontological or ahistorical fea-
ture of human agency.
Let us now turn to Taylor’s second account of human agency. Against 
the rationalist disengaged view of human agency that he takes to have 
become dominant in our modern times, Taylor argues that human 
agency is engaged agency in the distinctive and technical sense that 
‘the world of the agent is shaped by his or her form of life, or history, 
or bodily existence (Taylor 2006, 203)’. To have one’s ‘world shaped’ 
by something is a relation different from the causal link it is often 
confused with, in Taylor’s view. In the latter sense, for instance, what 
one can see now is a consequence of the way his body is positioned in 
space. For instance, one cannot see the door behind him because the 
refracted light cannot reach his retina. This is not an example of 
engaged agency. In this case the relationship between our experience 
and our embodiment is an external one, where we, as if we were a 
neutral observer, can assert a contingent causal relationship between 
our position in space and the rays of light that cannot reach our eye.
The world-shaping relationship comes down to an internal relation-
ship that concerns the intelligibility of certain terms. We can only 
understand the words up and down, nearby and far away, from within 
27 See, for example, Taylor 1989, 27; and Taylor 1985, 3. A brief explanation of strong evalua-
tion may be helpful here: When I engage in strong evaluation, I prefer one desire over 
another because I deem it of higher value. So I abstain from lying because I value honesty 
more than having the small profit I would have if I were to lie now.
28 ‘By analogy, our orientation in relation to the good requires not only some framework(s) 
which defines the shape of the qualitatively higher but also a sense of where we stand in 
relation to this’ (Taylor 1989, 42).
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our bodily experience.29 This relationship is internal: it requires an 
involvement, a Heideggerian being-in-the-world; it requires the expe-
riencing itself, from the inside as it were. Taylor explicitly does not 
restrict engaged agency to embodiment. Our human world is being 
shaped by body, culture, and form of life. Wittgenstein (1958, I, §584) 
gives an example of a context other than embodiment:
Now suppose I sit in my room and hope that N.N. will come and 
bring me some money, and suppose one minute of this state could 
be isolated, cut out of its context [Zusammenhang]; would what 
happened in it then not be hope? – Think, for example, of the 
words which you perhaps utter in this space of time. They are no 
longer part of this language. And in different surroundings the 
institution of money doesn’t exist either. 
Here, too, we can take the relationship between our experience and 
our world in the two senses identified by Taylor. First, we can see how 
a subject lives in a world where money exists. We can see an interac-
tion between a person and her money. We can see how money ‘makes 
her happy’. Then money becomes one of the many factors that have a 
causal influence on this person’s self-understanding and, for example, 
her well-being. Second, in the stronger sense of world-shaping, we 
know that to be able to interpret a piece of metal as a coin – that is, as 
money – there has to be a sense-making context or form of life. This is 
always intertwined with personal backgrounds, and that is the reason 
we need the person’s self-interpretation and thus cannot know before 
29 In the following quote, Taylor uses the example of embodiment to explain the difference 
between two interpretations of the idea that our experience is shaped by our body, culture, 
or form of life: ‘Thus there are two quite different kinds of relationship which might be 
expressed by saying that our experience is shaped by our bodily constitution. In the first – 
the case of the wall behind me – we note some consequences of this constitution for our 
experience, however characterized. In the second, we point out how the nature of this expe-
rience is formed by this constitution, and how the terms in which this experience is described 
are given their sense only in relation to this form of embodiment. The first kind of relation is 
asserted in an ordinary statement of contingent causality. The second concerns by con-
trast the conditions of intelligibility of certain terms. It is this second relation I want to invoke 
in speaking of our “world being shaped” by body, culture, form of life. The ways in which our 
world is so shaped define the contours of what I am calling engaged agency – what 
Heidegger sometimes referred to as the ‘finitude’ of the knowing agent’ (Taylor 1995b, 63).
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asking or a priori what money means to her now. So for Taylor as a 
hermeneutical philosopher in a Heideggerian/Wittgensteinian tradi-
tion, the idea of an undetachable, (un)articulated background is utterly 
important. These mostly tacit backgrounds provide the necessary con-
ditions for sense making. If they remained in the foreground con-
stantly, they would literally be in our way. For this reason, we mostly 
forget that it is only because of our being embodied creatures that we 
can distinguish between objects that are nearby and things that are 
farther away. We forget that up and down are only intelligible as con-
cepts because of the fact we have human bodies. In the same vein, 
Wittgenstein shows us that we forget that money counts as money 
only because of our shared form of life. But the fact that this back-
ground is not visible to us most of the time does not mean it is not 
there.
As already noted, Taylor believes there is a strong modernist tendency 
to adhere to a rationalist view of agency (the thinking agent) in which 
the relation of ‘world-shaping’ that holds between a kind of agency 
and a certain form of experience is easily confused with a psycho-
physical causal relation (Taylor 2006). This, we believe, is the phe-
nomenon evident in the previously given examples of parent-child 
interactions, where what happens is accounted for in terms of physi-
ological causal relations. Seen from a Taylorian perspective, this out-
look, attractive as it may seem, actually detaches the person from his 
or her sense-giving contexts and replaces these internal relationships 
with external ones. For example, if a mother loves her child, she has a 
more or less articulated sense of what this means; she will have a cer-
tain form of knowing how to show this, how to act out of loving her 
child; loving her child gets its meaning from her personal history, her 
cultural background, her ideas of a desired future, and so on. The pro-
ponent of science-informed good parenting implicitly but urgently 
asks the mother to abstract from or to put between brackets these 
sense-making or world-shaping contexts, and to conceive of herself as 
a psychophysical causal factor and of the child as an organism follow-
ing in its functioning causal mechanistic rules.
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A hermeneutical circle
The idea of human agency as self-interpretation against a background 
of strong evaluations and the idea of engaged agency function in two 
different strands of Taylor’s philosophy, respectively: the former is 
central to his effort to articulate noncontingent features of being 
human, what Taylor himself somewhat hesitantly called a philosophi-
cal anthropology (Taylor 1985, 1), and the latter is tied to his criticism 
of the primacy of epistemology in our Western (philosophical) tradi-
tion. Taylor never mentions strong evaluations in his account of 
engaged agency (1995b and 2006). In our reading of Taylor, we will 
explicitly bring these two accounts together. More importantly, we 
will show how these two accounts, namely self-interpretation and 
world-shaping, though treated separately both in Taylor and in Abbey’s 
reading of Taylor, can be seen as internally connected in a hermeneuti-
cal circle. This means both are of equal importance. Recognizing this 
relationship enables us to appreciate how new individual or collective 
self-interpretations can feed back into our self-understanding as they 
become a part of the world-shaping context. Moreover, it can help us 
to understand and appreciate the ambiguities and paradoxes that seem 
so typical of our late-modern condition and to try to reach a higher 
level of self-understanding through analyzing Sunderland’s and 
Letourneau’s work on parenting, rather than merely criticizing it.
First, in order to do this, it is important to stress that Taylor’s idea of 
engaged agency encompasses more than mere embodiment. In her 
monograph on Taylor, Abbey treats the idea of engaged agency in the 
context of Taylor’s criticism of modern Western epistemology, in which 
a detached subject has to try to regain connection or contact with the 
outside world of objects (Abbey 2001, 179 ff). To make this point, she 
accounts for Taylor’s idea of engaged agency as a form of embodiment 
in line with Maurice Merleau-Ponty. This is, of course, a very strong 
argument against the Cartesian epistemological tradition. Still, by not 
referring to the idea of world-shaping, and by elaborating engaged 
agency only as embodied agency, Abbey leaves the impression (probably 
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unintentionally) that for Taylor engaged agency is nothing more and 
nothing less than embodied agency. While Taylor himself only mentions 
and elaborates embodied agency, he reminds us, as noted earlier, of the 
fact that sense-giving contexts are multiple (Taylor 1995b and 2006).
Second, for Taylor the idea of a background plays an important role 
in both his accounts of human agency. In his first account, this back-
ground is made up of one’s strong evaluations; in his second, it is 
conceived as ‘embodiment’, ’form of life’, and ‘our history’. We believe 
the strong evaluations of his first account can be subsumed under the 
broader categories of embodiment, form of life, and our history in his 
second account. The diversified background of embodiment, culture, 
language, history, and strong evaluations, then, allows for the (partly) 
constitutive self-understanding. This interpretation leaves the impres-
sion that world-shaping is primordial since it enables self-interpreta-
tion and makes it possible for us to understand ourselves, that is, to 
understand our backgrounds (Abbey 2001, 81). For we could say that 
it is not our objectivity, but our subjectivity, conceived not as an empty 
point (for example, Locke’s punctual self)30 but as being-in-the-world 
in the Heideggerian sense, that serves as the necessary background to 
understand how we can be human beings.
At this point, we want to propose taking a third step. In accordance 
with Taylor’s anthropology, this subjectivity is constituted partly by 
the fact that we are self-interpreting and speaking animals. As human 
beings we continuously (re)interpret the world and ourselves. We are 
constantly articulating or bringing to the foreground parts of our 
sense-giving backgrounds. Our linguistic articulations of the unar-
ticulated background feed back into this background. This happens 
on the individual as well as the collective level. To take one example, 
the way Freudian and Marxist concepts have become colloquial has 
changed the way we understand ourselves–without it being neces-
sary, by the way, to have a ‘correct’ understanding of these concepts 
30 (Taylor 1989, 159 ff.)
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(Abbey 2001, 154-155). In the same manner, one’s re-evaluation 
of one’s strong evaluations changes one’s background and thus one’s 
self-interpretation. So although we might believe the world-shaping 
relationship to be primordial to our being human, in fact we always 
enter a hermeneutical circle in which interpretation implies a 
background that can be articulated and that changes our self-inter-
pretations.31
In our reading of Taylor’s philosophy, then, the term ‘engaged agency’ 
is the more generic, encompassing concept though it is not a primor-
dial one. It implies (partly) constitutive self-understanding against a 
diversified background of embodiment, culture, history, language, and 
strong evaluations, and it allows our self-understandings to feed back 
into the meaning-giving or world-shaping background. Instead of 
accepting a hierarchy in which engaged agency – or, specifically, 
embodiment – is more basic than self-interpretation, it is more instruc-
tive to use the image of the hermeneutical circle.
Two things follow from this. First, for Taylor as for Heidegger, the 
hermeneutical circle has to be taken in a strong sense: interpretation 
leads to interpretation and this happens endlessly, as the final interpre-
tation is never reached (Hoy 2006). But for Taylor this has to be con-
ceived as a nonneutral fact, by connecting it to selfhood and thus to 
morality and responsibility, and as intertwined with personal prog-
ress. So how does Taylor account for the fact that human agency is 
about a self as a responsible human being? For Taylor the identity of 
the self is defined in terms of more basic or essential evaluations, which 
31 In Human Agency and Language, Taylor writes, ‘our formulations about ourselves can alter 
what they are about’ (1985, 101). As Abbey (2001, 59) observes, this claim suggests that for 
Taylor a change in my self-interpretation is at the same time a change in me: it is a change 
in the self that is both the interpreter and the interpreted. As a person acquires different 
vocabularies for talking about his or her experiences, emotions, or aspirations, the person’s 
understanding of those things and of him- or herself changes. 
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provide the horizon for other evaluations one makes. The more funda-
mental evaluations are often least clear and least articulated, and these 
are the ones that are also the hardest to be clear about. Taylor does not 
believe we humans are able to radically choose our evaluations, as 
Jean-Paul Sartre did, nor does he believe we cannot help having them. 
His argument is that fresh insight can always change our evaluations, 
and thus ourselves, for the better. Hence, he describes his understand-
ing of responsibility as follows: ‘within the limits of my capacity to 
change myself by fresh insight … I am responsible32 in the full direct, 
‘modern’ sense for my evaluations (Taylor 1985, 39).’ Fresh insight 
can change our self-evaluations in a passive way, but more actively it 
is always possible to pose the question:
[O]ught I to re-evaluate my most basic evaluations? Have I really 
understood what I sense to be the highest mode of life? Now this 
kind of re-evaluation will be radical … in the sense that our look-
ing again can be so undertaken that in principle no formulations 
are considered unrevisable. (ibid., 39, emphasis added)
In this sense Taylor’s ontological claim that human beings are self-
interpreting subjects who try to make sense of their lives and of their 
selves opens up to a form of responsibility and thus to a broader pos-
sibility of changing one’s self – that is, changing one’s orientation 
32 Interestingly, the psychologist Jerome Kagan also connects interpretation with revision 
and so with responsibility. He distinguishes between three ways clinicians categorize their 
patients: as having a disease, as having learned maladaptive behaviours, or as having cer-
tain private interpretations. This has consequences for their conception of treatment. 
Respectively, they will want to cure the patient, teach the patient new behaviours, or per-
suade the patient to rethink his or her understanding of the distress and its causes. In the 
latter case, the patient takes an active role in this process of rethinking, and hence assumes 
much of the responsibility for remission. Kagan notes, ‘Least common are clinicians who 
categorize the patient’s plight as originating in private interpretations of life experiences. 
The noun interpretation is preferentially linked to the predicate revise, and these therapists 
persuade their patients to rethink their understanding of their distress and its causes. The 
verb revise in the sentence “The doctor revises the thinking of the patient” implies that the 
patient must assume an active role in rethinking his or her premises. Therefore, much of the 
responsibility for remission rests with the patient’. (2012, 206-207)
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toward the good. Abbey points out that, for Taylor, revising one’s self-
interpretation is perceived as progress.33
The limits of disembedding
The second thing that follows from our entering this hermeneutical 
circle entails the possibility that our contingent self-understandings 
can conflict with our ontological features – that is, it entails the pos-
sibility of paradox. Taylor shows this in two examples: the idea of 
disengagement as a contingent example of engaged agency, and that of 
individualism as a contingent example of our dependency on a social 
matrix.
The first example we find in Sources of the Self. Taylor claims the dis-
engaged identity has in fact become a familiar modern figure. It gains 
control through disengagement, and, importantly, this disengagement 
is always correlative of an ‘objectification’. In Taylor’s (1989, 160) 
account, the term objectification has a precise meaning: ‘Objectifying 
a given domain involves depriving it of its normative force for us. If 
we take a domain of being in which hitherto the way things are has set 
norms or standards for us, and take a new stance to it as neutral, I will 
speak of objectifying it’. 
For Taylor, living within strongly qualified moral horizons is constitu-
tive of human agency, and this is not a historical and contingent fact. 
There are no exceptions; there cannot be ‘supermen of disengaged 
objectification’. Taylor uses rather dramatic and very negative quali-
fiers in describing a person who would really step out of these moral 
33 Abbey (2001, 61) explains, ‘When an individual adopts a new interpretation of some experi-
ence, event, or emotion, this person sees him- or herself as selecting not simply a different 
interpretation, but a better, truer, or more perspicacious one. So the individual’s self-inter-
pretations are not simply arbitrary impositions or constructions of meaning; there is no 
sense that any reading of myself will do. Just as Taylor argues that the individual’s moral 
life is typically construed in narrative terms, so he proposes that the succession of self-
understandings that individuals adopt is seen by them to be part of a progressive story 
about the unfolding or enhancing self-knowledge’.
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horizons (objectifying them). According to him, such a person would 
be ‘in the grip of an appalling identity crisis’, ‘deeply disturbed’, and 
outside ‘our space of interlocution’ – in short, such a person would be 
‘pathological’ (ibid., 27).
But, in making his point so strongly – that is, by claiming that a human 
standpoint or position outside any background of moral evaluations 
is uninhabitable, is unliveable for human agents qua human agents – 
Taylor then has to address the problem presented by the fact that there 
are actually people who embrace the ideal of a disengaged agent who 
stands outside any framework. Taylor believes such people are mis-
guided because they in fact are committed to certain moral frame-
works, but they fail to see this. A famous example is the utilitarian 
ideologue who ‘admires people who live up to this ideal, condemns 
those who fail or who are too confused even to accept it, [and] feels 
wrong when he himself falls below it’ (ibid., 31). In other words, this 
figure of disengagement is self-defeating. It cannot count as a counter-
example against the idea of engaged agency. Taylor sketches more 
examples of figures of disengagement in the weak sense of the word, 
including ‘the believer in disengaged objectification, who sees mastery 
of reason as a kind of rational control over the emotions attained 
through the distance of scientific scrutiny, the kind of modern of whom 
Freud is a prototypical example and for whom he is often a model’ 
(ibid., 45). So Taylor’s philosophy leaves room for the ambiguity and 
paradox we find in the Sunderland and Letourneau examples.
It has been argued that, as a parent, one could not become a figure of 
disengagement in the strong sense because the parent-child relation-
ship is moral all the way down;34 however, even if parents adopt a 
so-called disengaged stance, this would not entail them stepping out-
side a background of moral evaluations. In fact, they are not asked to 
do so. Books such as The Science of Parenting and Scientific Parenting 
suggest that parents who adopt a scientific stance will be better parents, 
34 Ramaekers and Suissa 2012, 61, 89, and 108, for instance.
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that their children will be better citizens, and so on. Parents are thus 
implicitly offered a moral framework. Our point here is analogous to 
the example of the utilitarian ideologue: the proponent of scientific 
parenting is not abstracting from morality altogether; rather, he or she 
is actively trying to persuade parents to embrace certain ‘moral ideals’, 
to use Taylor’s terminology.35
Let us take a look at our second example. Abbey points out how the 
ideal of the free, disengaged self that Taylor traces to the Scientific 
Revolution is also free of social embedding (Abbey 2001, 100). Taylor 
elaborates the idea of a historical process of disembedding individuals 
in his historical account of (multiple) modernities, Modern Social 
Imaginaries. In this work he deals with another example of misguid-
edness – or what we prefer to call ambiguity or paradox – in our cul-
ture. Taylor points out that we moderns are likely to misconceive our-
selves as atomistic individuals that have no dependency on the social 
matrix to which we belong. We confuse the formal with the material 
mode of social embedding:
[O]ur first self-understanding was deeply embedded in society. 
Our essential identity was as father, son, and so on, and as a mem-
ber of this tribe. Only later did we come to conceive of ourselves 
as free individuals first (…). [W]e have to distinguish between a 
formal and material mode of social embedding (…). On the first 
level, we are always socially embedded; we learn our identities in 
dialogue, by being inducted into a certain language. But on the 
level of content, what we may learn is to be an individual, have our 
own opinions (…). (Taylor 2004, 64-65)
Although formally socially embedded, we materially learned to be 
atomistic individuals, and we tend to ontologize this contingent and 
35 In The Ethics of Authenticity, Taylor writes, ‘What do I mean by a moral ideal? I mean a 
picture of what a better or higher mode of life would be, where “better” and “higher” are 
defined not in terms of what we happen to desire or need, but offer a standard of what we 
ought to desire.’ (1992, 16)
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historical fact. Taylor uses a thought experiment to escape this 
‘bewitchment’: he considers the question, ‘What would I be like if I 
had been born to different parents?’ Of course, one can answer, ‘like 
the people who were in fact born to those other parents’. But if you 
really try to get a grip on the question, he writes, then your ‘head 
begins to swim.’ Taylor believes that making sense of this question 
requires delving too deep into the formative horizon of one’s identity. 
Still, many questions that were not conceivable in earlier societies are 
not only conceivable nowadays, but they arise as burning practical 
questions: Should I have married that woman/man? Should we have 
had children? Should I convert to another religion? For Taylor, this is 
a measure of our disembedding. Because of this evolution, we can 
entertain an abstract question such as ‘What would I be like if I was 
born to different parents?,’ even if we cannot make it imaginatively 
real (ibid. 54-55).Taylor views this ability to abstract and disconnect 
from one’s social matrix as a distinctly modern Western phenome-
non.36 But he also believes it is ontologically limited. 
Embracing our late-modern condition
Our late-modern condition is characterized by ambiguities and para-
doxes that we cannot escape because new ideals have been deeply 
inscribed in our forms of life;37 they have become part of our sense-
giving moral horizons and hence our self-understandings. The idea(l)s 
of disengaged agency, neutral agency, and scientific agency have entered 
our form of life, and this entails the conviction that unless a scientific 
approach is followed, our world will no longer be habitable. So for us 
late-modern Western subjects, the idea of parenting without any recourse 
to science is not acceptable. Taylor proposed that we should try to limit 
the scope of the ideal of disengagement. The scientific parenting case 
36 Compare this with the distinction between the ontological and the advocacy aspects of com-
munitarianism in Taylor’s political thought. See Abbey 2001, 102; and Taylor 1995a, 181–203.
37 Another example of such a paradox in our late-modern society is that we demand that 
persons must be unique individuals in order to be accepted socially.
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shows that this is not an easy task to accomplish. In this section, we will 
first try to understand why it may be difficult to escape the pitfalls of 
our time, and then we will assess the new scientific parenting account 
and see what the pitfalls are in that case.
We saw how our late-modern ambiguity and paradox has become pos-
sible as a historical condition because we continuously engage in a her-
meneutical circle of (self-)understanding. Our moral horizons are com-
plex and partly contradictory: we are socialized as atomistic individuals; 
we conceive of engaged agency as if it was disengaged agency by replac-
ing sense-giving with psychophysical causation; and parenting experts 
like Sunderland and Letourneau position themselves morally by refer-
ring to allegedly value-free hard sciences. In a sense, our noncontingent 
human features recede ever further into our late-modern backgrounds. 
They become harder to retrieve as they escape articulation. Sunderland 
and Letourneau are cases in point: they do not even seem to notice that 
there could be a problem of disengaged agency. They would probably 
claim that their viewpoint is very ‘engaged’, as indeed they are asking 
parents to be highly engaged. This shows how our late-modern condi-
tion makes us increasingly blind to the fact that we are self-interpreting 
beings, that we position ourselves toward the good by being strong eval-
uators, that we are engaged agents with a multifaceted subjectivity, that 
we need a linguistic community in order to be able to articulate anything, 
and that, as self-interpreting subjects, we are capable of taking responsi-
bility for ourselves by revising our evaluations and interpretations. Fur-
thermore, as Taylor’s thought experiment shows, it is difficult to see 
where the limits are. We are not sure how far we can go. It is symptom-
atic of our late-modern condition that we cannot easily distinguish what 
‘goes’ from what doesn’t, so we risk going further than we can bear. For 
instance, parents might really try to hold onto the ideal of taking a dis-
engaged stance toward their children and their parenting in a manner 
analogous to people who try to be independent of others and who try to 
live up to the ideals of atomistic individualism. But these parents proba-
bly will not succeed. Unlike scientists, they did not receive training in 
how to assume a disengaged stance; their children are not objects under 
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study, but are their children.38 Their bond with their children is not 
reducible to interacting nervous systems or hormonal systems, and it has 
a significance that cannot be captured completely by objectifying it.
While our noncontingent features disappear into the background, the 
new ideals are explicitly promoted. That explains why it can be hard 
for late-modern Western subjects like ourselves to see any problem 
with Sunderland’s and Letourneau’s accounts of parenting. It also 
means that it can be very hard for policymakers, parenting experts 
who engage in various forms of parenting support, and parents them-
selves to see potential problems with these science-based approaches. 
In the same vein, it can be hard nowadays to see that in order to thrive 
as individual subjects, we still need others.
So what would these problems be? When we look from a hermeneuti-
cal perspective at the parenting paradox as exemplified in the work of 
Sunderland and Letourneau, we see that the new scientific account of 
parenting does not take any aspect of Taylor’s (revised) anthropology 
into account. The widely accepted ideal of scientific objectivity that is 
espoused by both Sunderland and Letourneau involves a strong ten-
dency not to accept the idea of a hermeneutical circle. The advocates 
of science-informed parenting claim that they want to break through 
the fuzziness of unreliable parenting opinions.39 Their conviction is 
38 Ramaekers and Suissa (2012) repeatedly make this point. 
39 See, for example, Strahan, Dixon Jr., and Banks 2010: ‘Sometimes it feels as though every-
body has an opinion on how you should bring up your child – and no two people seem to 
agree on how it should be done for the best! Parenting with Reason cuts through the 
masses of confusing and often contradictory advice about parenting by providing hard 
evidence to back up the tough decisions all parents face. Unlike many self-help guides to 
parenting which are based on the opinion of one author, this book is based on many find-
ings from scientific research, giving you a trustworthy, ‘evidence-based’ guide to help you 
see your way through parenting dilemma’s’ (2010, i). 
 In The Science of Parenting, Sunderland gives another good example: ‘There was a moment 
of shock when I first realized how much impact the everyday interactions between parent 
and child can have on a child’s developing brain. Yet the mass of scientific research on this 
subject was not getting through to parents or to the public arena. This is what fueled my 
passion to write a book that would not be just one more opinion on parenting (we have quite 
enough of these), but would rather empower parents to make informed choices for their 
children based on what we can learn from these scientific studies’ (2006, 6, emphasis 
added).
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that we finally have the means necessary to attain the hard and 
unchanging knowledge about what really goes on between parents 
and their children. More interpretive sciences such as psychology have 
been left behind,40 and this is seen as a relief and an improvement 
since neuroscience promises direct epistemic access to reality. 
There is no role for the sense-giving backgrounds to play in a herme-
neutical sense, as a form of ‘engaged agency’; the only ‘background’ 
at work is embodiment – we are our brains, as a Dutch neurologist 
claims without any hint of irony (Swaab 2014). This means that our 
interactions are reduced to exchanges of bodily processes. Our multi-
faceted subjectivity is replaced by a purely biological objectivity; 
hence understanding is replaced by explanation. Take, for example, 
Letourneau’s use of the word ‘influence’ in her book title: Scientific 
Parenting: What Science Reveals about Parental Influence. Here, the 
term is not used in a hermeneutical sense, to mean that what parents 
or children do is always interpreted by all participants; rather, in this 
context, it has a purely causal and thus explanatory meaning that, as 
we have seen, is not accessible to those participating in the interac-
tions themselves. This reinforces the prevailing ideas of parental 
determinism and of parents’ needing the help of experts to bring up 
their children successfully. Since the implicit idea is that we share the 
same physiology, all kinds of relevant nonbiological differences – 
such as cultural differences, biographical differences, differences in 
socioeconomic background, and so on – are bracketed out. This 
means that one approach serves all. Governments can reduce social 
politics to interventions in the parent-child realm with an exclusive 
focus on brain development.
But, as already noted, morality is not ruled out completely. On the 
contrary, one is supposed to become a warm and caring parent through 
40 See, for example, an interview with Peter Adriaenssens, a Belgian child psychiatrist and 
parenting expert (Beel 2006). 
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adherence to the hard-science account of parenting.41 Experts in the 
field of parenting and parenting support are expected to keep the lat-
est scientific developments in mind. According to this view, it seems a 
bit immoral to continue to refer to developmental psychology when 
we now have all this brain knowledge. Still, we believe there is a major 
problem on the level of morality. A hermeneutical approach such as 
Taylor’s can help remind us that what we take to be our ‘reality’ always 
entails our personal sense-giving backgrounds, which we cannot 
choose and cannot oversee.
Because we are (self-)interpreting subjects, our articulations are 
always at least partly our own responsibility. To put this in the words 
of Stanley Cavell (1999, 216), the scientific account of parenting 
asks parents and parenting experts to accept that the world, which is 
supposed to be accurately described by scientists, provides answers 
that are independent of any individual’s responsibility for claiming 
something to be so – whether that individual is a scientist, parenting 
expert, or parent. The Taylorian version of personal responsibility is 
also ruled out since parents are not invited to reassess their deepest 
convictions, but instead are instructed to listen to the experts who 
can generate claims directly from reality. Even parenting experts are 
no longer free to refer to their own personal values or their own 
personal responsibility. Moreover, although the examples of scien-
tific parenting we looked at still entail a positioning toward the good, 
in silent accordance with Taylor’s anthropology, it is not up to par-
ents themselves to decide what this good means, and this positioning 
is never made explicit. As a result, parents are not understood to be 
full-blown, adult moral agents, and experts are blind to the fact that 
41 In The Science of Parenting, Sunderland writes, ‘Opioids are hormones that give us a sense 
of well-being; these chemicals are produced when a child is lovingly touched or held by a 
parent or other caring person. Warm, attentive parents will repeatedly activate the release 
of these hormones, creating a secure bond with their child. If, however, parents do not 
understand their child’s need for closeness – or worse, if they regularly respond to that 
child with criticism and shouting – the release of opioids and oxytocin is blocked. Instead, 
the child may then suffer from “hormonal hell” due to prolonged stress, which, as we will see 
later in the book, can cause permanent changes in the child’s brain’ (2006, 26).
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they often repeat commonsense ideas that reflect our contemporary 
moral standards in the form of scientific knowledge.42 Parents are 
thus denied their responsibility, as articulated by Taylor, for personal 
moral reflection; experts, on the other hand, either keep silent about 
or are perhaps unaware of the role they actually play in imposing or 
reinforcing moral standards. From this science-based viewpoint, there 
is no sense in looking at parents’ strong evaluations and revising them. 
Responsibility boils down to accepting the science-informed approach 
to parenting without question. Of course, one might object, for many 
parents these accounts offer fresh insights, which means parents can 
and probably will passively change their evaluations. But parents are 
not invited to revise their own evaluations in the radical sense of con-
sidering that no evaluation is beyond revision; they are simply not 
addressed as people who have their own strong evaluations. There-
fore, responsibility, in the distinctive sense that Taylor uses this term, 
is not an issue at all. Taylor has suggested that we should try to accept 
the disengaged identity without letting it take over all of our life. The 
case of scientific parenting shows that this is indeed a necessary goal, 
but one that is not easy to accomplish. We are lured into overenthusi-
astic acceptance of only one moral ideal (or, to use Taylor’s term, 
‘hypergood’) while forgetting the others. Indeed, in our reading of the 
hermeneutical circle, our noncontingent features – for example, the 
‘fact’ that we are strong evaluators – are also moral ideals. In articu-
lating them, Taylor clearly wants us to see that they are important. 
However, we late moderns are attracted to simplified understandings 
of our very complex and multi-layered moral horizons. For politi-
cians, parenting experts, and parents alike, it can be very tempting to 
reduce the complexity to a level that is more manageable, with the risk 
of dehumanizing ourselves.
42 In Parenting Culture Studies, Macvarish (2014, 176) makes this point: ‘While the use of a 
neuroscientific vocabulary of synapses, neurons, and cortisol appears to bring scientific 
advancements to bear on parenting, the recommendations derived from it tend to chime 
with existing common-sense ideas about what constitutes good parenting, indicating that 
shifting cultural norms shape the kinds of scientific “truths” on which claims about correct 
parenting are made’.
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Embracing our late-modern condition means we have to find a middle 
ground between acceptance and rejection. We need to take a critical 
‘yes, but there is more to it’ attitude. Adopting such an attitude in this 
specific case would mean that experts should rely on science, but 
should also realize and admit that they are holding a moral position 
and that they are imposing a certain self-understanding and particular 
hypergoods upon parents. In addition, it would mean conceiving of 
the truths of science as provisional in principle and as limited in scope 
and application, since promoting certain scientific findings over others 
always also involves some kind of human interpretation that is contin-
gent upon a zeitgeist, and thus involves responsibility. Given this, sci-
entific results should not be presented to parents as universal and non-
contingent self-evident truths, but parents should be granted the 
opportunity to consider and reconsider the moral viewpoints they 
imply. This means that parents as human beings deserve a space in 
which to evaluate what it would mean for themselves to endorse or 
reject these views. By extension, it would mean that they have some 
responsibility of their own to look for ways to make our world a bet-
ter place. The question we could ask ourselves as parents, then, would 
not be ‘Is it really possible for us as fathers to experience this para-
doxical parenting self-understanding or to act according to this self-
conception?’, but, rather, ‘(Why) should we prefer this self-under-
standing?’, or ‘Is this a possibility that we should deem of higher 
value’? We believe that our late-modern condition makes it harder for 
parents to ask precisely these personal ethical questions.
If we really want to deal with the challenges of our late-modern time, 
we cannot be satisfied with simply rejecting what many of our con-
temporary human beings appear to consider received wisdom. On the 
other hand, enthusiastically and uncritically endorsing, for instance, 
scientific approaches to parenting is a negation of the very complexity 
of the contradicting ideals so typical of our late-modern condition. 
This negation entails its own dangers.
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How scientific frameworks ‘frame parents’: 
Wittgenstein on the import of changing  
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Introduction
I n this chapter I take the way certain propositions function in a par-ticular parenting handbook as a starting point of an investigation 
into the ways language-games actually change and what this implies 
for parents and parenting. The choice of The Whole­brain Child. 12 
Revolutionary Strategies to Nurture Your Child’s Developing Mind 
(Siegel and Bryson 2012)44 is not coincidental. It represents an impor-
tant strand in parenting support – a default position –, that holds first 
that there is a lack of parental confidence which can be restored by 
providing scientific knowledge, and second that the providing of this 
knowledge is somehow morally neutral: these resources allegedly only 
provide information. The sciences drawn from until recently were 
developmental and behavioral psychology, but the latest evolution is 
that parenting expertise draws from findings in the fields of ‘hard’ sci-
ences such as neurology, epigenetics and endocrinology. Engaging with 
Wittgenstein and Wittgenstein scholarship, especially on On Cer­
tainty, I will critically question both of the above assumptions. 
43 This chapter  has been published in A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education: Pedagogical 
Investigations (Springer, 2017) edited by Jeff Stickney and Michael A. Peters. This version is 
slightly longer because I included more Wittgenstein quotations, especially from Remarks 
on the Foundations of Mathematics. 
44 I will further refer to this book as WBC. 
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WBC is a bestseller and has been translated into 21 languages, at the 
time of writing.45 In the introductory pages of WBC parents read that 
they will acquire knowledge that will allow them to ‘parent’ better and 
it is suggested that what they will learn is firmly grounded in epistemic 
certainties, which are in a way foundational: 
So we want to introduce you to the whole-brain perspective. We’d 
like to explain some fundamental concepts about the brain and 
help you apply your new knowledge in ways that will make par-
enting easier and more meaningful. (WBC, 3)
What you do as a parent matters, and we’ll provide you with 
straightforward, scientifically based ideas that will help you build 
a strong relationship with your child that can help shape his brain 
well and give him the best foundation for a healthy and happy life. 
(WBC, 4; emphasis mine)
Parents learn that through their relationship with their child, they can 
help shape his/her brain, and that a brain that is well shaped, is a foun­
dation for a happy, healthy and prosperous life. Some basic ideas that 
I believe to be very significant are: 
‘Parents can shape their child’s brain, through their relationship 
with him/her.’
‘Brains can be well shaped.’
‘Well shaped brains are a foundation for a happy, healthy and 
prosperous life.’
WBC contains what I believe is another rather central and fundamen-
tal idea, that we could rephrase as: ‘parenting ultimately boils down to 
45 See Siegel’s website: http://www.drdansiegel.com/books/the_whole_brain_child/ accessed 
on 16 November 2015. 
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integration, this is the wiring and rewiring of our child’s brain’.46 This 
proposition is not articulated, let alone claimed, as such. But it seems 
to be central in the book, as the next small selection of parts of the 
book (hopefully) will make clear. 
The first chapter presents the concept of parenting with the brain 
in mind and introduces the simple and powerful concept at the 
heart of the whole-brain approach, integration. (WBC, x)
A clear understanding of these different aspects of the whole-brain 
approach will allow you to view parenting in a whole new way. 
(WBC, xi)
[T]he brain physically changes throughout the course of our lives, 
not just in childhood, as we had previously assumed. What molds 
our brain? Experience. (…) [O]n top of our basic brain architec-
ture and our inborn temperament, parents have much they can do 
to provide the kinds of experiences that will help develop a resil-
ient well-integrated brain. This book will show how to use your 
everyday experiences to help your child’s brain become more and 
more integrated. (…) This wire-and-rewire process is what integra-
tion is all about: giving your children experiences to create connec-
tions between different parts of the brain. (WBC, 7-8) 
The rate of brain maturation is largely influenced by the genes we 
inherit. But the degree of integration may be exactly what we can 
influence in our day-to-day parenting. The good news is that by 
using everyday moments, you can influence how well your child’s 
brain grows toward integration. (WBC, 10; emphasis in original) 47
46 Compare this with Wittgenstein (1966, 24): ‘The attraction of certain kinds of explanation 
is overwhelming. At a given time, the attraction of a certain kind of explanation is greater 
than you can conceive. In particular, explanations of the kind “This is really only this”.’
47 It may seem that I am overstating their claim here: is ‘integration’ really intended to replace 
the broader scope of the parenting role? The least one can say is that it is the central and 
very pervasive idea within their account of parenting. And we can imagine many readers 
would interpret it in this way. 
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Some ideas are emphatically presented as very central and foundational. 
Sibling rivalry is like so many other issues that make parenting dif-
ficult – tantrums, disobedience, homework battles, discipline mat-
ters, and so on. As we’ll explain in the coming chapters, these 
everyday parenting challenges result from a lack of integration 
within your child’s brain. (WBC 9-10; emphasis mine) 
Others are mentioned ‘en passant’ and thus demand some interpreta-
tive effort. 
‘The upstairs brain weighs different options.’ 
‘A parent connects with his/her child’s brain.’48 
‘Brains are shaped by parents.’ 
The most basic or fundamental ideas of the book (for instance, ‘Humans 
have brains’) are not explicitly mentioned, and it would furthermore be 
strange to mention them, although they are very fundamental. 
‘What happens between a child and a parent are interactions.’
‘We have brains.’ 
‘Parenting exists.’
48 ‘Once she had connected with him right brain to right brain, it was much easier to connect 
left to left and deal with the issues in a rational manner. By first connecting with his right 
brain, she could then redirect with the left brain through logical explanation and planning, 
which required that his left hemisphere join the conversation. This approach allowed him to 
use both sides of his brain in an integrated, coordinated way.’ (WBC, 25)
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These propositions are exemplary for many parenting manuals and 
websites. They allegedly inform49 parents of epistemic certainties, that 
result from scientific enquiries. What they have in common is that they 
seem to say: Consider these propositions as beyond any doubt. Still, 
some of them are rather new and maybe even unsettling, for instance 
to believe that it is not the child, but his/her brain that weighs different 
options.
Non-epistemic foundations in Wittgenstein’s  
On Certainty
In On Certainty Wittgenstein showed a particular interest in propo-
sitions50 that were beyond doubt, but he was not the first to articu­
late them. In his famous attempt to overcome scepticism the com-
mon sense philosopher G. E. Moore claimed that he knew that e.g. 
‘Here is one hand and here is another,’ or that ‘The earth existed for 
a long time before my birth.’ Moore believed that the propositions 
that he had discovered were universal and established knowledge. 
They were truly foundational in an epistemological sense to him and 
allegedly countered the threats of idealism and scepticism (cf. Ham-
ilton 2014,168-177). Wittgenstein did not accept that these state-
ments expressed knowledge, but was on the other hand convinced 
that they articulated certainties, leaving open the possibility of non-
epistemic foundations. For Wittgenstein, Moore’s epistemic certain-
ties are no more and no less than the unmoving foundations of our 
49 ‘But even the most caring, best-educated parents often lack basic information about their 
child’s brain.’ (WBC, 3); ‘This is really important information for parents to understand.’ (WBC, 41) 
50 I will, in the following discussion, use the word ‘proposition’ as is commonly done in the 
Wittgenstein scholarship. When I use ‘proposition’ I follow Hamilton (2014, 112) who believes 
that Wittgenstein, at least in his later philosophy, conceived of ‘propositions’ non-techni-
cally as ‘statements’ or ‘what is said’ in an everyday sense. However, I do not agree with 
Hamilton when he claims that ‘a proposition, unlike a sentence, does not belong to a par-
ticular language, but must always be expressible in one’ (ibid.), because it seems to allow for 
meaning outside of a context of use.
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language-games in disguise, which means they cannot truly be estab-
lished as knowledge: 
To say of man, in Moore’s sense, that he knows something, that 
what he says is therefore unconditionally the truth, seems wrong 
to me. – It is the truth only inasmuch as it is an unmoving founda-
tion of his language-games. (1969, §403)
This ‘unmoving foundation’ is no more and no less than ‘logic’ in 
Wittgenstein’s view. For instance, Rhees takes ‘the questions raised in 
On Certainty’ to be ‘questions in logic, not questions in epistemology’ 
(Philips in Rhees 2003, 135) and thus (Rhees 2003, 48-51) claims that 
for Wittgenstein the whole set of remarks that compose On Certainty 
is a discussion of logic, not in the sense that it describes logical prin-
ciples, but in the sense that it describes language-games, or what 
belongs to a language-game. For language and communication to be 
possible, there is a logical requirement of agreement in judgments.51
For Wittgenstein, agreement in the judgment ‘This is a hand’ – 
speakers agree that this is a hand – underlies the determination of 
the meaning of ‘hand’ in English. It follows that if, in normal cir-
cumstances, someone were to express doubt that this is a hand, 
then either their understanding of English, or their cognitive or 
sensory functioning, would be in question. (…) The proposition 
that in normal circumstances no two-handed person doubts 
whether they have two hands is, for Wittgenstein, part of logic – 
and not, as most philosophers would say, an empirical claim. It is 
part of the characterization of a language-game – the language-
game of knowledge-ascription which relies on agreement in such 
judgments. (Hamilton 2014, 32-33)
51 Cf. Wittgenstein 1958, §242: ‘If language is to be a means of communication there must be 
agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments.’ 
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On many occasions in his later philosophy Wittgenstein refers to situ-
ations of learning, to emphasize that we are not born with this agree-
ment in judgments. Instead we have to become, to borrow a phrase of 
Cavell, initiated into language, and hence into logic. Cavell claims that 
for Wittgenstein language-learning implies being initiated into forms 
of life:
Instead, then, of saying either that we tell beginners what words 
mean, or that we teach them what objects are, I will say: We initi-
ate them, into the relevant forms of life held in language and gath-
ered around the objects and persons of our world. (…) In ‘learning 
language’ you learn not merely what the names of things are, but 
what a name is; not merely what the form of expression is for 
expressing a wish, but what expressing a wish is; not merely what 
the word for ‘father’ is, but what a father is; not merely what the 
word for ‘love’ is, but what love is. In learning language, you do 
not merely learn the pronunciation of sounds, and their grammat-
ical orders, but the forms of life which make those sounds the 
words they are, do what they do – e.g. name, call, point, express a 
wish or affection, indicate a choice or an aversion. (Cavell 1999, 
177-178)
While we usually conceive of the verb ‘learning’ as a transitive verb in 
the sense that we always learn ‘something’, Cavell seems to be indicat-
ing here that for Wittgenstein the verb ‘learning’ is strangely enough 
not only transitive, but also constitutive: the processes of learning 
‘produce’ ‘names’, ‘wishes’, ‘fathers’. So the learning itself is constitu-
tive of what has been learned, and constitutes our ontologies.52 What 
exists in my world can only do so thanks to my having acquired forms 
of life.
52 Cavell’s analysis helps us to see that every form of initiation into new language-games 
involves the constitution of (partly) new ontologies. Children are initiated into existing forms 
of life, nothing new seems to happen there. Adults can be initiated into existing forms of life 
too, but as we will see later on, in the case of WBC something more is happening: new (sup-
posedly universal) ontologies are propagated through the process of initiation and thus 
ontologies are changing. 
95 CHAPTER 3
I have wanted to say: Kittens – what we call ‘kittens’ – do not exist 
in her [Cavell’s three-year-old daughter, at the time] world yet, she 
has not acquired the forms of life that contain them. They do not 
exist in something like the way cities and mayors will not exist in 
her world until long after pumpkins and kittens do (…). (Cavell 
1999, 172)
So we could say that initiation into forms of life is also conceivable as 
an initiation into certain ‘grammars’ or ‘logics’. The logics we have 
been initiated into reside mostly in the background. They form sys-
tems of what one does not doubt, what is self-evident, the ‘obvious’. 
Once these ‘foundations of our language-games’ have been articulated 
and uttered, they do not contain nor convey any knowledge; they tell 
us nothing new. These propositions in fact look awkward, almost too 
obvious. But if we can imagine a use for them in daily life, the awk-
wardness disappears. Many have a use in situations of teaching and 
learning, and thus as instructions (cf. Wittgenstein 1969, §36). Often 
these propositions look like empirical propositions that describe 
states-of-affairs in the world, though Wittgenstein discovered that the 
role they play in our language games is a very different one. Proposi-
tions such as ‘The earth existed for a long time before my birth’ are in 
fact, as Wittgenstein believes, not empirical propositions that describe 
a state of affairs in the outside world, but are articulations of the foun-
dations of our world-picture or of that which stands fast for us. It does 
not make sense to announce that one knows these facts, as Moore did, 
since they are not facts, but articulate what we have to consider beyond 
doubt in order to make it possible for facts to be known. 
A dynamic account of ‘what is beyond doubt’
Wittgenstein talks about the ‘unmoving foundations of our language-
games’, or uses the simile of propositions being like ‘hinges’ on which 
a door turns (1969, §341, §343, §655), and so stresses the need for a 
certain semantic stability. In addition, On Certainty is a work on logic. 
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So aren’t things rather static in a Wittgensteinian account? I don’t 
believe they are. First, no proposition can be called an empirical prop-
osition or a ‘methodological’ proposition as he calls them sometimes 
(for instance §318-321) outside a context of use. Furthermore, for 
Wittgenstein the domain of what is beyond doubt seems to be ever 
shifting, and not the same for everyone, or in any timeframe. Proposi-
tions that were once empirical, have become ‘propositions that are 
beyond doubt’, others were once ‘methodological’, and have become 
empirical again. 
Wittgenstein’s vision of these particular propositions is a very dynamic 
one, as is pointed out by Hamilton (2014, 104-109). As the riverbed 
simile clarifies,53 some of our propositions are very solid, and can 
hardly change – on another occasion (§492 and §512) he suggests that 
they are un-revisable – , still hard rock can become sand and vice 
versa. 
94. But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself 
of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its cor-
rectness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distin-
guish between true and false. 
95. The propositions describing this world-picture might be part 
of a kind of mythology. And their role is like that of rules of a 
game; and the game can be learned purely practically, without 
learning any explicit rules. 
96. It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of 
empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels 
53 It is good to remind oneself of the remark Wittgenstein made concerning his use of similes 
in the Chapter ‘Philosophy’ of the Big Typescript which he constructed in 1933. 
 ‘(A simile is part of our edifice; but we cannot draw any conclusions from it either; it doesn’t 
lead us beyond itself, but must remain standing as a simile. We can draw no inferences from 
it. (…) Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces any-
thing.)’ (1993, 177)
 The word edifice was underlined, meaning that Wittgenstein was not sure of it (1993, 158). 
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for the empirical propositions that were not hardened but fluid; 
and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions 
hardened, and hard ones became fluid. [Altered translation.]
97. The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-
bed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the movement 
of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though 
there is not a sharp division of the one from the other. 
98. But if someone were to say ‘So logic too is an empirical science’ 
he would be wrong. Yet this is right: the same proposition may get 
treated at one time as something to test by experience, at another 
as a rule of testing.
99. And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject 
to no alteration or only to an imperceptible one, partly of sand, 
which now in one place now in another gets washed away, or 
deposited.
Wittgenstein believes many discoveries have become part of what he 
calls the scaffolding of our thoughts (1969, §211). In the words of 
Philips (Rhees 2003, 155):
(…) in some cases, what is now accepted without question, was 
arrived at as a result of an investigation, for example, that every 
skull contains a brain. What is true is that once discovered, it 
becomes part of what Wittgenstein calls the scaffolding of our 
thought, such that no one would doubt that every skull contains a 
brain. 
Wittgenstein would accept ‘scaffolding’ (at least in English) to be 
something that is happening and that is reversible in time as the ‘river-
bank simile’ shows.
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In On Certainty Wittgenstein does not elaborate the idea of how 
something becomes a part of the scaffolding of our thought. He returns 
to mathematics (see Wittgenstein 1969, §210-212). 
210. Much seems to be fixed, and it is removed from the traffic. It 
is so to speak shunted to an unused siding. 
211. Now it gives our way of looking at things, and our researches, 
their form. Perhaps it was once disputed. But perhaps for unthink-
able ages, it has belonged to the scaffolding of our thoughts. (Every 
human has parents.) 
212. In certain circumstances, for example, we regard a calculus as 
sufficiently checked. What gives us a right to do so? Experience? 
May that not have deceived us? Somewhere we must be finished 
with justification, and then there remains the proposition that this 
is how we calculate. 
This is reminiscent of some passages in Remarks on the Foundations 
of Mathematics (Wittgenstein, 1978, 308-311):
22. Now someone says that in the series of cardinal numbers that 
obeys the rule +1, the technique of which was taught to us in such-
and-such a way, 450 succeeds 449. That is not the empirical prop-
osition that we come from 449 to 450 when it strikes us that we 
have applied the operation +1 to 499. Rather it is a stipulation that 
only when the result is 450 have we applied this operation. 
It is as if we had hardened the empirical proposition into a rule. 
And now we have, not an hypothesis that gets tested by experi-
ence, but a paradigm with which experience is compared and 
judged. And so a new kind of judgment. (1978, 324, underlining 
mine)
99 CHAPTER 3
23. (…) The justification of the proposition 25x25=625 is, natu-
rally, that if anyone has been trained in such-and-such a way, then 
under normal circumstances he gets 625 as the result of multiply-
ing 25 by 25. But the arithmetical proposition does not assert that. 
It is so to speak an empirical proposition hardened into a rule. It 
stipulates that the rule has been followed only when it is the result 
of the multiplication. It is thus withdrawn from being checked by 
experience, but now serves as a paradigm for judging experience. 
If we want to make practical use of a calculation, we convince 
ourselves that it has been ‘worked out right’, that the correct result 
has been obtained. And there can only be one correct result of 
(e.g.) the multiplication; it doesn’t depend on what you get when 
you apply the calculation. Thus we judge the facts by the aid of the 
calculation and quite differently from the way in which we would 
do so, if we did not regard the result of the calculation as some-
thing determined for all. (1978, 235, underlining mine)
Wittgenstein offers indeed a more elaborated account of these 
‘processes’ of the hardening of an empirical proposition into a rule 
in his Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, where he uses 
the image of ‘going in a circle’. Let us imagine a child that learns to 
count and discovers that 2 + 3 gives 5. And then: 
7. (…) Could he say: ‘What I have seen was very impressive. I have 
drawn a conclusion from it. In future I shall …’?
(E.g.: In future I shall always calculate like this.)
He tells us: ‘I saw that it must be like that.’
‘I realised that it must be like that’ – that is his report.
(…)
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But he does not say: I realised that this happens. Rather; that it 
must be like that. This ‘must’ shews what kind of lesson he has 
drawn from the scene. 
This ‘must’ shews that he has gone in a circle. 
I decide to see things like this. And so, to act in such-and-such a way. 
I imagine that whoever sees the process also draws a moral from it. 
‘It must be so’ means that this outcome has been defined to be 
essential to this process. 
8. This must shews that he has adopted a concept. 
This must signifies that he has gone in a circle. 
He has read off from the process, not a proposition of natural sci-
ence but, instead of that, the determination of a concept. 
Let concept here mean method. In contrast to the application of 
the method.
9. (…) ‘If we put 3 things by 2 things, that may yield various counts 
of things. But we see as a norm the procedure that 3 things and 2 
things make 5 things. See, this is how it looks when they make 5.’
Moyal-Sharrock (2007, 229) quotes Crispin Wright54: ‘What is novel 
in On Certainty is the extension [of the suggestion that such proposi-
tions are best viewed as rules] to propositions outside logic and math-
ematics, propositions which we should not normally deem to be 
capable of being known a priori but which have instead, as Wittgen-
stein says, the appearance of empirical propositions’. I believe there 
54 Cf. also Williams 1999, 297, note 12. 
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are good reasons to accept this extension also where it concerns the 
‘fossilization of empirical propositions into rules’ outside the domain 
of mathematics, and that the same similes might be used here too. 
The ‘liminality’ of propositions: the changing  
of language-games ‘caught in the act’ 
Looking into parenting manuals such as WBC, we can say that par-
ents are initiated into new language-games or logics. The ideas (prop-
ositions) that are presented to parents seem to be empirical proposi-
tions, but in fact they function as methodological or rule-like 
propositions. Empirical propositions can be true or false, they can be 
verified empirically: one can convince oneself of their correctness. But 
parents are not supposed to verify these insights. They are invited 
rather to treat them as methodological or rule-like propositions. In 
other words, to use them as a way of looking at the world, or as 
frameworks.55 
For instance, the (implicit) proposition ‘The level of integration of the 
child’s brain is decisive for parenting outcomes’ is intended to function 
as something one does not (or should not?) doubt in the new logic/
language-game parents are initiated into. To use some of Wittgen-
stein’s well-known images, we could state that this proposition func-
tions as an axis: ‘This axis is not fixed in the sense that anything holds 
it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.’ (1969, 
§152) or as a foundation wall that is supported by the whole house 
(1969, §248). And this is precisely what is demanded from parents in 
WBC: that they organize their parental behavior around this proposi-
tion. It should support everything they do and everything they do as 
parents should support it. 
55 Cf. Hamilton 2014, 4: (-) ‘Moorean propositions function more like a kind of framework within 
which genuinely empirical propositions operate.’ (emphasis mine)
102 CHAPTER 3
Some readers of the book may of course take a proposition as parent­
ing is the wiring and rewiring of a child’s brain, as an empirical state-
ment, and thus as a proposition that has a truth value. But the authors 
of WBC – as educators would56 – seem to want parents to accept this 
and other propositions as being obviously true, to stand fast for them 
and so they use them rather as instructions. 
At this point I should notice that this account might be too static. 
Although the content of the book is presented as reporting recent dis-
coveries of what has always been the case, what is happening is very 
dynamic. With WBC, we seem to be in the middle of the riverbed anal­
ogy, as it presents itself as a case of transition or ‘liminality’. The prop-
ositions at hand seem to have rather a ‘liminal’ or candidate-status, in 
the sense that they might become propositions that play a ‘method-
ological’ or ‘rule-like’ role too, or they might not; they might become 
part of the scaffolding of our thoughts, or they might not. This means 
that parents (or other adults) can ‘go in a circle’ and learn –to use 
another example – that it must be so that ‘the integration of a child’s 
brain is decisive for parenting outcomes’. This ‘going in a circle’ is a 
description of a crucial aspect of what happens in the process of ini-
tiation, whether it concerns an infant (a novice) learning its mother 
tongue, or the learning by adults of other languages and language-
games. This means, that we, in a Cavellian sense, can say that their 
ontologies change. This also means that we are looking into proposi-
tions of which at least some are somewhere in between, because they 
do not function as empirical propositions do, and neither do they 
function as rule-like propositions yet, at least not for many people.57 
When language-games are changing, some of the propositions haven’t 
yet hardened into rules or methodological propositions. That explains 
56 This point raises a whole other set of issues about education that lie beyond the scope of 
this chapter; for instance, about the significance of the pedagogical intent and relationship; 
or about whether there is some necessary (developmental?) stage in any educational pro-
cess which involves this intentional initiation into foundational logics.  
57 For Wittgenstein, unlike for Moore, a proposition can stand fast for me and many others, 
not necessarily for everyone: Instead of ‘I know …’, couldn’t Moore have said: ‘It stands fast 
for me that …’? And further: ‘It stands fast for me and many others…’ (1969, §116)
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why many are still mentioned. They are in the middle of the process of 
hardening, or not. They might become generally accepted, or not. 
Framework propositions usually do not seem to be worth mentioning, 
because they are so obvious that they ‘go without saying’, and if they 
are mentioned it often happens ‘en passant’,58 but here we have many 
propositions that apparently do seem worth mentioning. Since the 
context at hand is one of teaching and thus learning, this is another 
reason why the obvious has to be mentioned: in contexts of learning 
very often what is obvious for an educator is typically not (yet) for the 
pupil. It would be hard for us to remember the time when 2x2=4 
wasn’t obvious to us yet, but was something we still could ‘discover’. 
In the approach exemplified by WBC, parents are initiated into what 
is obvious, and as in other learning situations, it is hoped for that cer-
tain propositions will eventually be beyond doubt. 
First, some individuals might ‘have gone in a circle’, and begin to take 
them for granted, but eventually a whole community or society might 
‘have gone in a circle’ concerning certain certainties, or they might 
not. Here we see how parents are initiated into new frameworks, but 
unlike the initiation of children into their mother’s tongue, here at the 
same time new frameworks are propagated. Their discoverers want 
them to become universalized, because for them these certainties are 
universal. The authors of WBC seem to want parents to accept certain 
propositions as being so obvious, that they don’t seem to be worth 
mentioning anymore. 
58 Compare Camarata (2015, 42): Because your goal as a parent is to wire your child’s brain 
for real-life-thinking, the latest findings from neuroscience, based on the narrow bits of 
behaviour scientists use to isolate minute brain circuits in the lab, may not be very useful to 
you. (italics mine)
 The italicized part of this quotation from The Intuitive Parent illustrates how the idea that 
parenting boils down to the wiring of the brain is already treated as if it belongs to the scaf-
folding of our thinking about parenting.
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A science-based conversion? 
Instead of being provided with morally neutral scientific knowledge or 
information, I believe, in the exemplary case of WBC, parents are initi-
ated into new logics, new language-games. This may have far-reaching 
consequences. The next remark by Wittgenstein can provide some 
insight: 
If we imagine the facts otherwise than they are, certain language-
games lose some of their importance, while others become impor-
tant. And in this way there is an alternation – a gradual one – in 
the use of the vocabulary of a language. (1969, §63)
WBC offers an example of this changing of language-games: parents 
are invited at least to imagine the facts59 otherwise.
 ‘The upstairs brain weighs different options.’ 
Parents, on this account, should acknowledge the fact that it is not 
their child, but her upstairs brain that weighs options. This is a subjec-
tivization of the upstairs brain: it becomes the (grammatical) subject 
in a sentence. 
‘A parent connects with his/her child’s brain.’ 
Parents shouldn’t connect with their child directly, but through con-
necting their brains. A parent is quoted: 
59 Parents are given exact instructions about for instance how they should conceive of memory: 
‘That’s how memory works. One experience (the end of ballet class) causes certain neurons 
to fire, and those neurons can get wired to neurons from another experience (getting bub-
ble gum). Then each time we undergo the first experience, our brain connects it with the 
second one. Thus, when ballet ends, our brain triggers an expectation of getting gum.’ 
(WBC, 69) What seems to be implied is that it is the brain, and not the child, that is the 
cause of wanting bubble gum. Regardless of whether the account is true or not, parents are 
asked to imagine things differently. 
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‘Recently, I learned about trying to connect emotionally first – right 
brain to right brain, which was totally foreign to me’. (WBC, 36)
In ‘the entire system of our language-games’ (Wittgenstein 1969, 
§411) a shift seems to be ‘proposed’ from understanding and inter-
preting to explanation,60 from engaging with one’s child as a person 
to engaging with the brain of one’s child, from having a relationship 
with one’s child, to conceiving of this relationship as the interaction 
between brains, and even as the manufacturing of the child’s brain, 
and so on. 
Now for Wittgenstein, imagining the facts to be otherwise entails that 
some of our language-games become important, while others lose 
some of their importance. Language-games are not superficial. Chang-
ing one’s language-games means changing one’s way of going about in 
the world, changes one’s ways of acting, thinking, of what one is con-
vinced of, of what one can give reports about, of what one values. 
In On Certainty there is also another famous remark:
(…) why should not a king have been brought up in the belief that 
the world began with him? And if Moore and this king were to meet 
and discuss, could Moore really prove his belief to be the right one? 
I do not say that Moore could not convert the king to his view, but 
it would be a conversion of a special kind; the king would be brought 
to look at the world in a different way. (…) (§92)
When parents are not taught to look differently at certain facts, within 
their own familiar frameworks, but when their frameworks are changed, 
they are converted (or not) to a new logic, in the Wittgensteinian sense 
60 The Belgian child psychiatrist Adriaenssens (2010, 18-19) explains the aggressive behaviour 
of a schoolboy in terms of neurology and endocrinology. What gets lost is being interested 
in the story of the boy: What made him so upset? Not in terms of the functioning of parts of 
his brain, but in terms of how he understands himself, or of what he deems important and 
so on. Ramaekers and Suissa (2012, 20-21) made a similar point, using the same example: 
such explanations do not give real answers to educators.  
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of the word. WBC is a book that is particularly reminiscent of reli-
gious ideas of conversion. Promises are made. If parents accept this 
new ‘belief’, it will be possible to almost create a heaven on earth. 
Children who have been parented this way will be able to enjoy mean-
ingful relationships, they will be caring and compassionate, they will 
do well at school, they will work hard and be responsible, and they 
will feel good about who they are (WBC, vii). Another promise is that 
parents will be able to knead or mould their children’s brain and hence 
personality by manipulating their experiences, in the sense that bad 
parenting experiences (from the viewpoint of the parents) will become 
unique occasions to help their children thrive (WBC, viii)! The turn-
about that is demanded from parents can be conceived of as a conver-
sion, in the sense that one leaves behind an allegedly irrational belief 
system to exchange it for another one, not on the basis of rational 
arguments, but rather on the basis of persuasion. 
The indispensability of trust
At least some of the propositions parents are implicitly provided with 
are (candidate) framework or methodological propositions, that are 
supposed to be beyond doubt, and though they appear to be very cen-
tral and important, they don’t provide any information or knowledge, 
anyway not in the admittedly somewhat narrow sense of knowledge 
Wittgenstein uses.61 If we indeed accept that many of the seemingly 
empirical propositions provided by experts (in this case the authors of 
WBC) are non-empirical, which means parents are not supposed to 
convince themselves of their truth by verifying them, and parents are 
61 Cf. Hamilton 2014, 39: ‘Wittgenstein’s view is that unless it is logically possible to doubt the 
claim – that is, unless doubting makes sense – then it cannot be an object of knowledge.’ 
Hamilton believes for Wittgenstein ‘KILPOD’ holds: ‘knowledge implies the logical possibility 
of doubt’. Wittgenstein seems not to allow the use of the verb ‘to know’ at bedrock level (cf. 
1969, §495 and 498). If we loosen the constraints Wittgenstein puts onto the use of the 
word ‘knowledge’, we could indeed say that ‘we know that everyone has parents’. But we do 
not know this because we have verified it, but because we relied on our parents and other 
adults, and because we continue to rely on our language-games and thus our communal 
practices. 
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invited to include them in their belief systems (Wittgenstein, 1969, 
§141, §144) about parenting, then this means that parents are required 
to put their trust in these experts. 
If we look at trust amongst adults, then we notice that it implies as a 
necessary condition that not everything is known beforehand, as Han 
notices: 
Trust means establishing a positive relationship with the other, 
even in ignorance. It makes actions possible despite one’s lack of 
knowledge. If I know everything in advance, there is no need for 
trust. (Han 2015, 47, altered translation)
I believe Han’s observation helps to understand the strange runaway 
situation parenting support seems to have ended up in: in an effort to 
strengthen parents’ self-confidence, they are supplied with scientific 
‘information’. But since knowing more does not necessarily lead to 
trusting more or being more confident, but again demands trust as a 
condition, more information is still given, while parents do not become 
more sure of themselves.62 Anyway, as we saw, although the alleged 
lack of parental confidence is answered with more ‘information and 
knowledge’, at the heart of science-based parenting support it is still 
trust (at least in the sense of ‘relying on’) that is at work, or at least 
that has to do the work. 
But, the trust that is demanded from parents resembles an infantile form 
of trust. Children, while being initiated in their parents’ language-
games and forms of life, acquire mastery over ‘bedrock practices’, 
for instance counting or reading, and cannot but be blindly obedient 
(Williams 1999, 183). To believe that they could resist or doubt what 
62 Symptomatic of this tendency is Camarata (2015) who in his book The intuitive parent tries 
to reassure parents who became less confident after reading brain-based parenting 
advice, that they are naturally provided with the skills which enable them to do all the 
necessary wiring- and rewiring of their children’s brains. He then supports this claim with 
further scientific findings stemming from the same brain-science. 
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their parents say is a bit (but not wholly) like making the mistake of 
the sceptic in On Certainty who believes that it is possible to doubt 
everything. Wittgenstein argues that doubting everything is not logi-
cally conceivable. To be able to doubt, at least some things have to be 
certain,63 or have to have been acquired. To learn to speak/count/read 
and so on, also requires a form of relying on community practices and 
those who mastered these practices, the adults. This is not the same 
kind of trust or confidence that adults have in each other. When adults 
trust each other, for instance when someone makes a promise, the 
other one can decide whether or not to place their confidence in the 
one who made the promise and to trust them. In the latter case an ele-
ment of choice is involved, and thus an element of responsibility. 
Adults can always review this decision to trust someone and go back 
on it. 
We could say that what happens in science-based parenting support is 
the confusion of these two states. Parents, though they are adults, are 
regarded as novices (infants): they should unquestioningly trust the 
experts, and this trust or confidence is modelled along the lines of the 
learning of bedrock practices. Blind obedience and blind trust is 
demanded.64 The drawing on scientific evidence and alleged scientific 
certainties indeed seems to suspend the normal situation between 
adults, where one has to decide to trust another adult. It is as if the 
experts are saying: ‘You can trust what I say is scientifically founded. 
So I couldn’t possibly be lying to you. You can trust me as if we were 
in a parent-child relation.’ 
63 Wittgenstein (1969, §115): “If you tried to doubt everything you would not go as far as 
doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty.” Cf. also Hamilton 
2014 from page 227 on. 
64 One could make the (obvious) point that parents are not dependent on the parenting 
experts in quite the same way as children are dependent on adults; they can choose not to 
buy the parenting books, not to read the magazines; not to watch the TV programs. And 
this is my point: once they accept to read the book, readers are no longer supposed to be 
critical of it, they are supposed to behave in a way as infants. 
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Concluding remarks
In Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, we can experience a shift from know-
ing to trusting, in the sense that our basic certainties are not derived 
from knowledge, but from a relying on our language- games and 
world pictures we could not possibly escape from. 
In this chapter I have suggested that we can draw on this picture in 
thinking about recent trends in parenting support of which WBC is 
paradigmatic. Parents are (as with a conversion) asked to rely blindly on 
new language-games. They are demanded to trust those who propagate 
this new way of seeing the world, this is, also to see themselves and their 
children in new and promising ways. It is not so much that they receive 
new scientific evidence; rather, they are provided with new frameworks; 
they are asked to comply with them, and to accept their logics. 
We do not know yet whether these candidate-methodological proposi-
tions will become part of the scaffolding of our thoughts, and will 
actually come to stand fast for us. What we can conclude is that if 
parents accept these frameworks, this will probably change the ways 
they normally think about parenting and behave as parents, and that 
this may even change their moral horizons. Because all this happens as 
it were behind their backs, parents are put in a position of infants, 
who do not have the resources to take a critical stance towards these 
forms of ‘science-based’ parenting support and their propagated con-
ceptualizations of parenting. 
Wittgenstein’s holist and non-epistemic ‘foundationalism’ implies that 
we have to rely on others and our community. Maybe that is Wittgen-
stein’s lesson: certainty implies trusting, relying on [sich verlassen], 
rather than knowing. The emphasis on knowledge does not do away 
with the fact that trust is needed; this only seems to be the case: it is 
still trust that has to do the work. The emphasis on scientific (epis-
temic) certainty might obscure what parents really need: not so much 
more knowledge, for instance more ‘facts’ about the way brains work 
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or develop, but rather more recognition for their desire to be addressed 
as adults, who will and should always be doubting; and that their 
doubting is accepted as something for which no cure is available, or 
even desirable. 
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Introduction
R eading parenting websites and manuals as well as the literature that critically engages with parenting and parenting support, 
important distinctions often seem to be lacking, for instance between 
parenting support and parent support, or between parenting, as an 
active and technical endeavour, and being a parent, as an existential 
condition, or between the expert who tries to explain versus the coun-
sellor who tries to understand, and so on. This chapter seeks to posi-
tively contribute to the field of parent(ing) support as well as to schol-
arship in this field by articulating some perhaps until now rather 
underdeveloped aspects of the discussion on parent(ing) support. As a 
starting point, I accept the overall consensus that parents are in need 
of support, construed in a very broad way66, whereas the ‘parental 
deficit’ is predominantly narrowly conceived of as a lack of theoretical 
and practical knowledge. By questioning the nature of the ‘parental 
deficit’, the predominant technical parenting account can no longer be 
taken for granted either, and a space is opened to develop new ways of 
understanding what supporting parents should be about. 
65 This chapter is a slightly revised version of the article with the same title that has been 
published in Ethics and Education, Vol. 11, 3, 259-273. 
66 This could encompass things like policies on better child-care and parental leave, help from 
friends and family members, etc.  
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A technical account of parenting
In many parenting websites or manuals, a technical account of parent-
ing seems to be taken for granted. Furedi (2008) traces its roots back 
to the nineteenth century when the idea gained strength that mother-
ing and fathering were a distinct skill that could help develop the char-
acter traits necessary for a successful life, or, if absent, could ‘deprive 
the child of a positive future’ (102). Furedi refers to this latter phe-
nomenon as ‘parental determinism’ (Furedi 2014, viii). He believes 
that the rise of modern individualized nuclear family arrangements 
and the conviction that children are the responsibility of a mother and 
father rather than of a larger community, gave the idea of modern 
parenting an extra boost (102), and ‘once children were perceived as 
the more or less direct product of parenting, the status enjoyed by 
mothers and fathers became more intimately linked with the develop-
ment of their children’ (103 emphasis mine). In Furedi’s view, parent-
ing is culturally conceived of as a more or less insulated domain of 
parent-child interactions: ‘There is an important divergence between 
the private and public value of children. (…) [T]he sentimentalization 
of childhood often stops at the family’s doorstep’ (118). Smedts (2008) 
points out that parenting and parenting support are symptomatic of a 
Heideggerian Enframing. She contends ‘parents are easily seduced into 
becoming mere executioners of technologizaton’ (122). Drawing on 
Lambeir and Ramaekers (2007) she claims the identity of parents is 
linked to ‘doing something’, is about an ‘activity’. Parents are educa-
tional entrepreneurs, who ‘are expected to enhance their knowledge 
and skills in order to be called responsible or good parents’ (Smedts 
2008,126). In her account of the history of parenting, Lee (2014) 
stresses the fact that there has been an evolution from a more ambigu-
ous idea that accepted that, next to scientific input, folk knowledge or 
maternal or parental ‘instinct’ rightly had its place, to the more recent 
development where there is no longer a place for ‘instinct’, which 
means that parenting implies as a necessary condition the input from 
parenting experts. 
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So in the current predominant conceptualization, ‘parenting’ is seen as 
a set of skills that not only can be taught, but has to be taught. Parent-
ing and parenting support are like two sides of the same coin: one 
couldn’t be conceived of without the other. This seems almost too 
obvious, taken from the side of parenting support, but taken from the 
other side this is less self-evident: parents cannot parent unless they act 
in concert with parenting experts. Parenting has as a necessary supple­
ment and condition parenting support67. 
Supporting parents, or parenting?
The initiatives taken to help parents out in fact take very different 
forms68. This means that, if we follow Wittgenstein’s advice and look, 
instead of think (Wittgenstein 1958, §66), we will notice there are 
countless differences: for instance, parent counselling in the case of a child 
diagnosed with a mental condition such as Attention Deficit Hyperac-
tivity Disorder or Autism Spectrum Disorder; parents supporting each 
other on a practical level online and offline; information sessions about 
all kinds of parenting issues; meeting places; parenting websites; par-
enting manuals; books for parents that explicitly distance themselves 
from ordinary parenting advice literature; podcasts and so on. 
The whole range of initiatives comprised by the term ‘parenting sup-
port’ can be divided along different lines. For instance, one dividing 
line can be drawn between support given by professionals, and sup-
port given by other parents. The last category can be divided again 
into spontaneous forms of support amongst parents and more or less 
facilitated or organized forms of support, for instance in so-called 
‘meeting places’69. A second possible criterion is whether there are 
67 I will further refer to it as the ‘parenting (support) account’.
68 Hermanns (2014) deals with the difficulty to give a definition of parenting support. 
69 Ramaekers (2010) remarks that often professionals (psychologists) in fact take over or 
supervise the meeting of parents with each other, which means borders between catego-
ries of parenting support are sometimes fuzzy. 
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more serious problems or whether the initiative is meant for every par-
ent. Another dividing line might be drawn between initiatives where 
parents actually meet professionals and others where the experts do 
not get involved in the lives of individual parents, and as such remain 
a bit ‘abstract’ and often anonymous. If we use a material criterion, we 
could further say that some initiatives are on the Internet, while others 
are offline publications, such as books and so on. On the level of con-
tent, some are just offering advice, others give a kind of meta-advice 
(for instance Furedi 2008 and Camarata 2015) and still others do not 
give any advice at all70. 
The dividing line I want to focus on here however is the one that 
divides the whole set of instances of ‘support’ into two domains: 
namely, initiatives that are parent-focused and support parents, versus 
those that are parenting-focused and thus support parenting. This is a 
conceptual difference that does not neatly class all these initiatives 
into two categories71. But three points are decisive: first the aim of the 
initiative, second the way it specifies the deficit that allegedly is at the 
core of parenthood and is partly constitutive of it, and third the way 
it determines how to deal with this deficit. I want to look into the sec-
ond category first, and will later return to the first one.
Parenting-focused support aims at improving processes of parenting 
on the level of parent-child interactions, more precisely by intervening 
in these processes of which the parent is often not aware, and where 
she needs additional information and practical advice to execute her 
task better, and as such boils down to a form of technical support. 
Parenting support thus implies a conceptualization of parenting as 
consisting of concrete physical and psychological interactions with the 
child. Furthermore, parenting-focused support will typically try to 
70 Cf. Van Bockel (2009), who in her autobiographical account of living with a daughter diag-
nosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder gives an insight in the daily challenges of a mother. 
71 It would require some empirical research to ensure that the first category is not empty. A 
recent study on ‘parenting support’ in Europe, has the significant and paradoxical title 
Think parents! Putting parents at the heart of parenting support. (Fukkink, Vink and 
Bosscher 2014)  
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modify parental behaviour, and will argue for these modifications by 
referring to knowledge that is not immediately accessible to parents 
under the form of ‘instinct or ‘folk knowledge’, drawing from different 
scientific fields. In this technical conception parenting has a lack of 
knowledge as its constituting deficit, and parenting experts need to 
supply this knowledge. Even if the advice given is about everyday 
communication (instead of hormonal or neurological or even epigen-
etic mechanisms) between parents and their children, as in Faber and 
Mazlish’s How to talk so kids will listen and listen so kids will talk. 
(2012 [1980]), a causal-mechanical logic is used: if one does ‘a’, the 
child will do ‘b’72. Although parents, on this view, do not need to 
understand or work out why this is the case, and just need to trust the 
expert, often a great deal of effort is invested in helping them to under-
stand, so as to give them insights into the mechanics of parenting. To 
sum up, the parenting focused initiatives aim at improving processes 
of parenting, define the parental deficit as an epistemic deficit and try 
to deal with this deficit by providing knowledge, at the level of theo-
retical insight as well as at the level of practical know-how. Parenting 
and parenting expertise are like two sides of the same coin, or are like 
Siamese twins, who differ from each other, but cannot survive without 
each other. This conception of parenting defines a deficit in the parents: 
knowledge, or insight in the mechanics of child rearing, as well as the 
know-how to apply this theoretical knowledge to everyday situations.
Parenting as a frictionless fiction
In the next sections I will try to develop an account of parent focused 
support. This will be a view of what such support requires, regardless 
of the question whether these practices do exist. Let us pause and have 
a look at the way Letourneau explains the use of examples in her book 
The Science of Parenting:
72 Cf. Ramaekers and Suissa, 2012, 36. 
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The anecdotes found throughout the book, we should note, are fic-
tional. They don’t represent the experiences of any one real person 
or family, but are cobbled together from 20 years of professional 
experience. Their purpose is to illustrate, through narrative, the the-
ories this book discusses, to pin a human face to the numbers and 
conclusions of scientific studies. Sophie may not exist, but I (Nicole) 
can assure you that people like her do. (Letourneau 2013, 25)
And in a note, she further clarifies: 
We are referring only to the third-person narratives used to illus-
trate certain principles. Stories regarding scientific studies and his-
torical events are true (Ibid. 243).
So ‘fiction’ here means on the one hand not real, or not true, and on 
the other hand almost more than ‘real’, or perhaps even ‘too good to 
be true’. Although there obviously are good reasons not to use real 
parents’ and children’s stories, I believe this fictionalizing of examples 
and even persons might be symptomatic of a deeper fictional nature of 
the parenting (support) account. 
Indeed, within the parenting (support) framework, difficulties can be 
explained and solved, outcomes can be identified and reached, advice 
can and has to be given, steps can be taken, causal-mechanical logics 
are acceptable and moreover, even self-evident; in short, everything is 
crystal clear. We could refer here to a famous simile Wittgenstein uses: 
We have got onto slippery ice where there is no friction and so in 
a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of 
that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need friction. 
Back to the rough ground! (Wittgenstein, 1958, I, §107)
Whereas the later Wittgenstein believed that the language conception 
he adhered to in his Tractatus was in a sense too mechanical, too 
simple, and, I would like to add, too fictional, something analogous 
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also goes for the predominant parenting (support) account. It should 
not come as a surprise that the aforementioned image of parenting 
resides mostly in parenting manuals and parenting websites, i.e. forms 
of parenting support where parents and counsellors do not actually 
meet, which means that the idea(l)s of parenting are not slowed down 
by the stubborn and sticky quality of the lived experiences of the 
upbringing of one’s children. One does not need to appeal to the fac-
ulty of practical judgement so as to apply the universal to particular 
cases (Neiman 2014, 192). Parenting seems to be a fiction that has 
become inevitably attractive for us. But what turns this account into a 
fiction? And why is it so attractive? 
We could say that it is precisely the fact that it becomes frictionless 
that turns it into a fiction: everything that slows things down, for 
instance, hesitating, deliberation, human judging (the weighing up of 
pros and cons), everything that can’t immediately be resolved, every-
thing that cannot be thought in a linear and straightforward manner 
(and so on), disappears. Or to put it positively: it is fictional because 
of several characteristics, that are not always present to the same 
extent. To sum up (not exhaustively):
1. This parenting (support) account is fictional insofar as it construes 
parents and children as belonging to the physical world of nature only, 
or at least primarily. This means that the fact that parents and children 
are human beings that are characterized, as Heidegger remarked, by 
being-in-the-world, or that they are self- interpreting subjects, to put it 
in Taylorian terms, is ignored. 
2. It is fictional insofar as it devises a certain ‘space’, a cocoon-like 
world of ‘interactions’ between a parent and their child(ren), that 
seems very cosy and safe as it shuts out the ‘real’ world lying outside 
this intimate sphere, with its socio-economic, racial, (geo-)political 
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problems and challenges73. It construes a ‘parenting interface’ where 
parents do not so much live with their children, but where they (can) 
causally influence them; where they apply techniques and exercise 
skills and so on. 
3. This parenting (support) account is fictional insofar as it sees sci-
ences as a source of absolute certainty, and not as one of the possible 
resources parents can rely on, like for instance experience, stories they 
hear from other parents, growing personal insight, and so on. Indeed, 
the fact that the technical parenting (support) account allegedly is 
founded on ‘(hard) sciences’ doesn’t necessarily make it less fictional, 
since the methodological doubt that is characteristic of serious scien-
tific practices seems to be completely forgotten in the parenting (sup-
port) account, where scientific findings are presented as hard facts, 
leaving no room for doubt. Knowledge claims, in the form of ‘we now 
know that’ are very common, whereas a more modest, and perhaps 
more serious scientist74 would accept that every scientific claim is in 
principle open to corroboration or falsification. 
4. It is also fictional insofar as it only picks out certain parental prob-
lems and difficulties, most often behavioural problems, ignoring that 
what we have here is maybe best thought of as an example of family 
resemblances. How to deal with a toddler that throws a temper tan-
trum is quite different from the question of how to deal with a teen-
ager that wants to be a vegetarian, or that openly sympathizes with a 
73 At the time of writing this, the Brexit vote has just taken place in the UK; in Belgium, we are 
recovering from the 3/22 terrorist attacks in Brussels, and expecting the return of Syria 
fighters. But this all escapes the parenting focus. Of course, immediately after the terrorist 
attacks in Brussels on 22/3/2016, parenting experts on TV and in the newspapers, were 
giving advice aimed precisely at keep parents and children in this sphere safe. It is only in 
such extreme cases that the ‘real world’ apparently threatens to intrude and accordingly 
has to be dealt with. 
74 Cf. Willingham (2012, 87) who quotes the astronomer Carl Sagan: ‘In science it often hap-
pens that scientists say, “You know that’s a really good argument; my position is mistaken”, 
and then they actually change their minds and you never hear that old view from them 
again. They really do it. It doesn’t happen as often as it should, because scientists are 
human and change is sometimes painful. But it happens every day. I cannot recall the last 
time something like that happened in politics or religion.’
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racist political party. Problems need to be identifiable within scientific 
frameworks that parents are not (at least at the outset) acquainted 
with. Often it is taken for granted that children’s behaviour can be 
dealt with using Learning Theory (positive and negative reinforce-
ment) to diminish undesirable behaviour or to increase desired behav-
iour (cf. Camarata 2015, 191 ff.).75 
5. It is fictional insofar as parental doubting is ignored. Within the inter-
actional parenting domain, problems can be identified and can be 
solved. There is no room for nor acknowledgement of the parental 
experience that sometimes there are no answers to be given.
Why is it attractive? The parenting (support) account promises a firm 
hold or grip on the elusive domain of education and upbringing. 
Although a whole domain of educational experiences cannot be cap-
tured by explanatory theories, many allegedly are captured and 
explained by them. As a fiction we could call it science(-based) fiction, 
preferably based on hard sciences: see for instance The Whole­Brain 
Child (Siegel and Bryson 2011), where science offers supposedly firm 
ground. Furthermore, there is a very engaging optimism and volun-
tarism at work in many parenting support manuals or websites76. Of 
course many parents experience all kinds of behavioural challenges, 
which are treated extensively in books like How to talk so kids will 
listen and listen so kids will talk; but this doesn’t exhaust the range of 
difficulties parents can experience. For instance, problems that are 
connected with the fact that not only becoming and being a parent can 
and will change their self-understanding deeply and often disturbingly, 
or that it can induce anxiety and Angst, or that it can put them amidst 
75 Taylor (2016, 7) extensively argues that human beings are language animals and hence 
cannot be reduced to ‘rats in a maze’. The technical account seems to confuse children with 
non-linguistic animals. 
76 Just a randomly taken example of this optimism taken from a website of the Government 
of South-Australia: ‘Dads are very important in children’s lives. Dads can spend time with 
children, help them to learn about culture [and] have a strong identity as an Aboriginal 
person. However you were brought up, you can be the kind of dad you want to be for your 
children.’ (http://www.parenting.sa.gov.au/peg_aboriginal_list.htm#peg190 emphasis mine)
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of moral dilemmas, and so on, stay out of the centre of attention77. We 
could interpret this in the sense that this account helps parents to 
escape the existential urge that can arise to ‘own’ their lives and con-
front the Heideggerian Angst78, and, as Ramaekers and Suissa (2012) 
point out, drawing upon Bauman, to ‘dissolve’ it into small surveyable 
tasks79. By leaving all the decisions in the hand of an expert, who 
refers to ‘hard sciences’, parents might be said to be relieved of a huge 
responsibility. The attractiveness of parenting as a fiction might be that 
it promises to solve every problem while at best solving only the practi-
cal and behavioural ones, or to put it differently: it transforms the insol-
uble existential deficit into a knowledge deficit that allegedly can be 
completely dealt with. It promises answers where none are to be given. 
Shifting the attention from the expert to the parent 
Clearly the experts know lots of things most parents never heard of, 
drawing upon scientific findings from different fields, but also from 
practical everyday psychology (cf. Faber and Mazlish 2012 [1980]) 
and they also supposedly know what parents should do. Parents only 
have to obey and execute their tasks. This scheme, where knowledge 
and execution are strictly separated, has a long history in Western 
political thought. Dunne (1993, 91) refers to the distinction Arendt 
highlights in The Human Condition between archein (beginning) and 
prattein (achieving), which belonged before Plato to the same cate-
gory, namely ‘action’. 
77 At least in the technical parenting (support) account. The idea of becoming a mother as 
posing a major challenge to one’s sense of self and identity is so common as to be almost 
ubiquitous in both first-person accounts of motherhood, feminist literature, and academic 
work on parenting identities. (Thanks to Judith Suissa for pointing this out.) 
78 See Chapter 1, 51-53; Van den Berge 2013, pp. 398-399.
79 ‘[T]he existential anxiety, in the face of the enormity of the reality of ‘being a parent’ is bro-
ken down into a series of well-defined tasks: establishing sleeping routines, toilet raining, 
controlling meal-time behaviour, etc., and replaced by focused anxiety over whether one is 
succeeding at performing these tasks well. Thus, the various techniques of good parenting 
are offered as ‘solutions’ to reduce parental anxiety. (…) [T]he potential of ‘perfect parent-
ing’ becomes a real vision: If one only can do it right, maybe one can dispel, once and for all, 
the anxiety.’ (128)
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Theoretically, the most brief and most fundamental version of the 
escape from action into rule occurs in the Statesman, where Plato 
opens a gulf between the two modes of action, archein and prat­
tein (‘beginning’ and ‘achieving’), which according to Greek under-
standing were interconnected. (…) Plato was the first to introduce 
the division between those who know and do not act and those 
who act and do not know, instead of the old articulation of action 
into beginning and achieving, so that knowing what to do and 
doing it became two altogether different performances. (Arendt 
1998, 222-223)
The sundering of action into these two domains led to a hierarchical 
account of politics, where some ‘know, but do not act’ and others ‘act, 
but do not know’. Analogously, the parenting experts stand in a higher 
hierarchical position as they ‘know, but do not act’, while parents ‘act, 
but do not know’. Experts do not act; that is, they do not get involved 
personally, they keep their distance, typically as authors of parenting 
manuals or sometimes even anonymous authors of parenting web-
sites, but often also when meeting clients, where they try to keep a 
‘professional’ distance. And parents should be prepared to execute 
experts’ wisdom. This means that within the parenting (support) 
account, parental acting isn’t acting in the full (ancient Greek) sense of 
the word. In order to create parental momentum, or to allow parents 
to ‘walk’ again, parents should thus be given back the archein as well 
as the prattein, and thus the possibility to take initiatives, to act (or 
refrain from acting) from their own motives and understanding of 
their situation. 
Criticizing the technical parenting (support) account, different schol-
ars try to shift the attention from the expert to the parent. Smedts 
(2008) wants educational experts and parenting practitioners to 
escape from the technological framing of parents and to leave room 
for questions that parents have as parents. She remarks that the nar-
row technical conception of parenting can hardly be maintained by 
the parent, so ‘professionals who work with parents should address 
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them not just as pawns in the system that can be steered by technical 
reason, but – very differently – as people who are capable of indepen-
dent practical judgement’. (122) 
Ramaekers and Suissa (2012) also stress the importance of addressing 
parents directly. They criticize the technical conception of parenting 
(support) and believe 
[t]he various techniques of good parenting are offered as ‘solu-
tions’ to reduce parental anxiety. The strategies offered by gurus 
such as Supernanny, backed up by the reassurance of ‘scientific 
evidence’, assure us that they will lead to desirable outcomes. All 
our focus then shifts to individuals and how they perform, and 
likewise, the potential of perfect parenting becomes a real vision. If 
I can only do it right, maybe one can dispel, once and for all the 
anxiety. (128) 
Drawing on Cavell, instead of trying to resolve human anxiety, they 
suggest parent80 support should try to accept it and to accept the long-
ing after certainty, that is its flipside. In what they somewhat hesitat-
ingly call ‘a way of conceptualising parent support’ (132), they believe 
we need to learn to live with the continuous temptations to cer-
tainty. (…) It is not (…) the uncontrollability of life as such that we 
need to learn to live with, but our continuous attempts at control, 
our continuous attempts at fixing the world and others in it. It is, 
thus, in a sense, ourselves we have to learn to live with. (135, 
emphasis mine)
And thus parent support along these Cavellian lines needs to address 
parents qua parents. This line of argument leads to a second reason to 
engage with parents qua parents: 
80 They write about ‘parent support’ and not ‘parenting support’!
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[W]hat parents are in danger of losing in relying heavily or being 
made to rely heavily on, for example, the scientific languages of 
parenting, is a full realisation of what they are doing, a realisation 
of whatever meaning they can give from the perspective of the first 
person. (135) 
This would mean that current practices of parent support entail this 
loss, and put the other way around, genuine parent support should 
help parents realize what they are doing, what meaning they can give 
from the first person perspective; which once more would mean that 
parent support has to address parents qua parents first of all.
Ramaekers and Suissa contrast the determinacy of parenting (support) 
accounts with the open-endedness of the experience of being a parent. 
In the former, ‘ends’ can be achieved, can be evaluated, parenting can 
be ‘successful’. While on the other hand, 
the hopes, aspirations and aims we have as parents (…) do not 
appear as fixed and desirable end points associated with potential 
approaches which, once identified and followed, can be reliably 
achieved; rather they confront us in varied, unpredictable and sub-
tly changing forms as a constitutive part of the experience of living 
as a human being who also happens to be the parent of another 
human being. (82)
So questions as ‘What can I do to make my child happy?’, ‘What does 
it mean to say that an individual child is not happy?’ or ‘How do I live 
with the concern for, the pain about, my children’s unhappiness?’ (…) 
are intrinsically open-ended questions. And 
being a parent means constantly asking such questions; asking, 
indeed, an infinite variety of similar questions that one could not 
possibly predict in advance; questions that themselves are thrown 
up by and derive their meaning from the experience of being a par-
ent; and in asking them, parents are also asking questions about 
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their own life: its meaning, its value, and its challenges. Yet, in the 
quest for ‘scientific’ parenting, this form of questioning is shut 
down (…). There is no room (…) for questions of meaning and 
value, for ambiguity and uncertainty. (82)
Parents are human beings that constantly pose questions of meaning 
and value, about their children’s lives as well as their own81. Applied 
to their proposal of parent support, this means it should be a space for 
parents to ask their questions, and perhaps where they are helped to 
live with the fact that no definite answers are available, instead of 
overruling them with not only answers, but also questions. (And this 
is perhaps a third reason to address parents directly.) 
Smeyers, drawing on the work of Charles Taylor, reminds us that, ‘we 
[as educators, as parents] are continuously forced to re-evaluate our 
values’ (2008, 59, my translation). Following up on this, in a concep-
tion of parent support, parents could also be given the space and the 
time to re-evaluate their values, or to talk about the re-evaluation of 
their values82. So instead of suggesting, as Furedi does,83 that parents 
should ignore parenting expertise and support, and should try to 
escape the overload of attention they get, the scholars I draw upon 
here seem to say the opposite: address parents more directly and 
explicitly, qua parents. But, this conception of parenthood requires a 
revision of what it means to be someone who provides support. 
81 Contrary to how Reece (2013) reads Ramaekers and Suissa, this is not how parents should 
be, but how parents actually are. 
82 Cf. Van den Berge 2012.
83 See for instance the new subtitle of the second edition (2008) of his Paranoid Parenting: 
‘Why ignoring the experts may be best for your child.’ 
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An ethics of hermeneutics in parent support :  
a preliminary conception of the parent counsellor  
as a figure of strong engagement 
Taylor argues (Chapter 2, 69-73; Van den Berge and Ramaekers 2014, 
612-615) that human agency is engaged agency, meaning that ‘the 
world of the agent is shaped by his or her form of life, or history, or 
bodily existence’. Making sense of things implies always partly unar-
ticulated backgrounds (Taylor 1995, 69). So it is humanly impossible 
to interpret without drawing from a background that always remains 
partly opaque. A figure of strong disengagement is logically inconceiv-
able and existentially unliveable, and that is why for Taylor Freud, for 
instance, is an example of what I want to call a ‘figure of weak disen-
gagement’, because scientific values paradoxically made up his moral 
background (Taylor 1989, 45; Chapter 2, 78-81; Van den Berge and 
Ramaekers 2014, 618-621).
Within the technical parenting (support) account, the parenting expert, 
as a self-declared disengaged agent, mistakenly believes she can 
abstract herself and the subject under investigation from this sense-
making condition. Since this ultimately isn’t possible, this means that 
the figure of weak disengagement, as I want to call it, will actively 
strive for – but ultimately never reach – values as objectivity, measur-
ability, generalisability, personal detachment of one’s own (moral and 
other) preferences and so on. For an expert as a figure of disengage-
ment it can be seen as problematic to become personally involved, 
whereas for a figure of engagement it is, as we will see, inevitable and 
even desirable. We human beings are engaged agents, all the time, and 
all the way down. This seems to be easily forgotten in our time, even 
when we are dealing with the very personal domain of childrearing, 
and thus it is worthwhile to try to develop, or perhaps retrieve, a more 
confident figure of (strong) engagement, by articulating, valuing and 
advocating an engaged stance. 
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The movement from a figure that values and strives for a disengaged 
stance, and does not acknowledge the necessity of background or con-
text for sense-making to be conceivable, to a figure that not only accepts 
the idea of a necessary sense-making background for herself as well as 
for the parents, but moreover takes it emphatically as its point of depar­
ture, can be described in terms of explanation versus understanding, or 
Erklären versus Verstehen84. Thiselton (2009) explains the difference:
[M]any writers on hermeneutics distinguish between the two valid 
dimensions of explanation and understanding. The axis of explana-
tion is more akin to the traditional flow of knowing; understanding 
entails a more personal, intuitive, or suprarational dimension. (9)
He also points out that 
[T]he more creative dimension of hermeneutics depends more fun-
damentally on the receptivity of the hearer or reader to listen with 
openness. To appreciate and appropriate what we seek to under-
stand with sensitivity have priority over the traditional method of 
scrutinizing ‘objects’ of ‘perception’, thought and knowledge. This 
‘listening’ dimension is often described as part of the process of 
‘understanding’ in contrast to the more rational, cognitive, or crit-
ical dimension of ‘explanation’. (7-8)
In order to accomplish understanding in human affairs, a specific her-
meneutical effort is necessary. Since hermeneutics traditionally was 
the art of interpreting texts, typically of the Biblical canon, it can seem 
strange to apply this approach to the domain of parent support. But, 
Taylor stresses 
Heidegger, and after him Gadamer and Ricoeur, pointed out that 
something like the hermeneutical circle obtains in our attempts to 
84 I do not however agree with the idea that explanation would have to be excluded from an 
engaged stance completely. For Ricoeur (Thiselton 2009, 229), following on this respect 
Schleiermacher, explanation is an important form of human interpretation. 
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understand (…) ‘human meanings’. The ‘texts’ here can be events, 
passages in the life of individuals, or societies, or human history; 
or we can start from individual experiences: feelings, actions, deci-
sions, and try to determine their meaning. Whatever meaning we 
attribute to the part has to make sense within the whole, whose 
meaning it also helps determine. (2016, 218-219) 
Schleiermacher, who was the first to develop the modern hermeneutics 
that Heidegger, Gadamer and Ricoeur amongst others further elabo-
rated, gave the following example of the hermeneutical circle very 
early on in his work: 
One must already know a man in order to understand what he 
says, and yet one first becomes acquainted with him by what he 
says. (Schleiermacher 1977, 56)
So Schleiermacher had already accepted the idea that the ‘text’ could 
be ‘something a man says’ meaning also that ‘knowing a man’ can be 
considered as the ‘whole text’. I rendered Schleiermacher’s early phras-
ing of the hermeneutical circle as follows in the field of counselling 
and psychotherapy: ‘to understand the client, you need “context infor-
mation” that you can only get through understanding the client’ (Van 
den Berge 2014a 7, translation mine). The hermeneutical circle points 
at a deep interdependence in meaning: no context without person, no 
person without context. 
But, the idea of a hermeneutical circle also coincides with the human 
experience that there is indeed a kind of deficit in life, as well as in 
human understanding, that cannot be removed completely. The her-
meneutical process of understanding is never completed. Likewise 
human life never reaches a point of complete immanence, of being 
identical and completely clear to itself. In fact, there is always friction. 
In that sense hermeneutics has an open-endedness similar to that of 
life itself. Hermeneutics exists by virtue of the impossibility of ever 
closing the circle. Parents have to deal with this deficit continuously. 
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Whereas a parenting expert conceived as a figure of (weak) disengage-
ment has an epistemic advantage and is thus perfectly equipped to 
counsel the parent, a parent counsellor as a figure of (strong) engage­
ment will really want to understand a parent, and is epistemically dis-
advantaged. This figure will thus need to take her time to listen with 
openness, with a great amount of receptivity, resisting attempts to 
explain what she hears, and trying rather to engage in a more personal 
and intuitive way. This all seems perhaps too obvious, and will thus 
need to be developed further, not exhaustively, in three ways: (1) the 
role of story-telling and story-development is pivotal; (2) involvement 
is hermeneutically conceived of as ‘being interpreted’; (3) this all comes 
with specific forms of responsibility on the part of the counsellor, 
derived from a non-causal notion of ‘influence’. 
Firstly, this ‘figure of engagement’ not only listens to the questions that 
often lead parents to seek the parent counsellor, but also to their sto-
ries. Wittgenstein remarks that in order to get friction, we need to go 
back to the ‘rough ground’, or, to put it in other words, we need to 
move ourselves into a space where the import of context in linguistic 
and hence human affairs is fully acknowledged and appreciated. Fol-
lowing Arendt’s idea of plurality, (1958, 175-176) the context of 
everybody involved in parent support has to be taken as radically idio-
syncratic, or one of a kind. Since – as Heidegger pointed out: the con-
text of the ‘da’ of ‘Dasein’ is not ‘box’-like – , it is not possible to know 
people’s context from the outside85. We need insider’s stories, in the 
case of the parent, to get to know the parents’ context, and this means 
entering the hermeneutical circle. Taylor (2016, 291-292) wants to 
defend the idea that stories give us an understanding of life, peo-
ple, and what happens to them which is peculiar (i.e., distinct from 
what other forms, like works of science and philosophy, can give 
us), and also unsubstitutable (i.e., what they show us can’t be 
translated without remainder into other media)’. (…) A story often 
85 See Polt 1999, 42.
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consists in a diachronic account of how some state or condition 
(usually the terminal phase) came to be. This can illuminate things 
in various ways. It often gives us an idea of ‘how things came to 
be’, in the sense of explaining why or giving causes. It can also 
offer insight into what this terminal phase is like: we can perhaps 
now appreciate more its fragility or permanence, or its value or 
drawbacks, and the like. (…) [I]t can lay out a gamut of different 
ways of being human, different paths or characters which interact 
in the story, and thus offer insights in human life in general. (…) 
[T]he thesis is here to the effect that valid insight in the above mat-
ters can be given in a story which cannot be transposed to the 
medium of science, atemporal generalization, and the like. 
Narratives or stories reveal something that cannot be captured in the 
language of science or atemporal generalization. Moreover, the meet-
ing with a parent counsellor will itself become a story, with a dia-
chronic structure, that leads to changes in the self-understanding of 
those involved in the encounter. So Wittgenstein’s suggestion (1984, 
80) that two philosophers who meet should greet each other with the 
words ‘Take your time’ (Lass dir Zeit) might be appropriate here too. 
It is only if they do that a genuine encounter between two (or more) 
human beings can take place, within this hermeneutical framework. 
Secondly, according to Thiselton, 
[I]n hermeneutics, it is the text itself (or what a person seeks to 
understand) that almost operates as the active subject, exposing 
and interrogating the human inquirer as its object of scrutiny. This 
in contradistinction to the ‘traditional philosophical [scientific] 
approach’ where the subject under scrutiny has a passive role. 
Thiselton uses the writings of Funk, who himself draws on the work 
of Fuchs, to give a telling example of how a text can ‘interpret’ the 
listener or reader. 
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Robert Funk (…) illustrates the dynamics of this epistemological 
flow of understanding with the parable of the prodigal son (Luke 
15:11-32). The parable traces the journey of the younger son from 
his desire for independence into estrangement, destitution, derelic-
tion, and finally utter remorse. At his wits’ end, he determines to 
return to his father, seeking only the status of a hired laborer. Yet 
his father runs to welcome him, and restores his personal dignity 
through the gifts of a ring, a robe and shoes. However, the parable 
turns also on the attitude of the elder son. He resents the generous 
and lavish welcome for the prodigal, and refuses to join in the 
welcome in angry indignation, because he views the comparison 
between the younger son’s conduct and his welcome as flagrantly 
unjust to him. 
Of the elder son Funk writes: ‘He refuses to be identified as a sin-
ner because he is righteous and has no need of the grace of God. 
The word of grace and the deed of grace divide the audience into 
younger sons and elder sons – into sinners and Pharisees. This is 
what Ernst Fuchs means when he says that one does not interpret 
the parables: the parables interpret him’. (Thiselton 2009, 8-9)
This means that ‘[t]he interpreter of texts is not a neutral observer, on 
the analogy of the supposed stance of the natural scientist or empiri-
cist. Understanding in the fullest sense demands engagement and self­
involvement’ (Thiselton 2009, 8). In order to counsel parents, as a 
figure of engagement, one needs to know them; in order to get to 
know them, the counsellor has to listen to the stories people tell. But, 
this also means that (s)he will be ‘interpreted’ by them, since, as we 
saw, people and their stories can be considered as ‘texts’. Letting one-
self be ‘interpreted’ by another person and her stories means accepting 
that one’s autobiographical self-understanding can be changed, and 
that one accepts this changeability, or this wanting to be affected by 
someone’s stories. The psychotherapist Michael White accounts for 
the effects of working with families and individual clients in terms of 
‘being moved’, 
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moved not just in terms of having an emotional experience, but in 
terms of being transported to another place from which one might, 
amongst other developments: a) have a new perspective on one’s 
life and history and identity, b) re-engage with neglected aspects of 
one’s own history, c) make new meanings of experience not previ-
ously understood, d) invite steps in one’s life otherwise never con-
sidered, e) think beyond what one routinely thinks, and so on. 
(White, 2004, 49,50)
White is not talking here about his clients’ experiences, but of the 
experiences of those who work with them as therapists or counsellors. 
This is not to say of course that clients do not have analogous experi-
ences. If we listen to each other’s stories, then we will be ‘interpreted’ 
by each other. And this is the point I want to make here86. Parent sup-
port should be about creating ‘momentum’, which can also be inter-
preted as allowing oneself to be ‘moved’, i.e. not only the parent, but 
also the parent counsellor. Parents can be moved only when their idio-
syncratic circumstances are first recognized and acknowledged. They 
can revise their self-understandings, and their understandings of the 
world, and be moved to another place, if and only if they feel the par-
ent counsellor (or another human being for that matter) is really try-
ing to understand them, and letting these understandings exist as such, 
without necessarily agreeing with them87. 
A third point is that since whatever the counsellor does will belong to 
the clients’ self-understanding, and thus (deeply) influence it, the for-
mer will have to be careful and take responsibility for what she shares 
of her interpretations with the latter. Being a ‘professional’ counsellor 
86 Compare this with Dreyfus and Taylor (2016), 125-126, where, in considering the possibility of 
intercultural exchange, they refer to Gadamer’s idea of a fusion of horizons. For instance: ‘If 
understanding the other is to be construed as fusion of horizons and not as possessing a science 
of the object, then the slogan might be: no understanding the other without a changed 
understanding of the self.’ (125) or ‘Real understanding always has an identity cost (…). The 
cost appears as such from the standpoint of the antecedent identity, of course.’ (125-126).
87 This is of course an empirical point. My professional experience, together with that of many 
others, teaches us, indeed, that this is the case. No-one can change an interpretation if this 
interpretation is not allowed to exist first. 
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will thus mean that there has been a sufficiently long training that is 
not so much about knowledge of parenting but rather of having 
acquired sufficient experience of dealing with such issues as ‘when do 
I speak?’, ‘when do I withhold my suggestion or my question?’, and so 
on. Openness to listen is not the same as openness about oneself. 
Whereas the parenting expert is mostly not someone most parents 
actually meet, and as such remains a bit abstract or unknown, the fig-
ure of engagement I tried to develop (or retrieve) has to be someone 
that one meets, not necessarily face-to-face, but at least ‘in person’. 
Furthermore, there are many requirements that a professional counsel-
lor has to satisfy. Many books and papers have been written on this 
subject88 and this is not the place to elaborate on it, but notwithstand-
ing this, we could say that learning to know very different parenting 
contexts, including learning about how existing expertise is interpreted 
by parents i.e. how it influences them; listening without judging or 
explaining what the problem is; using scientific knowledge, not as a 
framework that ‘frames parents’ (Chapter 3; Van den Berge 2017), but 
as a possible resource to help parents understand certain phenomena 
they encounter; and so on, could perhaps indeed be called professional 
know-how that counsellors need to acquire through training, (peer) 
supervision, lots of practice and not in the least knowledge of life. 
Conclusion
One of the questions concerning our late modern western cultures 
that the case of parenting support confronts us with, is why we are 
so easily lured into accepting fictional and empirically empty accounts 
88 In the Dutch speaking part of Europe for instance much work has been done or is currently 
done by van der Pas (see for instance her dissertation A serious case of neglect (2003) and 
the 10 volume textbook on the theory and practice of parent counselling Handboek 
Methodische Ouderbegeleiding (1993-2008); Baert (2001, 1997), Van Daele (2004); Van 
Daele and Vermeire 2009, Cottyn (2009); Weille (2010); Vermeire (2011, 2012) , Van den 
Berge 2014b and Remmerswaal and de Gouw (2016) to name only a few. In The Netherlands 
the leading journal for professionals is Ouderschapskennis, formerly Ouderschap en ouder-
begeleiding) (www.ouderschapskennis.nl).
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of what we deem on the other hand to be so very important, i.e., the 
upbringing of our offspring. Disconnected from lived experiences, the 
rough ground, the world of parenting becomes a fairy-tale like world, 
where every problem supposedly can be identified and resolved, 
because there is only one deficit, and that is the deficit of scientific 
knowledge, which can and should be overcome by acknowledging it 
and hiring experts or studying textbooks. If we on the other hand 
accept a hermeneutical stance, this implies that the existential parental 
deficit cannot be removed without a remainder. 
It is (of course) not possible to take into account the inevitably idiosyn-
cratic and finite nature of human agency and experiences completely, 
for this is part and parcel of this hermeneutical deficit. While ‘parenting 
support’, especially when it takes the form of websites or parenting 
manuals, can ignore this, ‘personalized’ parent support, often in the 
form of counselling, has to deal with it somehow. To try to do so, it will 
have to take some considerations into account. I have tried to develop 
these in a preliminary normative conception of the figure of strong 
engagement as opposed to the parenting expert as a figure of weak 
disengagement. This figure of strong engagement meets the require-
ment of opening up a space for parents that acknowledges the import 
of context in human and parental affairs. This figure accepts parents as 
being ethically and politically orientated. (S)he does not problematize 
not knowing or doubting; nor does (s)he exclude moral issues, or 
dilemmas that parents can encounter because of conflicting values. 
Since (and insofar as) she does not have an agenda of her own, parents 
are not seen as the passive recipients of support, but in fact regain and 
take up an active role, by becoming de facto moral and political agents. 
Although it focuses on the position of the professional, this concep-
tion articulates the conditions that allow for the creation of parental 
momentum; this is a state in which parents – with or without the help 
of a parent counsellor – can endure and perhaps even embrace the fric-
tions that are constitutive of being a parent, and can (be) move(d) 
along the different dimensions as enumerated by Michael White.
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Parenting or parent support?  
From an ethics of causality towards  
an ethics of hermeneutics (and back)
T he overall conjecture that underlies these philosophical investi-gations of our contemporary parenting (support) culture was 
that ‘even the domain of the very subjective, lived experiences of being 
a parent, is at least affected, and maybe even colonized by the disen-
gaged scientific stance.’ There were four ‘smaller’ conjectures: (1) in 
our late-modern Western societies, parents are supposed or expected 
to be in need of some kind of support; (2) parenting support is often 
science-based; (3) parents seem to be infantilized and instrumental-
ized; (4) nevertheless, there seems to be a possibility of conceptualiz-
ing practices of parenting support and counselling that take parents 
seriously as the full-blown moral and political subjects they are. The 
purpose of these investigations was to follow these ‘signposts’ in order 
to give an interpretation of certain phenomena, to make sense of them, 
or to try at least to elaborate and clarify them a little bit. Chapter Four 
deals most emphatically with conjecture (1) and (4), chapters Two and 
Three address and elaborate conjecture (2), while conjecture (3) is 
discussed in chapter Three. 
In this concluding chapter I want to bring the different threads 
together. As concerns the overall conjecture, I would rather conclude 
now that ‘the colonization’ has to be seen as a continuous process of 
attempts to tempt parents to look through ‘disengaged’ lenses, a pro-
cess that isn’t finished yet, as Chapter Three made clear, which means 
that (on the empirical plane) many parents probably still have to be 
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convinced. In that sense the ‘disengaged stance’, as mentioned by Tay-
lor, has only to a certain extent a grip on us; we can still resist. Indeed, 
as with all colonizations, there is always space for resistance or there 
are always elements that cannot be fully colonized. One of the signs of 
this ‘grip’ is that we see in our parenting (support) culture how tenden-
cies arise to place a high value on understanding in terms of causal-
mechanistic explanations, as a means to understand our children as 
well as to understand the relationships we have with them. 
We saw this predominance of causality, surprisingly, in Furedi’s rather 
unsuccessful attempt (as I showed in Chapter One) to help parents 
out. The attempt was unsuccessful in the sense that treating evolutions 
at the level of society as causal phenomena, that stand in a sense out-
side our self-understandings, threatens to widen the gap between the 
individual and the broader community or society he or she belongs to. 
This approach strengthens the very paranoia it is supposed to remedy. 
We saw this predominance of causality also (Chapter Two) in the way 
some parenting experts conceive of parental influence. Conceiving of 
interactions in causal-mechanistic ways leads to a parenting paradox. 
These examples are, I believe symptomatic of an ‘overrating’ or ‘over-
valuing’ of certain aspects of something we rightly value, namely sci-
ence. Science penetrates our everyday material surroundings in a very 
silent and self-evident way (we have potable water in our homes, we 
take electric currents as something obvious, we use clocks, phones, 
computers, cars, and so on, without realizing how much of our sur-
roundings would be very different without science). It is not possible 
nor desirable to banish science from our material surroundings. In the 
same sense it is not possible to drive away all science from the domain 
of childrearing or personal relationships. But, what we can conclude 
from our study of our current parenting support culture is that bound-
aries between the world and a science of objects on the one hand and 
the world and a science of subjects on the other tend to be fuzzy. 
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An ethics of causality versus an ethics of hermeneutics
In Chapter Four I tried to sketch an ethics of hermeneutics, that 
demands an interpretative effort, namely the effort to try to under-
stand the idiosyncrasies of human affairs. To understand what it means 
for parents to hear for instance that their child is diagnosed with 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder one has to listen carefully to 
these parents. Qualitative scientific research could show that most 
parents show signs of relief when they learn that their child isn’t just 
naughty. But still, because sense-making contexts should be consid-
ered to be unique within an ethics of hermeneutics, no expert can ever 
know with certainty before asking and being told by the parents them-
selves, what things mean for parent(s). So establishing a (professional) 
personal relationship between experts or counsellors and parents will 
be necessary. The counsellor will need to be a figure of strong engage-
ment. Within an ethics of hermeneutics, the role of parents cannot be 
restricted to executing the wisdom of parenting experts. 
But there seems to be a problem here. No one will seriously doubt that 
parenting experts have the best intentions towards parents and their 
children: their understanding is informed by ethical demands too. An 
example that was already quoted89 in Ramaekers and Suissa (2012, 
20-21) can make this clear. The Belgian child psychiatrist Adriaenssens 
explains the aggressive behaviour of a schoolboy in terms of brain-
science. Understanding the boy’s misbehaviour in terms of the func-
tioning of parts of his brain is necessary in order to excuse him, give 
him a second chance in the eyes of the school principal. Doing this 
constitutes an act that for Adriaenssens apparently is strongly valued 
in Taylor’s sense of the word. Although the principal perhaps would 
like to expel the boy from school, Adriaenssens obviously believes it is 
better to try to understand his behaviour in terms of causal endocrino-
logical and neurological processes90. To fill the hiatus, I want to introduce 
89 See also footnote 60. 
90 And as such he is a figure of disengagement in the weak sense of the word. 
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the term ethics of causality as opposed to the ethics of hermeneutics 
that I started to develop in Chapter Four. What the latter requires is 
that one is interested in the boy’s story; that one wants to know what 
precisely it is that upset him; that one prefers an understanding in 
terms of his self-understanding and his understanding of the world91, 
or of what he deems important and so on. In contradistinction, an eth­
ics of causality prescribes that the boy’s misbehaviour should be 
understood in terms of a causal-mechanistic explanation. The Whole­
brain­child is a book that explains the behavior of children in causal-
mechanistic terms: 
‘Sibling rivalry is like so many other issues that make parenting 
difficult – tantrums, disobedience, homework battles, discipline 
matters, and so on. As we’ll explain in the coming chapters, these 
everyday parenting challenges result from a lack of integration 
within your child’s brain. The reason her brain isn’t always capa-
ble of integration is simple: it hasn’t had the time to develop. In 
fact, it’s got a long way to go, since a person’s brain isn’t consid-
ered fully developed until she reaches her mid-twenties.’ (WBC, 
9-10)
The way parents are advised to react is also informed by causal-mech-
anistic explanations. 
So that’s the bad news: you have to wait for your child’s brain to 
develop. That’s right. No matter how brilliant you think your pre-
schooler is, she does not have the brain of a ten-year-old, and won’t 
for several years. The rate of brain maturation is largely influenced 
by the genes we inherit. But the degree of integration may be 
exactly what we can influence in our day-to-day parenting.
91 Cf. Taylor 2016, 117: ‘I am using “world” in a Heidegger-derived sense to designate our sur-
roundings in their significance to us.’ 
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The good news is that by using everyday moments, you can influence 
how well your child’s brain grows toward integration. (WBC, 10)
This discussion raises the question of why one should prefer an ethics 
of hermeneutics, if both approaches constitute ethical behavior. On 
what points do they differ from each other? Causal explanations are 
external and imply third person perspectives: one must ignore the 
idiosyncratic self-understandings of those involved. An ethics of cau­
sality demands an effort to inform oneself as an expert by drawing on 
scientific findings, not necessarily in the field of education but also of 
psychology, endocrinology, neurosciences and so on. It requires that 
the expert listen very carefully to parents’ stories, not in order to 
understand what these mean for parents, but rather to explain what is 
happening from within scientific causal-mechanistic frameworks, and 
to subsume problems under more general categories. A personal con-
tact between the expert and the parent(s) is not required. An ethics of 
causality rather requires a disengagement on the part of the expert, for 
instance by abstaining from having more personal contact than is 
absolutely necessary, ignoring non-causal factors, withholding interest 
in meanings or feelings, and so on. This disengagement furthermore 
specifies a conception of ‘influence’ as causal too. 
Influence: causal or hermeneutical? 
When influence is conceived of as causal this means that there is no 
difference in principle between how ‘genes influence the maturation of 
a brain’ and how ‘parents influence the integration of the child’s brain’. 
We have seen however in Chapter Two that ‘influence’ can be con-
ceived of not only as causal but also as hermeneutical. We can draw on 
Dunne’s analyses of the classical Greek philosophical concepts poiesis 
(making) and praxis (doing) to spell out the difference between a 
causal-mechanistic interpretation of influence and a hermeneutical 
one. Poiesis means having ‘causal influence on the materials used’, 
while praxis means having ‘influence’ in a hermeneutical sense: one 
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never can predict completely how others will interpret one’s actions, 
and thus how they will react in response; and thus how they them-
selves will appear as persons to others and to themselves. 
[T]he agent is invested in his action more completely than the pro-
ducer is in his product. Whereas the latter can stand outside his 
materials and allow the productive process to be shaped by the 
impersonal form which he has objectively conceived, the agent on 
the other hand is constituted through the actions which disclose 
him both to others and to himself as the person that he is. He can 
never possess an idea of himself in the way that the craftsman pos-
sesses the form of his product; rather than his having any definitive 
‘what’ as blueprint for his actions or his life, he becomes and dis-
covers ‘who’ he is through these actions. And the medium for this 
becoming through action is not one over which he is sovereign 
master; it is, rather, a network of other people who are also agents 
and with whom he is bound up in relationships of interdepen-
dency. (Dunne 1997, 263)
And: 
When a craftsman ‘acts’ on suitable materials in order to produce 
an artefact which is comfortably within his or her proficiency, 
there is a predictability about success which is commensurate with 
this proficiency itself. However, when one’s actions are not imposed 
on materials but are directed toward other persons, such mastery 
is not attainable. One cannot determine in advance the efficacy of 
one’s words and deeds. Efficacy turns out to be a form of influence; 
it lies not so much in one’s own operation as in the cooperation of 
others. The nature and extent of this cooperation cannot be 
counted beforehand, and even afterwards one cannot be sure just 
what it has been. (ibid, 359, emphasis mine)
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I believe that the distinction between and ethics of causality and an 
ethics of hermeneutics is a useful way in which to understand the dif-
ferent conceptions of ‘influence’ discussed here.
Problems with a one-sided adhering to  
an ethics of causality 
There are many reasons92 to be at least cautious before engaging 
uncritically in an ethics of causality: 
(1) Inequality is introduced. An ethics of causality tends to take 
away a hermeneutical idea of influence and replace it with the idea 
of influence as (blind) causality, on the level of neurology and endo-
crinology as well as on the interpersonal relational level: When one 
does a and b, c and d will follow. This means outcomes are guaran-
teed if one follows the right procedures. Parents do not really need 
to know how the mechanisms work. The rule is: Experts (need to) 
know; parents (have to) execute. Parents can never become masters 
in the different scientific fields. Inequality or an asymmetric relation 
is thus installed. Parents will always need the expert’s advice. Of 
course, parents cannot really be blamed for what they un-knowingly 
do wrong. This is perhaps one reason why so many efforts are 
invested in providing parents with the necessary knowledge. An 
informed parent cannot invoke ignorance as an excuse when things 
do go wrong.
(2) Parents have a ‘thin’ identity. An ethics of causality will not help 
experts or counsellors in the field of child rearing to see parents in 
a holistic way: next to parents they are also, for instance, spouses, 
or employees, or friends or daughters or sons, and so on. Next to 
92 What I enumerate here are not like the results of an investigation in the field of natural sci-
ences. In that sense they are not ‘new’. I rather revisit preliminary insights, or perhaps re-
articulate them, and I believe that my investigations provide the necessary background 
that allows for these (re-)interpretations. 
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educational beings they are also existential, moral and political beings. 
Therefore, an ethics of causality will help to give answers only to a 
very small part of parents’ questions. 
(3) Trust is an irrelevant category. There is a ‘skein’ of meanings that 
links causality with knowledge, a lack of confidence and even para-
noia, as the Furedi example shows. If you as a parent have a lack of 
necessary knowledge to raise your child (i.e., if you accept this 
‘framing’), then you cannot trust yourself, or your instincts, or your 
friends or family. Still, you will need to trust someone who claims to 
have this knowledge. (In the technical parenting (support) account 
that I tried to articulate in the fourth chapter, a lack of knowledge 
in parents is presupposed, expected, maybe one could even say ‘con-
structed’.) An ethics of causality puts more weight on ‘knowing’ 
than on ‘trusting’, whereas being a parent opens a space of ques-
tions that cannot be completely answered by providing them with 
more knowledge. 
(4) That parents can have an active supportive role is neglected. An 
ethics of causality doesn’t help parents to see that they are not only in 
need of support, but that they themselves can also develop all kinds of 
initiatives where they as parents are supportive of other parents, chil-
dren or their communities and the society in which they live. 
(5) Parental self­understanding is not considered important. An ethics 
of causality will not consider the worries parents might have about 
who they will become (in their own eyes and the eyes of people whom 
they consider important) when they execute the experts’ wisdom. Par-
ents are first and foremost executors.
So, it is necessary to further develop an ethics of hermeneutics in par-
ent support, whatever form it takes, where understanding is preferred 
over explanation, and involvement over disengagement. This is not to 
say however that there would be no room left for causal explanation: 
it may be very important to understand how digestion works in an 
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infant, or what it means that certain parts of the brain haven’t yet fully 
developed in a teenager. But these causal explanations should play a 
more modest role. In any event, scientific frameworks should never 
frame93 parents (Chapter Three), because this framing entails the self-
evident, dominant use of causal explanations. 
Parental momentum vs. counselling momentum
Within the technical parenting (support) account that I sketched in 
Chapter Four, the promise is that if parents engage with their children 
in an objective, neutral and scientifically informed way, there will be 
good ‘outcomes’. Within the technical parenting (support) account, 
parenting experts are framed as disengaged agents as well. In Chapter 
Four I offered, in a kind of countermovement, a preliminary account 
of a normative framework of the parent counsellor as a figure of 
strong engagement. 
I want to use a distinction that is made by Heidegger in Being and 
Time in order to conceive of parent counselling momentum, as 
opposed to the parental momentum I introduced in Chapter Four. 
For Heidegger (1962, 158-159) there is a continuum of forms of car-
ing for others, or solicitude, of which there are two extreme possi-
bilities. The first one
(…) can, as it were, take away ‘care’ from the Other and put itself 
in his position in concern: it can leap in for him. This kind of 
solicitude takes over for the Other that with which he is to concern 
93 Framing typically puts the onus of proof with the one who has been ‘framed’. When a small 
and marginal group of terrorists founds the ‘Islamic State’, and for instance governments 
like the Belgian accept this ‘framing’ in their communication, then the huge majority of 
Muslims will need to explain and convince others that they are not terrorists. In a similar 
sense, it becomes very difficult for parents to claim that they do not need any support from 
experts, be it psychologists, neuroscientists, endocrinologists and so on (Thanks to Najib 
Tuzani for making me aware of the analogy).  
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himself. The Other is thus thrown out of his own position; he steps 
back so that afterwards, when the matter has been attended to, he 
can either take it over as something finished and at his disposal, or 
disburden himself of it completely. In such solicitude the Other can 
become one who is dominated and dependent, even if this domina-
tion is a tacit one and remains hidden from him. 
The second extreme
(…) does not so much leap in for the Other as leap ahead of him 
in his existentiell potentiality-for-Being, not in order to take away 
his ‘care’ but rather to give it back to him authentically as such for 
the first time. This kind of solicitude pertains essentially to authen-
tic care – that is, to the existence of the other, not to a ‘what’ with 
which he is concerned; it helps the Other to become transparent to 
himself in his care and to become free for it.
I interpret ‘leaping ahead’ in the context of supporting parents to mean 
that there’s a ‘realisation’ of parents’ worries in a double sense of the 
word: parents become aware of the problems they have, this is they 
become real for them, they realize they have them; and the problems 
become a reality shared by parent and professional. This means the 
parent counsellor will need to be able to endure the existence of the 
problems or worries without giving in to the inclination to do some-
thing about them, or to counsel parents by giving them advice, or to 
simply take the problems out of their hands and to become as such a 
better parent for the child. 
This ‘caring’ relationship applies to the parent-child relationship as 
well as the parent counsellor or parenting expert-parent relationship. 
Let me apply this continuum to child rearing itself, through an exam-
ple. When a child is young, it is considered appropriate to be on the 
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‘leaping in’ side of the spectrum94, but the child becoming older will 
demand a shifting towards the other extreme. When e.g. a baby cries 
and is hungry, or is in some kind of pain, then a caring adult has to 
feed it or comfort it. When a sixteen-year-old boy has to do a project 
for school, it would not be considered appropriate for parents to per-
form this task in his place. He needs, rather, encouragement. His task 
has to be given back to himself, as something he has to deal with, 
whether he likes it or not. One might say still – and here I am saying 
more than Heidegger did –, that a rich and full form of care implies 
the possibility of moving from one side to the other on the continuum, 
or to be on different sides at the same time. When the sixteen-year-old 
son is very ill, his mother or father might still want to comfort him or 
take away his pain. This might be an example of ‘parental momentum’. 
Analogously there are situations imaginable where parents would like 
experts they consult to decide in their place and to literally take the 
care of their children out of their hands, for examples in some cases of 
severe medical or psychiatric problems. Then experts would be on the 
leaping in side of the care continuum, at the demand of the parents. 
On the other side of the continuum an expert can try to listen to the 
parents’ worries as they articulate them themselves, and help them, 
encourage them to hold on, not by taking away their concerns, but by 
giving these concerns back to the parents as something they have to 
deal with and that ultimately can never be taken away from them, no 
matter how hard one tries to (re)frame them as neuropsychological or 
developmental psychological issues. Maybe an expert could under-
stand that even in the former case, where parents ask them to take 
94 This is reminiscent of what Langeveld (1965) would have called the grown-up acting as a 
substitute of the child. As Ramaekers (Forthcoming) points out, for Langeveld this ‘substi-
tution’ is a matter for the grownup of finding the right balance as the child is growing up, 
since the child, being active in the process of upbringing, has ‘an increasing duty to autono-
mously fulfill her task in life’. Ramaekers (Forthcoming) further explains: ‘As long as the child 
is not yet capable of placing herself under the authority of a higher moral order, the 
grownup takes responsibility instead of the child. The grownup acts as a substitute for the 
child. She acts, literally, in the child’s stead as long as the child is not capable of acting her-
self (i.e., acting responsibly). Clearly this “substitution” is a matter for the grownup of finding 
the right balance as the child is growing up, since the child, being active in the process of 
upbringing, has “an increasing duty to autonomously fulfill her task in life” (§15).’ 
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over, parents will probably always need the support that is given in the 
latter case, where they are as it were ‘given back their problems or 
worries as something they have to deal with themselves’. This counsel­
ling momentum may not be possible, however. An ethics of causality 
implies that it is the professional who knows more: only the expert 
knows what is really going on in the child (conceived of as an organ-
ism), or in the parent-child-interaction, because (s)he has epistemic 
access to the causal-mechanistic universe that the parent does not 
have. This means it is the expert and the expert alone who knows 
what has to be done. An ethics of causality will urge him to convince 
the ‘executors’ of the right way to act. An ethics of causality prevents 
the expert from being able to move freely from the ‘leaping in’ side of 
the continuum to the ‘leaping ahead’ side, because this would imply 
that (s)he is capable of just being there, without giving advice, only 
listening to the parents’ stories. But knowing urges execution. So the 
parenting expert is in principle (unless (s)he leaves the ethics of causal-
ity behind) not capable of moving to the other side of the continuum. 
But if, on the other hand, a parent counselor (as a figure of engage-
ment in the strong sense) really wants to be supportive of parents, they 
will need to be able to move freely, if necessary, over the continuum, 
and sometimes it will be helpful and necessary to hold still at the ‘leap-
ing in’ side. 
For all these reasons, causal-mechanistic logics should never be domi-
nant and taken for granted; they should never become the ‘default set-
ting’ when the purpose is to really support parents. So the predominant 
parenting (support) account is in need of revision. In order for parent 
support to be humane, I take it to be necessary that parents are always 
listened to and taken seriously in their unique and idiosyncratic situa-
tions, applying an ethics of hermeneutics. No book, nor website nor 
any other form of personal or impersonal parenting support that only 
draws on causal-mechanistic explanations can offer this. 
However, as it is easier and cheaper for politicians and policymakers 
to provide mass information through websites, for instance, than to 
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engage and train parent-counsellors or try to find new, more personal 
ways of supporting parents, it is not unlikely that in the future an ethics 
of causality will continue to prevail in parent(ing) support. 
What we learn from the case of ‘parenting support’ is that we need to 
retrieve from our late-modern moral backgrounds the far receded idea 
that backgrounds or contexts are necessary to make sense of things, a 
fortiori when it concerns children and their parents. The idea that 
context has a special import in epistemology is traced back by Taylor 
(1995b) to Kant’s transcendental deduction as it was an original 
critique of the atomist view of empiricist modern philosophers. He 
sees Wittgenstein and Heidegger as very important figures in a holistic 
philosophical tradition. But both in fact broadened the scope: context 
is not only a necessary condition to know, but also to do and to live, 
to go about things in the world. 
This dissertation contributes to this philosophical literature through 
an analysis of the case of our parenting (support) culture. By expand-
ing the field of application of these originally philosophical critiques 
this dissertation in fact contributes to both fields. It makes philosophy 
into a richer domain that stands closer to what human beings (for 
instance as parents) are concerned about. It also brings a significant 
philosophical dimension to critique of contemporary parenting cul-
ture. Finally, a philosophical approach contributes to the development 
of normative frameworks that are of interest to professionals who are 
actually supporting parents. 
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Ganz befriedigt durch den Eindruck  
eines Kunstwerks sind wir nur dann,  
wenn er etwas hinterlässt, das wir,  
bei allem Nachdenken darüber,  
nicht bis zur Deutlichkeit eines Begriffs  
herabziehen können.
We are entirely satisfied by the impression  
of a work of art only when it leaves  
behind something that, in spite of all  
our reflections on it, we cannot bring down  
to the distinctness of a concept.
— Arthur Schopenhauer
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